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ON
THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Briefing No. 1

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

Following the recent death of the Palestinian President on 11 November 2004 some claimed there was an opportunity for peace in the region while others considered a secure peace had become more difficult. Taking all relevant factors into account, by what means can Israel and the Palestinian Authority secure a state of peace and avoid a state of war?

PREFACE

The Declaration of Trust constituting the International Peace Project[2000] was executed on 2 November 2002 and IPP was registered as a charity (no. 1101966) by the Charity Commission for England and Wales on 6 February 2004. Its objects are 'the advancement by all charitable means of the education of the public in the differing means of securing a state of peace and avoiding a state of war.' These objects include the precise wording used by the Court of Appeal, in its judgment of 28 June 2000 in the case of *Re Project on Demilitarisation* (Prodem), of an educational programme that would promote public benefit. The International Peace Project (IPP) is, therefore, founded on this case law.

The primary strategy for achieving the IPP objects is the 'Peace Games 2004' which comprise competing analyses of global and regional conflicts published simultaneously in a series of 'briefings', supplemented by public seminars. The briefings are aimed at all those individuals and organisations concerned with security and, in particular, the balance between military and peaceful means of resolving disputes within and between nations.

IPP is run by an international group of Trustees: Dr Oleg Barabanov [Russia]; Shiraz Ebrahim; Dr Edward Mogire; Dr Joe Oshomuvwe [USA]; David Parsons; Jon Peacock; and Air Vice Marshal Mohammed Umaru (retired) [Nigeria]. To illustrate the IPP strategy the Trustees launched the trial peace games, focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in December 2004 and this Briefing No. 1 is the result. *However, the contents of this briefing are not to be taken as reflecting the views of IPP or its Trustees.*

Contributors

As a result of a literature review, which I carried out in January 2005, two academics were invited by the Hon. Secretary, on behalf of the trustees, to participate with me in these trial peace games. Professor Israeli was able to do so, by reviewing draft Chapter 1, and although Cheryl Rubenberg was unable to review Chapter 2, due to another publishing commitment, she was content for her work to be used by me in this way.

Professor Raphael Israeli is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies and of East Asian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is author of War, Peace and Terror in the Middle East (Frank Cass, 2003) as well as some 15 books and 100 articles on Middle Eastern, Chinese and Islamic Affairs.

Cheryl A. Rubenberg is an independent analyst and former associate professor at Florida International University who has written on US policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for more than twenty five years. She is author of The Palestinians in Search of a Just Peace (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

Peter M. Southwood has a BA (Hons) and Ph.D from Bradford University's Department of Peace Studies and a MBA from Warwick University. His doctoral thesis in 1987 was on 'Arms Conversion and the United Kingdom Defence Industry'. He co-founded Prodem in 1992 before becoming IPP promoter from June 2000 until September 2004.

How To Use This Briefing

By setting three contrasting methods of understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict side-by-side, in a common format, the reader should be able more easily to:

(i) Compare and contrast these approaches to assess where the truth lies;
(ii) Judge the soundness of these analyses against future events in the region.
(iii) Decide whether this strategy for predicting peace or war is better than any other.

The appendices provide relevant background information from other sources, which may be especially useful to those less familiar with the conflict. Readers are encouraged to feedback their views to the Trustees. (See the IPP web site for details on how to do this.)

Acknowledgements

Ten years after writing the last of the Prodem briefings, which outlined the concept of the 'peace games' (though it was not called that then) I find myself writing the whole of the first IPP Briefing. I am, though, particularly grateful for the direct participation of Professor Israeli and the indirect involvement of Cheryl Rubenberg since IPP seeks the widest possible participation and range of methods for analysing conflict. Finding 'contestants' or contributors to the peace games has been, perhaps surprisingly, a long and difficult process. Yet the role of creative conflict in opposition to conventional wisdom is vital to ascertain and disseminate the truth. Consequently I would also like to acknowledge with sincere appreciation the role played by the many individuals and institutions involved in Prodem and the legal case in making possible this IPP briefing.

The publication of IPP Briefing No. 1 was approved in September 2005 by five of the Trustees, two abstaining from the decision on the grounds of their prior friendship with me. I accept sole responsibility for any errors or omissions remaining in this briefing. As I hope to participate in future peace games this is the only IPP briefing I will edit. Future contributions, if there are too many of high quality to publish, would be anonymised to ensure selection of the best by the Trustees on the basis of: technical merit; objective criteria for judging outcomes in conflict areas; and political balance. By these means it is intended to avoid any bias or unfair advantage to me as the pioneer of this strategy.

This first briefing is being funded by voluntary effort, in terms of time and gifts in kind, until the value of predicting peace or war is recognised and rewarded by grant making bodies or public subscription. The costs of establishing IPP itself up to registration as a charity has been met almost entirely by me. However, the support and encouragement of the seven founding trustees (most of whom are from developing countries or countries in transition), has been critical for both setting up the Trust and publishing this briefing.

Peter Southwood
Special Editor, Briefing No. 1

SUMMARY: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE

Introduction
Professor Israeli's recent work is particularly concerned with terrorism and incitement, which has contributed greatly to the increasing level of violence in the Middle East.

Historical Background
While the Palestinian issue has been central to the setback to the peace process much of it has been aided by global Islamic terrorism. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 it has become apparent that Islamic radicalism, unlike Muslim conservatism under pro-Western protection, could escape that Western orbit and win vast popular support in the process of rebellion. The West and Israel's dilemma in the war on Islamic terrorism is that success requires as allies mostly autocratic regimes, where terror is based, opposed to democracy which the West rushes to support when Islamic parties come in sight of power.

Method of Analysing the Conflict
Parties to a conflict must be aware of the quantitative versus qualitative aspects of every item under negotiation. The former are measurable and capable of compromise but the latter are value-laden and non-negotiable. Under this method qualitative issues must be dealt with first, mitigated by quantitative concessions, and only when they are being resolved might other quantitative issues be solved more easily.

Analysis
The analysis covers the following topics:
- The relationship between politics and Islam amongst Palestinians (including 'jihad');
- Education in Palestinian schools;
- The peace with Egypt;
- Islamic terrorism (the mind-sets behind 'Islamikaze' and Islamic martyrology);
- Peace and its demise (comparing the Israel-Jordan agreement in 1994 with the Oslo Accords of 1993-95).

Conclusions
Following occupation of more Arab lands through war Israel's 'land for peace' formula was calculated to pay Arabs in quantity as a balanced *quid pro quo* for their qualitative approval of Israel. Although this formula seemed feasible with Egypt and Jordan, on whose land Israel had no designs, the Palestinians reject it for qualitative reasons.

Criteria for Evaluating Outcomes
Paradoxically, by compromising before negotiations begin Israel invites pressures for more. It needs to stand firmly, wait out the Palestinians, and not to yield one inch without a proper *quid pro quo*. Israel must seek a peace of reciprocity, tested over a protracted period, insisting that the agreed upon is implemented before any further step is taken.

Recommendations
(1) No negotiation with Arabs is possible while violence or incitement is pursued; and (2) Arabs must be willing to share historical and religious sites of importance to both sides.

SUMMARY: A PALESTINIAN PERSPECTIVE

Introduction
For Cheryl Rubenberg the core of the problem for most people, in understanding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is that Westerners tend to identify with Israel and generally are unable to see, let alone understand or empathise with the condition of the Palestinians.

Historical Background
The origins and development of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the late nineteenth century through to the early 1990s is used to provide insight into Palestinian positions in the peace process and clarify 'why Palestinians insist on achieving a viable independent state in the remaining 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine (e.g., the West Bank and Gaza).' The major themes inspiring the Palestinian national movement to the present time are: injustice, dispossession, statelessness and fear of transfer; occupation, resistance, steadfastness and the significance of land; plight of refugees and sacredness of Jerusalem.

Method of Analysing the Conflict
This approach contrasts Israel, as one of the strongest states in the global system, backed unreservedly by the United States as the dominant superpower, with the Palestinians as a dispersed people, dispossessed from their land. These power disparities are highlighted to show how Israeli power represses the Palestinians and threatens their security.

Analysis
The analysis covers the following topics:
- The Oslo Accords and Agreements, 1993-2000; and the resulting impact on
- Palestinians' quality of life in the occupied territories;
- Jewish settler violence against Palestinians;
- Jerusalem;
- The Palestinian Authority;
- The role of the United States of America in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- The Al-Aqsa (or Second) Intifada from 2000.

Conclusions
The future for the Palestinians looked bleak (as at late 2002). At the same time the Israeli government expressed satisfaction at its military success and promised not to negotiate with Palestinians until they gave up their intifada. However, many of its traditional European allies opposed its approach to the Palestinians and imposed various sanctions.

Criteria for Evaluating Outcomes
'… the solution is for Israel to end the occupation of the territories it conquered in 1967 and to allow the Palestinians to establish a viable, independent state alongside Israel.'

Recommendations
'Power of a Different Kind' highlights the potential inherent in grassroots movements to have an important impact on global politics, including Palestine, in the years ahead.

SUMMARY: AN IRENICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

In 'aiming… at peace' Peter Southwood claims *these 'peace games' involve foreseeing whether the evil effects of war are likely to be avoided and consequent emphasis put on peaceful, rather than military, techniques for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*.

Historical background

The much longer history of conflict between Muslims and Jews (and of both with Christians) is relevant here because there must be real doubt as to whether a political settlement between competing Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms over land would be sustainable in the long term without a 'peace settlement' between these three monotheistic faiths. In considering the claims of competing religions, in their common search for peace, each faith community must be understood through its own eyes rather than by the imposition of alien values or doctrines based on a different religious tradition.

Method of Analysing the Conflict

The Israeli government and Palestinian National Authority in mid-2005 have three common assumptions covering the military, economic and institutional dimensions of security. The analysis of these assumptions relies on 'the balance of peace', which is the relative weight each party gives to peaceful, rather than military, techniques for resolving the conflict. *The thesis here is that over the long term it is the balance of peace rather than the balance of power that will decide the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*.

Analysis

The analysis covers the following topics:

- The Arab-Israeli military balance, including war scenario predictions and jihad;
- Economic independence or integration between the Israeli and Palestinian economies;
- A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including lessons from the Oslo process, and the potential role of education in creating a culture of peace.

Conclusions

The prediction is for periodic war between Israel and the Palestinian movement:

- **until the greater jihad assumes priority in practice over the lesser jihad; and**
- **peaceful initiatives, like the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, can assume priority in practice over political and military strength.**

Criteria for Evaluating Outcomes

If 'a' applies despite the lack of progress on 'b' or 'c', the conclusions will be refuted:

a. Armed conflict is contained rather than resulting in a wider Middle Eastern war;
b. The Islamic practice of jihad moves from a culture of war to a culture of peace;
c. Israel gives greater emphasis to peaceful means of conflict resolution.

Recommendations

As there can be *no peace without mercy* the primary role of education, within charity law, needs to be recognised in evaluating the peace process with fairness and compassion.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

C^4I/BM	- Command, Control, Communication and Computers, Intelligence/ Battlefield Management
CIA	- Central Intelligence Agency
EU	- European Union
GDP	- gross domestic product
GNP	- gross national product
IDF	- Israeli Defence Forces
IISS	- The International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMA	- Israel Manufacturers Association
IPP	- International Peace Project
MENA	- Middle East and North Africa (conference)
NGOs	- non-governmental organisations
OECD	- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PADICO	- Palestine Development and Investment Company
Paltrade	- Palestinian Trade Centre
PLC	- Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	- Palestine Liberation Organisation
PNA (or PA)	- Palestinian National Authority
PNC	- Palestine National Council
UN	- United Nations
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNRWA	- United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCO	- United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories
UNSCOP	- United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
USA	- United States of America

Conventions

Arabic and Hebrew names are spelt in the manner used by the authority cited and no attempt has been made to harmonise the spelling of names by different authorities.

Direct quotations from authorities are either indented without quotation marks (long quotations) or put in single quotation marks (short quotations). The use of bullet points, dashes or numbered paragraphs normally indicates that the work(s) cited have been paraphrased rather than directly quoted.

References are given in full on first citation, at the end of the chapter or appendix, and in abbreviated form thereafter based on the first author's surname and date of publication (if more than one). Where one authority quotes another or relies upon another for statistical evidence then that source is also cited wherever possible.

1. AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Raphael Israeli's recent book, War, Peace and Terror in the Middle East, is particularly concerned with terrorism and incitement which has contributed greatly to the increasing level of violence in that volatile region of the world.[1] It has eroded the hopes for peace inherent in the process initiated by President Sadat of Egypt and Israeli Prime Minister Begin in 1977 such that all efforts to repeat that feat between Israel and the Palestinians have been frustrated so far. The current world crisis, brought about by the terrorism and attacks against Western culture that al-Qa'ida and its allies have orchestrated, may lead to new strategic thinking, altering allegiances and alliances to produce a new world order.

This chapter offers an IPP review, written by Peter Southwood, of Israeli's book within the standard headings for each contribution to this trial peace game, aimed at ease of comparison. Raphael Israeli has read and corrected this summary. His main comments are:

- As the contents below make clear, it is the wider Arab-Israeli conflict or the emerging Muslim-Jewish (and Christian) conflict which has to be tackled.[2] The focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reflected in the title of this Briefing, is very restrictive and misleading.
- While this review covers many of my writings, the most pivotal are also the most recent: Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology and The Iraq War: Hidden Agendas and Babylonian Intrigue where key themes are dealt with more fully.[3]
- In general, though, the summary below is a fair and commendable one.

Minor corrections to the review were also made as a result of Professor Israeli's response.

1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

While the Palestinian issue has been central to the setback to the peace process much of it has been aided and abetted by 'rejectionists', global Islamic terrorism and even President Mubarak's Egypt. It is not coincidental that Palestinian lack of restraint and the outbreak of the Intifada in 2000, which undid that peace process, came on the heels of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. This encouraged Hamas and associated groups to copy the Iranian backed Hizbullah's model of fighting Israel into submission. Likewise it is not accidental that the incitement to further violence, led by the Palestinian Authority, has been based on the above themes and the current wave of Islamic terrorism has resonated strongly with, and received support from, many ordinary Palestinians.[4]

The world-wide war on terrorism, which followed the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, requires awareness of not only the stage at which this new form of terrorism emerged but also the vocabulary and definitions that describe and control it. Some 56 countries (as at early 2003) in Asia and Africa were Muslim, or mainly so, and

significant Muslim minorities have been settling in Western countries in recent decades thus enabling fundamentalist trends to establish themselves with support from radical Islamic regimes especially Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan.

> Without attributing specific blame to Islam as a faith, or to Muslim countries as political entities, it is nonetheless a fact that many current domestic and international conflicts are led by Muslims, in the name of Islam, from Muslim countries, or under their wings, or by Muslim minorities under non-Islamic rule. This must signify something in terms of Muslim ideological involvement in terror, and especially the grass-root support it seems to have among large portions of the Muslim populace, notwithstanding Muslim governments' attempts at concealment.[5]

Prior to 11 September many countries that harboured terrorism could ascribe the horrors to 'suicide-bombers' but, thereafter, the West focused on the bases from which terrorists emanated and by targeting al-Qa'ida leaders the USA acknowledged to the world that the authors of terror are fanatical killers, rather than 'frustrated' and unpredictable suicides, who might more aptly be nicknamed 'Islamikaze' (as defined in section 1.4.4 below).

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 it has become apparent that Islamic radicalism, unlike Muslim conservatism under pro-Western protection, could escape that Western orbit and win vast popular support in the process of rebellion. Furthermore, in contrast to the corrupt and illegitimate rulers allied to the West whom they replaced, the Islamic Revolution derived its legitimacy from Islam and sharia law and its leaders had a reputation for great integrity that sustained still more their popularity. [6]

Although there is nothing new in the globalisation of Islamic terrorism it was the West's short-sighted policies – reflecting public opinion that reacts to actual disasters, not to potential dangers, however serious – that declined to recognise the situation as it was. This process of globalisation occurred during the 1980s and 1990s along three parallel and sometimes overlapping pathways:

- *International terrorism*, sponsored by the Iranian Revolution;
- *The Afghanis* – volunteers from Arab and other Muslim states who had been supported by the USA and its proxies to help defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s and then returned to their own countries, highly motivated and determined to replace their governments with Islamic regimes;
- *Al-Qa'ida*, fanatical Sunni Muslims, who disagreed with their Shi'ite rivals in Iran over leadership of the global Islamic Revolution. They were concerned with building an international terrorist network funded by Muslim donors[7]

The dilemma which the West and Israel faces, in their war against global Islamic terrorism, is that success requires as allies countries that have, or are near to, terrorist bases but most of those regimes are autocratic, opposed to democracy and at odds with their populations, subjected in turn to anti-Western and anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement down the years. Even where the West promotes democracy, as soon as Islamic

parties come in sight of power due to popular support then the West rushes to assist the existing autocratic and secular governments thereby disregarding popular views. It may be better for the West to encourage the democratic process and take the consequences instead of taking sides between Islamic fundamentalists and their oppressors.[8]

1.3 METHOD OF ANALYSING THE CONFLICT

Israeli's approach to negotiations relating to difficult conflicts amongst nations, first developed in 1995, is to differentiate between what the parties consider to be 'negotiable' and what they regard as 'non-negotiable' under any conditions. For some issues are more amenable to compromise than others. Negotiable items normally affect measurable objects, the giving up of which entails only a material or monetary loss (e.g. land), but if this can be compensated for by acquiring other assets or gaining something else in return then give and take is possible. That is a *quantitative* argument: measurable, negotiable, and capable of compromise. However, when parties put forward value-laden arguments then, by definition, 'value' is not quantifiable and may be of great importance to one side but insignificant to another. A contested value can be moral, cultural or religious and it becomes completely non-negotiable and unchangeable. This is a *qualitative* discourse.[9]

Thus it is vital for parties to a conflict to be aware of the quantitative versus qualitative nature of the parameters of every problem on the agenda for negotiations. Such mutual awareness may lead to compensatory mechanisms whereby qualitative issues can be accepted provided there is a quantitative *quid pro quo* for the accepting party. Even in those situations where a party to a conflict seeks to denigrate others as an act of faith a gradual process of quantitative concessions may offset a qualitative refusal to compromise by the other party. It might, though, be a grave mistake to try to resolve the quantitative issues first and leave the qualitative issues to the end of the process because then the pool of quantitative *quid pro quos* will be depleted by the time qualitative issues come to be addressed. Consequently, under this method, the qualitative issues must be dealt with first by mitigating them with quantitative concessions and only, when they are being resolved, might the other quantitative issues be solved more easily.[10]

This approach is applied to the Oslo Accords of 1993-5 between Israel and the Palestinians, by comparison to the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, in section 1.4.5 below.

1.4 ANALYSIS

1.4.1 The Relationship Between Politics and Islam Amongst Palestinians

Paradoxically, Muslim movements could thrive under Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 because it permitted them scope to undertake open activities provided they did not break the law. On the other hand, Israeli impacts on the economic, social and political life of the Palestinians assisted the destruction of the remaining vestiges of their old structures and fealties and brought rapid modernisation. This enraged Muslim fundamentalists who thought that Israel was thereby subverting traditional Islamic society

and converting it from Islam. When mixed with the fertile soil of anti-Israeli sentiment nourished by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), who had also rejected Israeli rule for reasons of secular nationalism, the seeds of confrontation between fundamentalists and the Israelis were sown.[11]

Consequently the sudden emergence of Hamas during the first Intifada (in 1987) contained most Islamic fundamentalist currents of the day. However, such groups did not monopolise these Islamic traits because mainstream Palestinian nationalism has utilised Islam in describing enemies, drawing implications for types of action against them and in defining the nature of the Palestinian struggle so as to link religious and secular ideas.

As an example, 'jihad' (to be explained shortly) is linked with the armed struggle of the PLO against Zionism, which is itself considered an extension of imperialism. Both concepts are brought together in a contemporary interpretation of the first historical armed entry of the West into the Muslim world since the Crusaders. So when the PLO characterises its casualties as 'shahada' (martyrs) and its guerrillas as 'fedayeen' (self-sacrificers), it suggests the Muslim idea of redemption to be attained by dying for one's faith. Likewise the modern struggle calls to mind the old Muslim-Jewish enmity during the time of the Prophet.[12]

The PLO's use of Islamic symbols – especially Jerusalem as a capital city – reflects the importance of Islam in Palestinian culture. Whereas, though, the Palestinian Authority seeks to control Islam the fundamentalists are so passionate and impatient in their desire to turn Islam into a way of life that they challenge secular nationalism. The scholar Bernard Lewis has demonstrated that Arafat's name (Abu Ammar) and his rhetoric had Islamic implications. It may be added that having frequently used the symbols of Islam to depict himself as an Islamic, not just a national, leader he could not then disengage from such imagery in the process of state-building.[13]

The Hudaybiyya Model

The importance of the events at Hudaybiyya has become a model for generations of Muslims and its adaptation by Muslim religious and political leaders points to the abiding relevance of that precedent when negotiating peace with the enemy. Sadat's peace with Israel was legitimated through the Mufti of Al-Azhar who cited the Hudaybiyya model while Arafat and others referred to this precedent in relation to the Oslo Accords.[14]

According to eminent scholars specialising in early Islam, the Hudaybiyya story began in 628 AD[15] when the Prophet of Islam, already well founded in Medina, commanded his followers to go to the sanctuary of Mecca, his native city, which had become the focus of Islamic worship. However, on approaching Mecca at Hudaybiyya, the Quraysh tribe (originally the Prophet's own) would not allow the Muslims to enter their city. Instead an agreement was reached permitting the Muslims to enter Mecca the following year. The year after that, in 630, the Prophet sought to conquer the city citing, as a justification for war, the violation of one of the terms of the treaty of Hudaybiyya. This had stated that not only should the parties refrain from battle during the next ten years but also none of their

client tribes should attack those of the other party's. The conquest of Mecca, called 'al-fath' in Islamic tradition, resulted in both the occupation of the city and taking control of the Ka'ba shrine, which became the main sanctuary of Islam. These are the essential elements of the story though many questions remain.[16]

The great importance of the Hudaybiyya model lies in its application and consequences. For the Prophet, who in Islamic tradition could do no wrong, made concessions since he wished to avoid battle on two fronts – with the Jews of Khaybar and also the Quraysh of Mecca – because of the danger of exposing his city of Medina to the attack of the one if he waged war on the other. These concessions incensed his followers including 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, later the second Caliph of Islam (634-44). However, they proved to be 'for the benefit of Muslims' when the Prophet first defeated the Jews of Khaybar, an ally of the Quraysh of Mecca whom they were bound to assist but could not do so under the treaty of Hudaybiyya; then used the Quraysh treaty violation to take Mecca by force.[17]

Before applying this model to the Oslo Accords the notion of 'jihad' must be understood.

Jihad and Jerusalem

Jihad is the underlying Islamic justification for starting a war against an enemy. (See also Appendix E of this Briefing for an Islamic view.) In shari'a law it has one main meaning: a military action designed to expand the outer boundaries of the realm of Islam or to protect the boundaries of Dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam or, literally, the House of Islam) from usurping unbelievers. This idea is based on the belief that Islam is the latest and most valid revelation, which has come to replace other monotheistic religions.[18]

Under Islam jihad is the only valid war because the Faith, being universal, requires hostilities to be directed only against non-Muslims so Muslims should not wage war against each other. Most Muslim countries have refrained in practice, due to theological and practical considerations, from pursuing the notion of jihad which, in theory, could pit the Muslim community against the rest of the world until it is brought under Islamic rule. As a result wars against Israel including wars of terror by Hamas and others are described as jihad. This concept can, though, apply to defensive wars and, in the case of Arab-Israeli wars, Muslims would claim that since Palestine is part of their heritage and the establishment of the state of Israel was an act of aggression it is the duty of Muslims to defend their land through jihad. Although the attempt to limit jihad to a defensive, rather than offensive, role has its advocates and some scholars detect a similar train of thought in the Prophet's early work, the violent interpretation still prevails in the modern world especially by fundamentalists in respect of Israel.[19]

Arafat's repeated calls for jihad were usually concentrated on Jerusalem. In that respect jihad was described as a 'qital' (battle), a 'struggle until victory', that required 'sacrifices and martyrdom' – words that do not have a peaceful connotation. Jerusalem was given the role that Mecca had in the history of the Prophet, in order to mobilise the populace, and Arafat vowed to enter as victor as Caliph 'Umar did, according to Islamic tradition.[20]

Historical Patterns

The similarities between the Prophet and 'Umar's plans and actions in Islamic tradition and Arafat's words and behaviour offer an illuminating and explicit parallel:

(i.) Like the Prophet who made uncomfortable concessions in Hudaybiyya, under compulsion of events, so Arafat (with the Israelis playing the role of the Quraysh tribe) had to do the same with the Oslo Accords. An implication is that he would know when to extract himself as the Prophet did – this is Arafat's answer to Islamic critics;

(ii.) Parallel to the Prophet's entry into Mecca two years into a ten-year treaty Arafat pledges to enter Jerusalem and pray in al-Aqsa mosque to attain victory;

(iii.) If the peace accords are violated then the Palestinians are not bound by them just as 'Umar himself had despised the peace of Hudaybiyya while the Prophet, who also disliked it, had the foresight to adopt it but repeal it when necessary.

(iv.) In Islamic tradition it is acknowledged that the vast military superiority of the Muslims meant that the Quraysh would not have dared to attack them but their client tribes' attack on the client tribes of the Prophet vindicated his cancellation of the Hudaybiyya Treaty. Even on this view it may be asked how Arafat could know six months after Oslo that the Israelis would break their obligation to the point where his jihad into Jerusalem could be justified?[21]

1.4.2 Education in Palestinian Schools

The Oslo Accords and agreements placed obligations on both parties to eliminate aspects of incitement, including hostile propaganda, from their respective public school systems. (See also Appendix F of this Briefing.) The revising of Israeli textbooks had started before Oslo, and independently of it, under the influence of young Israeli historians who demonstrated that many 'facts' and 'events' in Israeli history were one-sided, partial and misleading. For example, these 'New Historians' found that many Palestinian refugees were expelled from battlefield zones and had not left voluntarily as previously claimed.[22]

An investigation of Palestinian textbooks, commissioned or adopted by the Palestinian Authority, highlighted:

> … the conviction which the Authority wishes to instill into the minds of its children, from an early age until adolescence, as to the necessity and inevitability of a prolonged jihad to liberate all Palestine from the Jewish-Israeli grip. The insistent demand that children should be prepared to fight and die in the service of this dream, is unequivocal inasmuch as the textbooks do not offer any glimmer of hope for a peaceful settlement.[23]

The approach appears surprisingly similar to that of Hamas.

On the basis that the school textbooks reflect the thinking and policy of the Palestinian Authority there is a question as to whether they are in accord with its domestic and

international obligations. While it is obvious that a state in the making must lay claim to its history and its own unique cultural and national identity to build social cohesion and a political consciousness and rally its people in that cause, it is unclear why this should involve delegitimising other peoples, denial of their future and nurturing a confrontational attitude in children against the counterparts of Palestinian nationalism.[24]

1.4.3 The Peace with Egypt

While anti-Israeli-Jewish-Zionist feelings in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world are not the result of the Arab-Israeli dispute of the last one hundred years they have worsened as a result of the fears and suspicions generated by their Israeli rivals. Thus the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbours, which began with the first Camp David in September 1978 on the assumption that Israel would exchange land for peace and normalisation, did not work out as Israel had hoped. Countries, like Egypt, which received their territories in full did not soften their fixed attitudes to Jews and Israel and so it proved with Palestinians several years after the Oslo Accords.[25]

An investigation of the Egyptian press, linked to the establishment or opposition, during the months covering the turn of the millennium regrettably did not show that their articles or editorials had become any less hectoring or more mature than in previous decades:

> These writings have remained grossly anti-Semitic, geared to diminishing Israel and denigrating it, to accusing it of all the ills suffered by the Arabs and the world, and to showing that no reconciliation is possible with it; even to leaving open the ominous prospect of the resumption of hostilities.[26]

A caveat is later added that, despite the overwhelming evidence against the Egyptian press, particularly in denial of the Holocaust, a few courageous individuals have publicly gone against this consensus, even though sometimes from questionable motives.[27]

1.4.4 Islamic Terrorism

Whether human-bomb assaults amount to ‘suicide attacks’, as described in the Western media, or to ‘martyrdom’, as their perpetrators and promoters laud them, or just nationalistic ‘heroism’, on the part of those eager for self-sacrifice in order to cause as much cold-blooded destruction of and damage to the enemy as possible, is hardly a quibble about words but vital to discerning varied ideas and mind-sets behind the deeds.[28]

‘Suicide’ normally relates to a disturbance of the mind leading an individual to flee from his feelings about an overwhelming problem by taking his own life. It may be motivated by a strong sense of protest against an existing order that cannot be withstood or altered or by revenge upon an individual or group with whom the suicide is disillusioned but cannot disengage. The Japanese tradition of ‘hara-kiri’ or ritual suicide was intended to offer a respectful exit strategy for individuals in such dire straits.

In a quite different category were the Japanese 'Special Units', known as Kamikaze or 'Winds of gods', which were trained and indoctrinated by the State to act not for self but for country and Emperor as part of a wider group of like-minded warriors. In blowing themselves up with their enemies during the Second World War they felt they were performing the ultimate sacrifice for a political-ideological cause, which also had a powerful religious aspect.[29] Muslim fundamentalists of this kind are dubbed 'Islamikaze'.

Islamikaze and Their Significance

In most Islamic countries the Islamikaze stand in opposition to the mainstream of Islam not as part of it. These groups, which may have their supporters, thrive on the disaffected and misfits in society which cannot keep pace with rapid social changes and Western modernity. Unlike established Islam, which aims at gradual and peaceful Islamisation, often in concert with existing rulers, these Muslim radicals want everything immediately. They gather around charismatic leaders, whom they regard as role models, not unlike the Jewish Hassidim with respect to their rabbi. Separating themselves from the evil environment around them they follow their leaders' word as the ultimate interpretation of God's will. Propelled by a relentless drive, nourished by a supportive atmosphere, and guided by the sanction of the leadership-inspired 'fatwas' to give authority to the deed, a Muslim radical can transcend the ordinary into the rarefied world of the Islamikaze.[30]

Turning to an Islamic frame of reference appears essential if this unique mode of self-sacrifice is to be understood. A leader of the fundamentalist Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Abdallah Shami, claimed that it was only the lack of weapons which had caused his organisation to use human beings instead. Their method based on 'martyrdom' is not idealised or justified as a goal in itself but as an 'economic' means of fighting injustice, that is, by reducing the perpetrators' losses while assuring them of entry into Paradise. [31]

The build-up of the Islamikaze's ideological commitment comes about incrementally through three elements: identifying the enemy; increasing the importance of jihad as the religious duty of every Muslim against that enemy; and then inciting the Islamikaze to show courage and self-sacrifice for the achievement of the stated goal. The significance of 'martyrdom operations' is brought home by a quotation from Fat'hi Shqaqi, Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, (who was assassinated in 1995):

> 'It is true that the material balance of power is not in our favor. But this should not prevent us from striking a balance of terror with the enemy. Here lies the significance of the martyrdom operations, which prove that the unjust balances of power are not eternal… and that we possess the option of fighting rather than surrendering…'[32]

What is missing from this Islamic rationale for their acts is a 'fatwa' (a religiously-binding verdict) to lend a stamp of approval. This is necessitated because Sunni Islam normally forbids suicide since the soul given by God must not be taken away by a believer's self-destruction. Several scholars, while acknowledging this point, make use of the consensus amongst Muslim jurists that near-suicidal attacks by one man against many

of the enemy are permitted when the perpetrator either believes he has a good prospect of remaining alive or thinks he can inflict great loss on the enemy, even though he will die. On such an interpretation justification for the actions of Islamikaze has been provided though most Muslim scholars believe that suicide is prohibited in any circumstances.[33]

Islamic Martyrology

However, even the Islamic Jihad's earnest desire for martyrdom is restricted by the ban on killing innocent people. Consequently the core issue becomes who is innocent and who is guilty? One example of an attempt to address these basic dilemmas is Qira'a, which translated means 'Readings in Islamic Martyrology', published in 1988.[34]

Relying on shari'a sources which prohibit suicide, from the Koran, to the authoritative collection of Hadith edited by Bukhari, the author prepares his readers to conclude that every rationale for suicide not expressly forbidden is allowed. He does this by avoiding overarching principles and by keeping strictly to detailed cases of prohibition referred to in his sources. These prohibitions rest on the strict commandment in the Koran, demanding respect for human life and the superior role of humans in God's creation, which is extraordinary because of the sharp contrast it offers to the apparent ease with which the Islamikaze kill themselves and, even more so, others. By this approach the writer of Qira'a grants licence to Islamikaze step by step:

> …first, he declares the value of worship of Allah over the value of human life; then jihad as the supreme form of worship; and, since jihad involves self-sacrifice, three levels thereof are identified, the highest and most commendable of which is the *act of martyrdom*.[35] [Emphasis in the original.]

Then confronting the contradiction between the author's sanctification of death and the Koranic injunction to preserve human life and flee from peril, a final twist in the argument leaves the final judgment to Heaven as to whether the martyr's act of extreme audacity was done with the right intention, that is, for the sake of Islam (= submission to the Will of God) and to inflict loss on the enemies of God.

On this doctrine of martyrdom the duty of jihad, unlike state-led jihad, falls on every individual Muslim against the combined Judaeo-Western onslaught that poses, the author of Qira'a maintains, a threat to Islam. The actual battle requires acts of martyrdom – the highest level of jihad – as the main mode of warfare in Palestine. Since all other conventional means are insufficient in the face of the military superiority of the Zionist enemy these acts use explosive on precise targets.[36]

Yet, of course, such acts of martyrdom, which are meant to spare women and children in particular, often make them the victims instead.

> In the context of universal Muslim combat for survival, which the author describes as the context in which Islamikaze acts are imperative, one is led to believe that without the supreme act of martyrdom, there is no other way to rescue

> Islam from its demise. Paradoxically, … it is precisely the perceived impending danger to Islam which forces the martyrs to commit their fanatic act of self-immolation; and it is their desperate act of self-sacrifice which signals that they have failed to transmit their message in some more acceptable and less horrific way.[37]

1.4.5 Peace and Its Demise

In applying the method of analysis outlined in section 1.3 above, by comparing the Israel-Jordan agreement and the Oslo Accords, the main focus is on how the qualitative and quantitative issues are dealt with. The analysis was initially written in 1995 but published as part of the book, as summarised here, when the Second Intifada was in full flow.

The Israel-Jordan Agreement, 1994

Israel's concessions were mostly measurable and quantitative: surrendering some of its land and water rights; granting economic aid; lobbying the United States in favour of reducing Jordan's debt; and even helping King Hussein to obtain new military hardware. Israel also agreed to discuss the repatriation of the 1967, and then 1948, Palestinian war refugees in Jordan. In return for this Israel hoped to receive a qualitative concession from the Arabs, who had not recognised its right to exist.

The Israeli government, concerned to reach a deal with a comparatively moderate and pro-Western king, was willing to recognise Hussein because that suggested Arafat, then Palestinian leader, represented only one third of Palestinians – i.e. those based in the territories – compared to the half based in Jordan. So while the superficial quantitative issues were 'resolved' the bigger qualitative issue of what constitutes Palestine, as opposed to Jordan, was left awaiting a qualitative settlement. If, under the impact of Muslim fundamentalist opposition to peace in Jordan, this issue comes to the fore again then the quantitative issues could turn out to have been in vain.[38]

The Oslo Accords, 1993-95

Unlike the Israeli-Jordanian agreement, the Oslo Accords contained nothing permanent. Far from involving a meeting of minds on qualitative as well as quantitative issues the Oslo documents tried to paper over differences by ambiguous statements which were open to different, even inconsistent, interpretations. In fact there was no agreement on substantial qualitative issues apart from a willingness for dialogue.

As a result of its quantitative concessions, such as withdrawals and limited autonomy, Israel left itself with few bargaining chips for the more difficult qualitative issues relating to a final settlement. This is not an argument against gradualism but 'interim' should mean a step in the agreed direction: 'Quantitative steps must follow the milestones that lead to a known qualitative target.'[39] The nebulous goal in the Oslo process meant that:

> The contradiction between the resolution of the Palestinians to ultimately arrive at their qualitative goals, and the equally qualitative determination of the Israelis not to let that happen, has led to the parties tackling quantitative issues only. Even the one far-reaching qualitative concession made by both parties at the outset of the process – namely that Israel should recognize the PLO in return for the latter's renunciation of its National Charter, which is reputedly committed to Israel's destruction – has so far [as at 1995] been respected only by Israel…[40]

All this went on as Israelis and Palestinians sustained contradictory goals amongst their own peoples. The qualitative issues still to be addressed include Jerusalem, on which compromise is hard to envisage, the Palestinian 'right of return' for refugees; the granting of Palestinian nationhood, still resisted by Israel; withdrawal from Israeli settlements in the territories and the relocation of Israeli settlers; and other matters.

1.5 CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the Arab-Israeli conflict has always had two aspects: quality and quantity. Since its establishment the state of Israel has demanded to be recognised and legitimated by its Arab neighbours while Arabs have accused Israel of taking over their lands and urged it to vacate all of them. Even some post-Oslo Palestinians have repeated this demand in that they regard those Accords as just one step on the road to the elimination of Israel.

Israeli occupation of more Arab lands through war was necessary to convince them to negotiate as the only means to win them back. This new formula of 'land for peace' was precisely calculated to pay Arabs in terms of quantity as a balanced *quid pro quo* for their qualitative approval of Israel. Although this formula seemed feasible with Egypt and Jordan, on whose land Israel had no designs, the Palestinians consider it completely inadequate for the following qualitative reasons:

(i) *The unqualified approach to the land, based on divine promise*, has as central a role among Hamas fundamentalists as hard-core settlers belonging to Gush Emunim. Neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority can afford to ignore their opposition.

(ii) *Palestinians and Israelis seek control of the same land*, despite the permanent settlements of either party there. Zero-sum games are less likely to succeed.

(iii) *Jerusalem is the pearl of the Palestinian crown* but a source of religious, cultural and historical contention by Israelis. The struggle for this one city is intense.

(iv) *The unresolved problem of the outside Palestinian majority* and the confinement of the Palestinian entity to *a limited territory, with strong demographic pressures*, will be a recipe for continued conflict.

(v) *Palestinian economic dependence on Israel* will continue even after any permanent settlement with attendant problems of economic and social discontent that will threaten any agreement reached.

(vi) Muslim fundamentalist influence in surrounding Arab-Israel countries has risen so high suggesting that *more Islamisation will also mean more anti-Israeli hostility*. It is difficult to see how this is reconcilable with Israel's formula for peace.[41]

The position now is that Israel has used up most of its disposable assets, which had more been held back might have enticed the Palestinians to continue the game to address the qualitative issues that remain.

1.6 CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE ANALYSIS AGAINST THE SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE CONFLICT AREA

The author Israeli maintains that, paradoxically, by compromising before the negotiations even begin Israel cannot attain the peace, which is its stated desire. On the contrary by embracing conciliatory attitudes without any retribution Israel simply invites more pressures for compromise. This was illustrated by what happened in the West Bank and Gaza after the far-reaching concessions offered at Camp David in 2000. In this position:

> … one is likely to encounter increasing and tougher demands, than if one had shown determination to stand firmly, to wait out the partner [the Palestinians], not to yield one inch without proper *quid pro quo*, and indeed no urgent interest to reach a settlement. At the same time, however, Israel must consistently indicate its interest in, and desire for, peace, a peace of reciprocity, which is tested along a protracted period of time, without rush, after long deliberations and considered reasoning, insisting that the agreed upon is implemented before any further step is effected.[42]

1.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

The collapse of the Oslo peace process forces Israel to revert to square one. It must define its essential national assets, and the 'red lines' that are not to be crossed in any event, and stand firm on them just as the Arabs do without regard to Israel's ambitions and demands. Two specific demands are made: first, the Arabs must give evidence for their political will to make peace, which Israel must welcome and respond to, but that no negotiation is possible while violence, whatever the pretext, or incitement to hatred is pursued; secondly, Arabs must declare their willingness to share historical and religious sites of importance to both sides. It is hoped that with Israel as a strong partner for peace, in full equality, the Arabs will learn that without a revolutionary change in their traditional views about Jews and Israel they can only harm themselves.[43]

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[39] . Israeli, p. 294.
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2. A PALESTINIAN PERSPECTIVE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Cheryl Rubenberg begins her book, The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace, by identifying what she sees as the core of the problem for most people in understanding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: Westerners tend to identify with Israel and generally are unable to see, let alone understand or empathise with the condition of the Palestinians.[1] Their perceptions are so grounded in prejudices and unchanging mental impressions, often subconscious, that they frequently fail to grasp the basic issues.

This chapter offers an IPP review, written by Peter Southwood, of Rubenberg's book within the standard headings for each contribution to this trial peace game, aimed at ease of comparison. Cheryl Rubenberg was given the opportunity to participate herself but although she would have liked to, despite some methodological and substantial questions on the outline proposal for IPP Briefing No. 1 (to which a written reply was given),[2] another prior publishing commitment meant that was not possible. Although IPP offered to allow her publisher the opportunity to read the draft of this chapter, in order to check that it is a fair and accurate summary of her work, she said that Southwood's review could be used without the permission of the publisher. Consequently responsibility for this review rests solely with IPP.

2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The starting point is an historical overview of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from its origins and development in the late nineteenth century through to the early 1990s. This is undertaken from a Palestinian perspective in order to provide insight into their positions in the peace process and 'to clarify why Palestinians insist on achieving a viable independent state in the remaining 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine (e.g., the West Bank and Gaza).'[3] Other historical perspectives are for this reason, and space limitations, not included.

The major themes and goals emerging from this overview, which inspire the Palestinian national movement to the present time are:

- *Injustice, dispossession, statelessness and fear of transfer or expulsion.* Injustice has remained as real for Palestinians as in 1948, when the state of Israel was created. The experience of statelessness has been traumatic, not only for Palestinian refugees. Despite their pragmatic acceptance of Israel on 78 per cent of what was their homeland, and willingness to coexist in peace, Palestinians earnestly desire an admission by Israel of the wrong done to them.
- *Occupation, resistance, steadfastness and the significance of land.* UN Resolution 181, approved by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, had called, albeit contrary to the wishes of the indigenous population, for the division of Palestine into a Jewish state (55 per cent of the land) and a Palestinian state (the remaining 45 per cent) with Jerusalem as a united city under permanent UN trusteeship.

While now accepting the creation of a Palestinian state, in the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war, on much less land than Resolution 181 originally granted, this constitutes *the* national objective. An independent, sovereign Palestinian state is invested with vast symbolic and emotional importance for Palestinians, whether or not they would live there, while for those under Israeli occupation it is a matter of individual and collective survival. 'All Palestinians believe that those living under occupation have the right–and duty– to resist.'[4]

- *The plight of refugees, the sacredness of Jerusalem*. The fate of refugees who were forced from their homes when Israel was created also has great significance. UN Resolution 194, approved by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948, called for the repatriation of the Palestinians to their homes or compensation to be paid to those who decided not to return. A year later the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established for Palestinian refugees but it was not authorised to seek local integration or the resettlement of refugees in other countries. Except in Jordan, most such refugees have remained stateless, in great need, and restricted to densely populated UNRWA camps. 'Resolution 194 remains the fundamental, although not the only, legal basis for the refugees' right of return.'[5] The majority of Palestinians believe the right of return is sacred and inviolable. Likewise, Palestinians, whether Muslim or Christian, do not accept Jewish dominance of a unified Jewish Jerusalem.

Each of these themes had a part in the Oslo Accords and their implementation.

2.2.1 Israel and the Palestinians on the Road to Peace?

Several points are emphasised, before analysing the Oslo peace process, concerning the size of the PLO's historic compromise:

- it abandoned the idea of liberating Palestine and when its proposal for a secular, democratic state was rejected by Israel the PLO agreed to a state alongside Israel;
- it accepted UN resolution 242 even though this resolution is silent on Palestinian political or national rights;
- Arafat, the PLO leader at the time, renounced terrorism despite Israel's 'persistent state terrorism against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and against Palestinian communities in the diaspora (e.g., Lebanon).'[6]
- it recognised Israel's *right* to exist, rather than simply recognising Israel, in effect granting legitimacy to the Zionist seizure of Palestinian land and dispossession of its rightful owners.

Consequently, after the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord, there were no further concessions, short of self-extinction as a nation, which the Palestinians could be expected to make.

For its part, Israel had rejected every Palestinian peace proposal and the failure of talks under the Madrid framework suggested it was not interested in a settlement that required recognising the Palestinian right to self-determination in an independent state. It appeared

that Israel valued the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories above an equitable solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

2.3 METHOD OF ANALYSING THE CONFLICT

Rubenberg's approach to analysing this conflict contrasts Israel, as one of the strongest states in the global system, backed unreservedly by the dominant superpower, the United States of America, with the Palestinians as a dispersed people, dispossessed from their land and disorganised – 'a party so pathetically weak in the power dynamics of this conflict that to equate it with Israel is absurd.'[7] These power disparities are highlighted throughout her book to show the many ways in which Israeli power represses the Palestinians and threatens their security.

This method links directly into her analysis of the Oslo process:

> The power disparity between Israel and the Palestinians is a leitmotif because Israel has enjoyed exclusive possession of the resources of power. The imbalance has been reflected at all levels – alliance patterns and support, social and political organization and cohesiveness, military strength, economic resources, even information. Palestinians have not been able to confront Israel from anything but a position of weakness, and nowhere has this been more apparent than in the agreements that constitute the Oslo process.[8]

2.4 ANALYSIS

2.4.1 The Oslo Accords and Agreements, 1993 - 2000

Following an analysis of the original Oslo Accord in 1993 and the various subsequent agreements between Israel and the Palestinians (not all of them covered in Appendix 1 of this Briefing), several conclusions are drawn. The failure of the Oslo process, from a Palestinian perspective, arose from the vast power imbalance between Israel and the PLO. Whereas the PLO entered the process in a very weak position Israel was at the pinnacle of its political and military achievements and having a full strategic partnership with the USA. In consequence the PLO was unable to influence even the most vital aspects of the Declaration of Principles and with every new agreement Israel could extract more concessions. Even when Israel failed to implement agreements it had signed the Palestinians could not compel compliance or extract compensation for non-compliance. Beyond this fundamental problem with the Oslo agreements as a whole there were other factors which explain the problems that surfaced:

- *The Declaration of Principles arose out of the warm personal relations that grew between the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators*. However, Israeli legal expertise ensured that the Declaration protected Israeli interests and prevented a sovereign, independent Palestinian state from emerging. Reliance on personal trust is a deeply flawed approach to conducting negotiations over vital national interests.

- *The separation of the interim from final status talks put the Palestinians at a huge disadvantage because they did not know what Israel meant, in legal terms, by final status*. This separation allowed Israel to unilaterally decide the final outcome and indefinitely prolong even the commencement of final-status talks while buying time to construct many new settlements in the occupied territories.
- *The most important defect was that the Declaration of Principles was not based on either international law or UN resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.* Leaving out relevant provisions of international law and UN Resolutions 181 and 194, with other supporting Resolutions, greatly weakened the Palestinian positions. As the Declaration is not founded on law, rights or precedent but a political agreement between two parties presented as equals, the Palestinians had no recourse to international legal provisions that should have assisted them. The reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242 in the Declaration was not clarified and allowed Israel to bargain over how much and from which areas Israel would withdraw rather than their having to leave all the occupied territories.
- *The lack of an impartial mediator, in the event of Israel failing to fulfil its obligations under the Declaration of Principles was another important defect.* While the USA assumed the role of 'honest broker', with Israeli support, it unreservedly supported Israel during the whole period.
- *Israel kept demanding that the Palestinians guarantee Israeli security*. This was something Israel could not do itself even in areas under its own control and it used every act of violence from the territories to claim that the Palestinian Authority had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Oslo agreements. This resulted in suspension of negotiations, security crackdowns and economic closures in the occupied territories while new Jewish settlements were constructed.[9]

On the fate of the refugees, this issue tended to be sidelined during the seven years of the Oslo process. It appears from a 1999 scheme, reflecting a longstanding Israeli position, that Israel will accept no blame or moral responsibility. The most it may do is to offer regret for the suffering the conflict has produced for the Palestinian people. While some refugees would be allowed to return to a Palestinian state, were it ever to be established, the great majority will be rehabilitated where they now live.[10]

In conclusion, the huge power disparities between Israel and the PLO/Palestinian Authority, produced one agreement after another that advanced Israeli interests and compromised Palestinian objectives. Simultaneously these imbalances permitted Israel to determine policies and pursue unilateral initiatives that seriously infringed the letter and spirit of the Oslo Accords:

> Israel imposed closures and curfews; confiscated Palestinian land; restricted Palestinian water usage; constructed new settlements and settler bypass roads; prohibited workers from entering Israel; demolished houses; and in general created a serious deterioration in the living conditions of the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. The PA [Palestinian Authority] was powerless to stop any of these actions or even to undertake initiatives of its own to pressure Israel. Moreover, by the end of the seven-year peace process, many

> Palestinians perceived Arafat and the PA as functioning solely as Israel's policemen–arresting Israel's most-wanted and attempting to ensure Israel's security.[11]

2.4.2 Collective and Individual Freedoms in the Occupied Territories

The Palestinians' quality of life following the 1993 Oslo Accords is examined with respect to collective freedoms, economic well-being, and individual freedoms to identify those areas in which this deteriorated or did not improve during the period to 2000.

Social and Economic Dimensions

Israel's imposition of closures more directly and adversely affected the Palestinian economy than any other policy between 1993-2000. Generally a 'closure' means that Palestinians and Palestinian goods may not enter Israel from the occupied territories without a permit. There are several types of closures, varying in extent and severity, which are enforced through a system of roadblocks and checkpoints and, in extreme cases, freedom of movement is curtailed by curfews in parts of the occupied territories. Implementation of the safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for persons and goods was delayed until 1999, only partly completed, and then closed in October 2000.[12]

Land, Settlements and Water

In the period from 1967 to 1987 Israel confiscated more than 52 per cent of the West Bank land and 40 per cent of the Gaza Strip and, by the end, had established 104 settlements with 65,000 Jewish settlers in the former territory and 18 settlements and 2,150 settlers in the latter. Severe restrictions have continued on how remaining Palestinian lands could be utilised.[13]

These settlements are typically built on hilltops in the West Bank, often surrounded by fertile agricultural land. 'Settlements' are really modern developed suburbs with recreational facilities, schools and even industrial parks but surrounded by security fences and military outposts, as well as landfills.

The Oslo period has resulted in a rapid growth in settlements and numbers of settlers with their supporting infrastructure including new bypass roads. Statistics from the Israeli 'Peace Now' organisation and its American partner reveal that, between September 1993 and January 2000, 45 new settlements were established bringing the total number of independent settlements to over 200. Housing in the settlements grew by 52 per cent and the settler population by 72 per cent.[14] All governments – Labour and Likud – have participated in this expansion, which has continued in the post-Oslo period.

Following the 1967 war Israel had put the control of all the water sources in the West Bank and Gaza under its military authority and then, in 1982, its national water company. According to an estimate in the mid-1980s the West Bank had an underground water

potential of 600 million cubic meters per year of which 475 million was used to hydrate Israel itself while the Palestinian population was permitted only about 20 million cubic meters per year of this sub-total.[15] The position in Gaza was even more severe.

Although Palestinian water rights were recognised for the first time under Oslo 2 in 1995, control remains in Israeli hands so that Palestinians are left with restricted access to water supplies that are insufficient to meet their current, let alone future, domestic consumption and still less their agricultural and industrial requirements for economic development. B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organisation, reported that the average Israeli consumes for domestic, urban and industrial use five times more than the Palestinian per capita consumption.[16] Whereas the World Health Organisation recommends as the essential minimum 100 litres of water per person per day the Palestinians consume an average of only 70 litres per day. Severe water shortages each summer have added to problems of access for thousands of Palestinians.

Economic Development and Well-Being

Palestinians had hoped that the peace process would enable them to restore their agricultural sector, develop a higher technology and more efficient industrial base, and offer better employment prospects for Palestinian workers in Palestinian firms. 'Not one of these objectives was realized.'[17]

The economic deterioration during the Oslo years (see Appendix C of this Briefing) was reflected in the growing number of people in poverty – defined as those with less than US$2 per capita income per day. Data from the World Bank and other official bodies reveal that the percentage of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population living in poverty increased from 14 per cent in 1995 to 35 per cent in 2000 before then rising to 64 per cent in 2002. The situation was more severe in Gaza where the poverty rate was 20 per cent in 1995 and 81 per cent by 2002.[18]

In assessing the development of the Palestinian economy under the Oslo Accords the New York-based Council for Economic and Social Rights wrote in June 2000 that it is '… poorer and more vulnerable today than it was at the start of the peace process, and is further, not closer, to the path of sustainable development.'[19]

The Israeli impediments to self-sustaining Palestinian economic development, which is necessary to the survival of an independent state, included: Israel's continued control of land, water, trade and other matters under the economic protocol of 1994; Israel's closure policies that had a still more devastating effect; the dependency of the occupied territories on Israel and attempts to ensure that Palestinian agriculture and industry did not compete with it. The insecure political situation also discouraged private investment during the Oslo period. Capital investments by international donors in infrastructure projects were not enough to generate self-sustaining growth.[20]

Individual Freedoms

While in 'Area A' individual freedoms improved with the withdrawal of the Israeli military forces, Israeli legal practices still affected 'Area B' (about 26 per cent of the West Bank), under joint control with the Palestinian Authority, and 'Area C' (about 70 per cent of the occupied territories), under sole Israeli control. Several such practices had detrimental effects for Palestinians, amongst which were:[21]

- *administrative detentions* (i.e. arbitrary imprisonment of an individual for up to six months without charge, indefinitely renewable for further such periods by the occupation authorities) used to hold 1,007 individuals as at 30 January 2003;[22]
- *arbitrary arrests and forced confessions*;
- *security offences*, including membership in a terrorist organisation and violent crimes but also non-violent political activities, led to 1,550 individuals being held in custody as of July 2000;[23]
- *torture* used widely by Israel during interrogations against administrative detainees and security prisoners from 1967 to the present day;
- *demolition of residential housing* has been used during the Oslo period officially because Palestinian houses were constructed without permits, though nearly every such application is reported to be rejected. Israel destroyed 962 houses between 1993 and 1999;[24]
- *political assassinations* – two documented cases between 1993 and 2000 – and *shooting of unarmed demonstrators*.

2.4.3 Settler Violence

As a microcosm of the issues relating to collective and individual freedoms above and also to provide insight into the issue of settler violence the case of Hebron is examined. Since the occupation began Jewish settlers have used various types of violence against Palestinians. As a consequence of the Oslo Accords and the settlers' fear that they might have to give up some land to Palestinians settler violence has markedly increased. B'Tselem, the human rights group, concluded in 2001 that all arms of the Israeli law enforcement system, concerning violent offences against Palestinians, tended to treat Palestinian complaints with contempt and show leniency towards Jewish offenders.[25]

The first Jewish settlement in Hebron was established in 1968 in the centre of a Palestinian neighbourhood near the Al-Ibrahimi mosque. Following the Six Day War the Israeli government imposed the right of worship in Al-Ibrahimi for Jews, which is called Ma'arat HaMachpela (the Cave of Machpela) by Israelis. Both Jews and Israelis revere the site as the burial place of Abraham, Issac and Jacob and their wives. However, the Gush Emunim (Bloc of Faithful), a messianic movement dedicated to redeem Eretz Israel and restore it to its rightful owners, were not content with worshipping at the site. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, its leader, and his followers wanted it to be exclusively Jewish and tried to gain control by various methods. They sought to establish a permanent Jewish settlement next to the mosque by seizing an Arab house so the Levinger family could move in while simultaneously provocations began. The latter included disrupting Muslim

prayers on Fridays and celebrating a Jewish rite involving the drinking of wine in the mosque – knowing that this was bound to cause deep offence. The resulting conflict with Palestinians led to the installation of an Israeli military garrison to protect the settlers. Although Gush Emunim was a fringe group with little public support no Israeli government has imposed the rule of law on it. More recently its support has grown.[26]

2.4.4 Jerusalem

Since 1967 Israel has pursued a programme of 'de-Arabization' in Jerusalem, to advance its objective of permanent Jewish sovereignty in the unified city, including policies aimed at a reduction in the Palestinian population. At the same time it has used processes of Judaization in order to transform Jerusalem into a predominately Jewish capital. Once the Oslo process had started in 1993 Israel reinforced these policies and made them more comprehensive and thorough. For example:

- several fundamentalist Jewish groups, backed by the government, made a determined attempt to seize Palestinian homes in Muslim and Christian enclaves of the Old City and to occupy Palestinian neighbourhoods around its boundaries;
- new settlements were created and existing ones expanded, while new bypass roads linked settlements in East Jerusalem with others throughout the West Bank;
- Israel developed various plans to situate Jerusalem as the prop for integrating settlement blocs in the outreaches of the West Bank with this newly expanded Jewish metropolis and, thereby, to Israel itself.[27]

It should be noted, though, that despite the growth of houses and settlements, with the supporting infrastructure, there are insufficient Jews to fill them. Consequently Israel is continuously seeking to recruit Jewish communities, or even some non-Jewish ones considered suitable for conversion, around the globe to come and settle in the occupied territories. In early 2003 the government authorised the immigration of 17,000 Falasha Moras (and 3,000 Falashas) from Ethiopia. These are black Jews who were made to convert to Christianity in the nineteenth century. The Falasha Moras were previously considered insufficiently Jewish because, unlike the Falashas, they had remained Christians in identity and religious practice. However, the need for settlers overcame the issue of their Jewishness.[28] The most controversial decision concerned a community of impoverished Peruvian Indians, brought to Israel in early 2002, who had no discernible Jewish ancestry but were willing converts and are eager settlers.

2.4.5 The Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority itself contributed to the decay of Palestinian society during the Oslo period. Its role, and that of President Arafat, was dictated at certain levels by Israel's overriding security demands such that Israeli-Palestinian Authority security cooperation led to very serious human rights violations against Palestinians. However, clear evidence exists that that Authority's own policies also infringed human and civil rights:

> Through corruption, economic monopolies, authoritarianism, repression, disdain for democratic processes and judicial fairness, *'asha'iriyyah* (reviving the *hamayel*, or clan system), nepotism, and other practices, PA policies exacerbated the fragmentation of Palestinian society, increased class and *hamayel* divisions, contributed to the growing economic impoverishment, and were largely responsible for the social disintegration that occurred during this time.[29]

The Palestinian Authority is examined under three broad headings: its manner of governing; its corruption; and its infringements of human rights.

On governance, the lack of a constitution during the Oslo period (though the Basic Law was finally signed by Arafat in 2002 – see background information in Appendix D2) meant that a foundation for the rule of law and the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the emergent Palestinian state was missing. As a result the executive tended to interfere in the judicial process or disregard court decisions. The compromising of the judiciary led, in turn, to growing dependency on clan or tribal law. The executive also obstructed the passage of legislation or refused to sign into law legislation that had been approved. Thus in place of the rule of law there was rule by arbitrary authority, political and military.[30]

The Palestinian system of government is described as 'neopatrimonial', a term used by the Canadian scholar Rex Brynen, under which formal lines of responsibility are overlaid by patronage and patron-client relationships such that the boundaries of public role and private interest become blurred with public office representing a means of extracting private profit and state resources being applied to oil patron-client networks. Simultaneously, the state's ability to extract foreign aid or taxes and regulate behaviours by, for instance, granting favours to loyalists creates an environment under which the supply of goods, or access to them, can be manipulated as the basis for patronage.[31]

On corruption in the Palestinian Authority, two areas of a complex web are investigated in some depth: numerous secret bank accounts abroad; and top officials in control of essential sectors of the economy through monopolies that offered personal wealth. Attempts by the Palestinian Legislative Council to rectify financial abuses and prosecute certain government ministers in the late 1990s were largely unsuccessful although the public scandal did result in foreign aid donors demanding accountability as a condition for making grants and, as far as possible, they funded specific projects directly instead of passing funds through the Palestinian Authority.[32]

On the human rights record of the Palestinian Authority, the practices identified include:

- *legal proceedings*. Between 1995 and 2000, forty nine individuals were sentenced to death and executed, most by the State Security Courts and military courts which deal exclusively with political opponents of the Authority;[33]
- *political prisoners*. According to Amnesty International there were 360 'political prisoners' – non-violent opponents of the Authority – who were arrested and

detained without charge in 2000 together with another 600 still in custody from the previous year(s).[34] Amnesty adopted many of these as prisoners of conscience.

- *censorship*. For example, the Press and Publication Law of 1995 regulates every publication produced or imported into areas within the Authority's jurisdiction and gives the Authority broad powers to regulate the media, news agencies, research centres, libraries and other information bodies. Ambiguity over what constitutes an offence also results in a degree of *self-censorship*.[35]

2.4.6 The Role of the United States of America

US policy towards Palestine is guided by deeply rooted perceptions, arising from beliefs and misconceptions dating back to the nineteenth century, which in time became 'truth'. Beliefs about Israel, regardless of factual circumstances, have continued to reflect strongly held US norms that depict Jews as victims and Israel as a democracy. On the other hand, Arabs and Muslims are seen as outsiders, at best, and at various times Palestinians have been portrayed as anti-Semitic or violent religious fanatics. These maxims have been sustained in the United States by, amongst others: the mainstream media, journalists and intellectuals; Hollywood; and certain Christian fundamentalists.[36]

In the 1980s when some people in the United States criticised Israel over such issues as its invasion of Lebanon or treatment of Palestinians during the First Intifada they were silenced by Israel and its US supporters who claimed the criticisms were anti-Semitic. Since anti-Semitism is taboo in any civilised society the Zionists' capacity to link the two was a powerful incentive to self-censorship and silence by media and intellectuals. Pro-Israeli groups used this approach again to attack those who criticised official Israeli policies in relation to the Second Intifada.[37]

So the perception of shared values lies at the core of the US-Israeli relationship. The United States has fully backed Israeli policies and marginalised Europe, Russia and the United Nations in Middle East diplomacy so leaving the Palestinians isolated. It is, therefore, as responsible as Israel for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the outbreak of a second uprising.[38]

2.4.7 The Al-Aqsa Intifada

The Second or Al-Aqsa Intifada – so-called because the catalyst was Ariel Sharon's visit to the Haram al-Sharif where the Al-Aqsa mosque is situated – is attributed to four interrelated factors:

(i.) The profoundly flawed nature of the Oslo Accords;
(ii.) Israel's policies, such as on closures, curfews, permits and land confiscations, that made Palestinian lives more difficult than they had been before 1993;
(iii.) The unbending US support for Israel's policies;
(iv.) The failure of the Palestinian leadership to fulfil their people's basic requirements, and the Palestinian Authority's corruption and repression.[39]

Nature of the Intifada

The Al-Aqsa Intifada differed from the First Intifada in 1987 because although it began as a popular protest within a few weeks it was turned into an armed conflict involving, for the most part, Palestinians with access to weapons.

Even so public opinion polls in 2000/2001 showed consistently that the intifada had overwhelming public support from Palestinians. Polls during this period also demonstrated that support for the Oslo process had diminished markedly with a maximum of 40 per cent of respondents backing it in any of five polls. On the question of trust in Palestinian leaders, Arafat scored between 23.5 per cent and 32.3 per cent while Ahmad Yassin, then leader of Hamas, had support ranging from 8 per cent to 12.8 per cent. Significantly, though, between 26 per cent and 31.9 per cent of respondents did not trust any Palestinian leader during 2000/01 which may help explain the lack of popular participation in the intifada.[40]

Other factors that may explain why the public in general was not involved include: the domination of the intifada by armed groups and the intensity of Israel's punitive response; the depth of despair amongst the people; the loss of legitimacy of non-governmental organisations; and the ineffectiveness of traditional political opposition during the Oslo years. The Palestinian Authority's focus on the process of negotiation to the neglect of substance, that is, political objectives, had the effect of depoliticising individuals whose growing poverty also led them to concentrate on feeding their families.

Power and Violence

The Israeli occupation is itself regarded as a form of violence. The conquest of the occupied territories and the illegitimate imposition of a military regime over the Palestinians is not a consensual arrangement but the domination of one people by another. Israeli sociologist, Baruch Kimmerling, is cited to argue that Palestinians have '…by any measure, the right to resist that occupation with any means at their disposal and to rise up in violence against that occupation. This is a moral right inherent to natural law and international law.'[41]

The Israeli attempts to define, in their interests, the legitimate use of force is:

> … one of the great prerogatives of power. Power names things, and it defines their meaning. Power creates myths. Power writes history from the perspective of those who dominate events. [42]

This Israeli definition cannot be accepted by Palestinians but even within Israel there are over 500 military reservists who have refused to serve in the occupied territories.

Suicide Bombings

While suicide bombings are acknowledged as the most controversial aspect of Palestinian resistance, deserving equal condemnation with Israel's killing of civilians, the explanation for these acts and the promotion of their use by some groups is said to lie in overwhelming despair about the future and consequent willingness for self-sacrifice. This combines with rage at Israeli assaults and an intense urge for vengeance. Although Sunni Islam absolutely prohibits suicide the struggle against occupation lead many Palestinians to view suicide bombers as heroes or martyrs.

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

In asking what future there is for the Palestinians Rubenberg argues that the essential issue, in the last analysis of their quest for a just peace, is 'power versus powerlessness'.[43]

The analysis has revealed that the Palestinians are devoid of power and without allies in their struggle against a powerful state, Israel, which is fully supported by the USA, the most powerful state in the international system. With the reoccupation of the West Bank the future for the Palestinians looked bleak (as at late 2002): the Palestinian Authority was 'dismantled, delegitimized, and discredited';[44] opinion polls continued to show that a large majority of Palestinians wished to persevere with the uprising but there was a high level of alienation from political leaders and factions; no political gains were made during the first two years of the intifada but there were many more deaths and injuries (including minors) amongst Palestinians than Israelis; the infrastructure of healthcare was in crisis; the Palestinian environment was badly affected by Israeli practices to suppress the intifada resulting in a serious decline in water quality and growing health problems; the education system was crippled due to curfews and closures; and thousands of Palestinians were held as prisoners by Israel, some without charge or access to lawyers, in grim conditions. During this period there was increasingly open discussion in Israel about the option of transfer as a solution to the Palestinian problem, involving expelling them from the occupied territories and also Palestinian Israeli citizens from Israel itself.[45]

At the same time the Israeli government expressed satisfaction at its military success and promised not to negotiate with Palestinians until they gave up their intifada. Convinced that Arabs understood only force and confident in their invincible might the leaders of Israel were unconcerned about conditions in the occupied territories. However, despite its apparently unchallengeable military, political, diplomatic and economic strength Israel's economy was in serious decline in 2002 and many of its traditional European allies opposed its approach to the Palestinians and imposed various kinds of sanctions.[46]

2.6 CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE ANALYSIS AGAINST THE SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE CONFLICT AREA

Rubenberg states succinctly, albeit at the risk of some oversimplification:

> … the solution is for Israel to end the occupation of the territories it conquered in 1967 and to allow the Palestinians to establish a viable, independent state alongside Israel.[47]

The clear inference appears to be that the conflict will not otherwise end.

2.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

Rubenberg's work ends on a hopeful note by highlighting 'Power of a Different Kind' and the potential inherent in grassroots movements to have an important impact on global politics, including the question of Palestine, in the years ahead.[48]

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3. AN IRENICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

'Irenical' means 'aiming or aimed at peace'.[1] For years it has been assumed that this must be primarily a political purpose because the resolution of an international dispute depends on the terms of settlement reached by the governments and other parties involved. Yet the Oslo Accords of 1993-95 illustrated the point that when it comes to implementing such an agreement politics can fail and a peace process may end in renewed armed conflict. In this chapter Peter Southwood argues that it is for education in peace and war, as defined by law rather than by academics or government officials, to fill this gap. This is possible for education because the legal framework now exists in England and Wales, influenced by that in the United States, which can be adapted for any country in the world.[2]

How does it work? The 'peace games' is a unique strategy aimed at peace involving competing methods of analysing, in this case, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to predict the direction of the conflict, that is, whether a 'climate' for peace or war is being created by the parties in dispute. An analogy with weather forecasting may help. Whether there is likely to be sunny weather or a thunderstorm in a given region can be foreseen by meteorologists but not whether the sun will shine on, or lightning strike, your house. In a similar way *these peace games involve foreseeing whether conditions are being created in which the evil effects of war are likely to be avoided and consequent emphasis put on peaceful, rather than military, techniques for resolving the conflict in future*. If such information, like weather forecasting, is useful because it enables precautionary steps to be taken by those affected then the Israeli-Palestinian peace games can make a difference.

3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first stage in the task of forecasting the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to look back and decide what is the relevant historical context to take into account?

Those who are mainly concerned with the latest political phase of the conflict between Muslims and Jews (and Christians) tend to focus on the period since the 1880s with the rise of Zionist movement and its ultimate objective of establishing an independent Jewish state in Palestine under international law. While Palestinian nationalism was forged, in major part, in opposition to that movement a separate Palestinian identity is evident, according to new scholarship, from the late Ottoman period.[3] The central issue, then, affecting the two sides remains the land and the competing nationalisms struggling for control over it. Thus a political settlement, if this could be attained, that respected the claims of each party would do much to resolve the wider Arab-Israeli conflict as well.

Set against this view, though, it should be acknowledged that while, on the one hand, Zionism owed more to secular nationalism and discrimination against Jews than to religious Judaism and, on the other hand, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is also a movement with largely secular aims yet both have drawn heavily on their respective religious roots. The claims of Zionism could hardly have been advanced as

successfully as they have been unless a Jewish kingdom had previously been established three thousand years ago, based on the promise made by God to the patriarch Abraham. Likewise the historical links, as perceived by the Palestinian nationalist movement, between Palestine and Islam, in particular, have been close and explicitly reflected in the speeches and writings of PLO leaders – made partly in response to the growing influence of militant Islamic organisations since the 1980s. Consequently, the much longer history of conflict between Muslims and Jews (and of both with Christians) is considered relevant here because there must be real doubt as to whether a political settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, if achievable at all, is sustainable in the long term without a 'peace settlement' between these three monotheistic faiths.

Historically, therefore, land and religion emerge as the twin issues to be resolved in securing peace between competing Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms. For Palestine is not simply land but contains the Holy Land with Jerusalem at its centre, which is sacred to Jews, Muslims and Christians. The intractability of the conflict owes much to the deeply and sincerely held, but conflicting, religious beliefs of the protagonists. Could this become a source of unity instead of division at least in the common search for peace?

A 'secular' educational charity must adopt, as a matter of principle, a policy of strict political and religious neutrality. Recognising that Zionism was always about justice (or fairness) for Jews rather than anyone else and, conversely, Palestinian nationalism is about fairness for Palestinian Arabs first and foremost – both positions being entirely understandable in relation to their respective histories and cultures, as Charles D. Smith observes[4] – an impartial position may be the last thing either party wants. However, unlike the British government during the Palestinian Mandate period in the 1920s and '30s, which was roundly condemned by both sides in its attempts to be 'fair',[5] an educational charity has not made potentially contradictory promises to each party. Likewise, in considering the relevant claims of competing religions, such a body must seek to understand each faith community through its own eyes rather than by the imposition of alien values or doctrines based on a different religious tradition.

This is the 'voluntarist' approach taken by this contributor here in the belief that the will of God is known, to the extent that it can be known, within the hearts and minds of believers and that nothing individuals or nations can do ever frustrates His purposes. Thus truth, as a believer within a community of believers inwardly perceives it, becomes the most powerful of all motives that may lead to the greatest acts of self-overcoming for good or ill in human history. Whether, though, it is the former or the latter must depend on the extent to which such believers in each faith community reflect, by divine grace, the nature of the God they worship as each faith believes that nature to be.

The practical implication of this approach, for the analysis that follows, is in answering the question asked by each faith community, namely, 'Who is a believer and who is not?' by responding 'The one who seeks peace' as that faith community understands it. In this Briefing it is Jewish and Islamic perspectives on this matter which will predominate because most people in mandatory Palestine belonged to one or other faith community.

3.3 METHOD OF ANALYSING THE CONFLICT

Despite the differences between them, the Israeli government and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and most of their respective publics in mid-2005 have three common assumptions on what may lead to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

(i) Political and/or military strength leading to a negotiated solution (Palestinian preference) or unilaterally imposed solution (Israeli preference) *rather than* relying mainly on rational persuasion;

(ii) Greater economic independence *rather than* economic integration;

(iii) A two-state solution *rather than* one-state solution.

These assumptions will be explained, qualified and tested in the analysis that follows. However, the basic building blocks for this analysis need to be outlined here.

The concept of 'power' is central to overcoming the resistance to achieving national objectives. Yet a distinction must be drawn between those types of power which rely on the use or threat of coercion and those that depend on cooperation between peoples. Here the former is called the 'power of coercion' and the latter the 'power of cooperation'.[6]

Generally, when people speak of 'power' they are referring to this power of coercion. Examples include military force but also '*peaceful… techniques*' like legal agreements and public opinion. So it is important to keep in mind that even peaceful methods can be highly coercive – the Oslo agreements constituted a peace settlement but not only did they carry binding obligations on each party (whether or not these were respected) but the consequences of implementing the agreements were at times anything but peaceful. Thus a legally binding agreement intended to inaugurate peaceful relations between former enemies can instead lead back to violent confrontation.

Conversely, though, military force can be applied in ways that illustrate the power of cooperation even though, in itself, it is not peaceful. One current example is the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, at its height in the week this chapter was written. Settler communities were being closed down and associated Israeli military infrastructure were to be withdrawn even though Palestinians in the occupied territories viewed both as highly coercive in themselves. Thus forces intended to maintain order or wage war could lead instead (though it remains to be seen) to more peaceful relations – despite increased tension between Israeli settlers and their own security forces in the interim.

This complex nature of power makes any traditional analysis based on the 'balance of power' (or coercion) inadequate on its own. The analysis here complements that with a new concept called 'the balance of peace' (or cooperation) which is the relative weight each party gives to peaceful, rather than military, techniques for resolving international conflicts. *The thesis here is that over the long term it is the balance of peace rather than the balance of power that will decide the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*.[7]

3.4 ANALYSIS

3.4.1 The Arab-Israeli Military Balance

As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of a wider Arab-Israeli dispute affecting Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in particular the analysis begins with an assessment of the power relationships between the governments and paramilitary groups involved.

The detailed evaluations by Anthony H. Cordesman demonstrate Israel's military superiority over its Arab neighbours in qualitative, rather than quantitative terms, i.e. in terms of high-tech weaponry and support systems (including training) rather than numbers of armed forces personnel and weapon systems.[8] Likewise Israel has had a clear lead in military spending but has a larger number of military contingencies to allow for. In view of the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and, more recently, between Israel and Jordan the present Arab-Israeli balance is, though, largely an Israeli-Syrian balance. It should be mentioned, too, that Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons although it has never officially declared this.

Turning to the Israeli-Palestinian military balance the PNA's domestic security services, formally established in 1994, have no heavy weaponry. Historically it is through 'asymmetric' or militarily unequal conflicts that the Palestinians have sought to redress the military imbalance with Israel. The First Intifada in the occupied territories (1987-1993) ended with the Oslo Accord while the Second or Al Aqsa Intifada began in September 2000 following the failure of the permanent status talks in July. This uprising may also have been influenced by Israel's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May that year after an eighteen year struggle against Shi'a factions, led by Hezbollah with Iranian and Syrian support.[9] For this was perceived as a military defeat for Israel by those advocating armed resistance by Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Predictions from War Scenarios

Before considering the different prospects for conflict in Gaza and the West Bank, amongst other war scenarios, Cordesman offers his views on the difficulties of prediction. He asserts that 'War simply is not predictable in terms of its timing, duration, intensity, and cost.' He does concede that 'It is possible to make rough subjective estimates of the potential outcome of a range of conflicts that illustrate the current and near-term risks in the balance, as well as possible considerations for force planning.'[10] While such estimates hardly predict the future they put the spotlight on key trends in the balance and make clear that the nature of a future war may differ in certain ways from a previous conflict.

Later it will be argued that part of this difficulty in predicting key trends arises from sole reliance on the balance of power. However, even on this basis, it is worth noting that, despite Cordesman's assessment in 2002 that it is 'almost impossible' to predict the political and strategic outcome of an enduring 'Second Intifada', his subsequent

conclusion that 'In short, neither side seems to have any military alternative that would allow it to truly "win"' that conflict appears (in 2005) to be close to the mark.[11]

Jihad or Holy War

What gave the Second Intifada its most controversial aspect, although this phenomenon long predated it, was the use of suicide bombings which are called 'martyrdom operations' by the Islamic militant groups that pioneered their use. This, in turn, has been linked to the Islamic concept of 'jihad' or striving that is also used by Muslims who have no connection to terrorist organisations or sympathy for their cause.

The work of a Muslim journalist, M K Akbar, has been taken as a starting point because he has written a history of jihad, which attempts to make the strongest case in favour without supporting the use of terror against civilians. The salient points are that: the jihad culture has its source in the anger against perceived injustice; it has been moulded by the history of Islam – which means surrender to the will of God – whose aim is peace but 'the Islamic faith also demands, from time to time, in a holy war defined by specific circumstances, the blood of the faithful in the defence of their faith.'[12] Believers may have to submit to an enemy but such a defeat is only a pause before renewal of jihad and the victory is achieved, as Allah has promised in His bargain with the believer specified in the Holy Quran. Akbar recognises that such a definition is open to abuse, because there is a risk that both the text and history will be reinterpreted to meet contemporary needs. Moreover, he accepts that the Prophet Muhammad insisted that the 'greater jihad' was the struggle to cleanse impurity within the believer but for Akbar that does not take away from 'the fact that the lesser jihad inspired the spirit that once made Muslim armies all-conquering' and enabled them to protect their holy places and most of the Muslim community or umma. This theme will be developed in the conclusions to this chapter.

Assessment

There does not appear to be any serious doubt that the balance of power in the Middle East favours Israel to such an extent that conventional war, except as a result of serious error or crisis mismanagement, is unlikely to occur for the foreseeable future. Deterrence is effective for now even if it cannot produce a comprehensive peace settlement. Beyond that, though, asymmetric conflict in the occupied territories (guerrilla war and terrorism) also appears unlikely to result in a decisive military victory for either side. While the Palestinians generally regard the occupation as a form of colonialism by Israeli settlers, supported and encouraged over the decades by Israeli governments and tolerated in the main by the United States, the Israelis also see this as their land, albeit disputed, as part of Eretz Israel and fully match the religious fervour of Islamic jihad culture with Jewish devotion and cultural traditions no less unbending to force or reason. Yet the mainstream on both sides, apart from Islamic and Jewish violent extremists and some secular paramilitaries as well, reject the use of terror against civilian targets whatever the reason.

In this climate, where each side has fought the other to a stalemate, if not to exhaustion or despair, the unilateral Israeli withdrawal around the 15 August 2005 Gaza deadline would

be an opportunity for rational persuasion to reassert itself in a renewed peace process – were it not that *each side remains wedded to a belief in the primacy of political and/or military strength as the basis for a negotiated solution or a unilaterally imposed solution*.

3.4.2 Economic Independence or Integration?

The generally poor economic picture in the Middle East since the 1980s was reflected and reinforced in the Palestinian territories where real per capita GDP for the West Bank and Gaza Strip fell an estimated 36 per cent between 1992 and 1996. This was due to the combined effects of falling aggregate incomes and strong population growth – half the population of Gaza being aged 14 years or less.[13] Hence it is appropriate to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli and Palestinian economies in relation to the Oslo Accord of 1993 and any future peace process.

The transformation of the *Israeli economy* since the crisis in the mid-1980s, under a centralised and state-driven economic policy and helped by large scale Jewish immigration particularly from Russia in the 1990s, led to economic growth averaging more than 5.2 per cent per annum between 1991-96.[14] The Israeli market economy evolved from heavy dependence on the public sector and collectivist institutions to a more liberal economy but with economic power highly concentrated in big business. This trend was facilitated by foreign direct investment and trade deregulation, further privatisation of state enterprises and reform of capital markets. Israel also became a major exporter of high technology equipment by the end of the 1990s, based on its indigenous defence industry. The gradual dismantling of Israel's protectionist trade regime and exposure of its domestic market to foreign imports led to a rapid increase in exports.

Underdeveloped before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and reliant on agriculture and monetary receipts, economic integration between Israel and the *Palestinian economy* until 1993 underpinned economic development. The customs union with Israel led to a growing concentration on the Israeli market – nearly all imports to Gaza and 90 per cent to the West Bank came from Israel while Israel took up to 82 per cent of all exports from Gaza in 1982 and Israel and Jordan each absorbed about 50 per cent of exports from the West Bank until the late 1980s.[15] Israeli policies hindered private sector growth while cheap unskilled or semi-skilled Palestinian labour, mainly to Israel became the chief source of export growth. Industry was limited to small subcontractors for Israeli firms in the textile sector. The combined GDP of the territories was only 5 per cent of Israel's in this period, indicating the scale of inequality in the relationship.

The Oslo Accords

The Paris Protocol of April 1994 laid the foundations for a customs union with Israel. The agreement had stipulated continuity of Palestinian employment but, instead, foreign workers were substituted due to the closures Israel maintained from 1991 as a result of regular terrorist attacks. Consequently employment of Palestinians in Israel fell from 30 per cent in 1991 to 7 per cent in 1996 with heavy loss of income. Trade decreased in the early to mid-1990s as imports fell by a quarter and exports by almost a half. GDP

declined by about 14 per cent between 1992-96 and the territories became even more dependent on Israel so that by 1998, 95 per cent of exports were to Israel.[16] Without over $4 billion of foreign aid pledged during the five-year interim period of Oslo it is estimated that GNP would have fallen by a further 6 to 11 per cent.[17] The PNA became the largest single employer accounting for 20 per cent of the workforce by mid-1998 when it then employed 50,000 civilians and 40,000 police.[18]

The Second Intifada led to even higher rates of unemployment and poverty just as the Palestinian economy indicated some recovery in the first half of 2000. By this stage a dualistic economy had evolved split between a politicised core of monopolistic conglomerates and private small and medium-sized companies.[19]

Big business in Israel has promoted the benefits of regional reconciliation since the start of the First Intifada in 1987. However, the real peace dividend for them lay in the opening of markets to third countries like India, Japan or China which came about as the Arab trade boycott dissolved in the 1990s. Intense internal debates among Israeli industrialists and big business associations, regarding economic relations with the Palestinians, resulted in a compromise in 1999 between the advocates of economic integration, favoured by big business, and clear regulations, if not economic separation, preferred by traders and small businesses. The Israel Manufacturers Association advocated creating a customs union, but with physical borders and customs controls. During a transitional period specific sectors would be given temporary protection.[20]

Part of the desire by *Palestinian business people* for separation and an autonomous economic policy lay in their disappointment over the first two years of co-operation under the Paris Protocol. Privately, though, many were not in favour of severing their ties with the Israeli economy, in view of their dependence on Israeli raw materials and markets. A division occurred amongst Palestinians: the newly emerging commercial order supported greater independence as did smaller businesses, especially in food or pharmaceuticals, which sought protection for local industries; but sectors like textiles, stone or marble, strongly rejected separation. The Palestinian Trade Centre, a business association promoting the private sector, came to lobby for a free trade agreement with Israel, in relation to permanent status negotiations, but this was omitted from the final recommendations of the PNA-initiated National Economic Dialogue Project in 1999, which reiterated the desire for more economic independence from Israel.[21]

Assessment

While big business in Israel has sustained interest in co-operation with counterparts in the Palestinian occupied territories, particularly through industrial joint ventures that draw on Israeli knowledge and technology and cheap but now skilled Palestinian labour, Israelis are also interested in maintaining their economic dominance and beneficial labour-sharing arrangements. This is politically sensitive for the Palestinians who after decades of economic integration with, and dependence on, Israel are seeking to reverse the trend.

In this climate where economic co-operation produced limited results under Oslo and the national desire of Palestinians for greater separation is currently matched by a similar political preference by the Israeli government, with potential economic implications, *there is a strong tension with the current realities of close economic integration and dependence*.[22] While foreign aid, pledged by donors at the London meeting in March 2005, may help the Palestinians, as such aid did in the 1990s, there is little reason to believe on the basis of that experience that development assistance can create either peace or prosperity on its own in the face of economic shocks and structural constraints.[23]

3.4.3 A Two-State Solution?

The consensus on the political front is more clear-cut though far from clear on detail. The current Israeli government (in 2005), reversing decades of Likud policy, has indicated its willingness to accept a Palestinian state but understandings of the terms 'sovereignty' and 'independence' in relation to such a state differ widely as between the parties to the conflict. Even so, while for years each denied the national identity of the other, since Oslo in 1993 there appears to be a greater willingness for mutual recognition.

International support for the Palestinian Authority and a two-state solution was reflected in the official conclusions to the London meeting on 1 March 2005. The participants to this meeting (though Israel did not attend):

> '… reaffirmed their commitment to achieving a resolution of this conflict through direct negotiations leading to the goal of **two states** – a safe and secure Israel and a sovereign, independent, viable, democratic and territorially contiguous Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.'[24] [Emphasis in the original.]

This was done as part of their commitment to a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement consistent with the 'Roadmap' of the Quartet and based on UN Security Council resolutions including 242 and 338.[25]

Assessment

A two-state solution, whatever its merits, is still partition to its detractors. For even the sympathetic and insightful analysis of Palestinian institutional development by Nathan J. Brown, whose central theme is that defining Palestine is not about how Palestinian politics should begin based on Oslo but how it should *resume* from mandatory Palestine, shows that much of this struggle has concerned how to build a Palestinian state as separate as possible from the conflict with Israel.[26] It could be argued, though, as the late Edward W. Said did in an article in 1999, that both Palestinian and Israeli visions of separation are unrealistic, due to the close proximity of the two populations resulting from Israeli settlement policies since 1967, and 'destined for decades of future violence.'[27] The Geneva Accord, for example, of a group of Palestinians and Israelis demonstrates that a draft final status deal is possible[28] but not that the problems of implementation would be any less than for Oslo. This approach might, contrary to the intentions of its authors, end in violence rather than a secure peace.

Lessons from Oslo

The proponents of informal 'Track-II' diplomacy draw a distinction between the ultimate failure of the Oslo *process* to deliver a final, secure resolution of the conflict and the effectiveness of these talks as a breakthrough *mechanism* in 1993.[29] The Oslo talks had initially involved two Israeli professors and three low profile official representatives of the PLO who regularly took part in academic conferences. Neither group had any discernible involvement in military operations. Despite the reservations of the then Israeli prime minister, Yitzak Rabin, about anything intellectual or run by academics it was this process rather than the formal Track-I Madrid talks that achieved the breakthrough, albeit with the assistance of trained Israeli negotiators in the later stages.[30]

It is not hard to see that if reasonable people from both sides sit down in a relaxed environment to discuss, in good faith, possible solutions to a seemingly intractable conflict then a major advance may be possible. However, it is one thing to agree the terms of such a settlement in that kind of climate and quite another to implement it in the outside world where some people on both sides are neither reasonable nor disposed to peaceful means of conflict resolution. If education (and educators) could, though, undeniably contribute to a breakthrough mechanism then why not to the process itself? *So it is not the terms of any 'final' political settlement but the means used to implement it that will be decisive as to whether a two- or one-state solution leads to peace or war.*

Creating a Culture of Peace or War

The potential role of education in evaluating and influencing the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is outlined in Appendix F. One of the most politically sensitive but formative subjects is the teaching of history in schools. In this respect the work of Ruth Firer and Sami Adwan, supported by the Georg Eckert Institute, offers a model of how to evaluate as objectively as possible the way each side's identity has been forged in a culture of war through over a hundred years. Their project illustrates how, by putting the narratives of Israeli and Palestinian histories side-by-side in a common format and assessing them against agreed criteria, it is possible to reach conclusions and make recommendations that will help to transform a culture of war to a culture of peace.[31] In 2002 over 150,000 people were involved in Arab-Jewish coexistence activities in Israel.[32]

Closer still to the concept of the 'peace games' is another project, beginning in 1996 and involving a group of Middle East experts, aimed at testing international relations theories to see how well they forecast the direction of Israeli-Palestinian relations. While this study is of particular interest, because of the dual concern with not only predicting outcomes but also with the research model used to arrive at those forecasts, sufficient time had not yet passed to evaluate all aspects of those forecasts.[33] In particular, it is unclear how the model links five possible outcomes by 2002, including a two-state solution or a negotiated agreement for Palestinian autonomy, to high or low levels of conflict. For as argued above, either outcome could lead to greater or lesser violence depending on the circumstances surrounding a given settlement.

The time has come to draw together the strands of this analysis to show how conclusions about the prospects for peace or war between Israelis and Palestinians can be derived.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS: THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

The prospects for peace between Israel and the PNA are based on the preceding analysis of the three assumptions (in section 3.3) covering the military, economic and institutional dimensions of security. Instead of just examining the balance of power, which favours Israel in each aspect, comparisons also include both parties' co-operation with the other – the 'balance of peace' – in terms of the likely consequences for peace or war:

For the Palestinians

The view expressed publicly by Hamas, as an Islamic militant movement willing to use terror against civilian targets, that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is a 'military victory' for them[34] illustrates how year after year the culture of jihad has served to undermine the Palestinian case before the Western world. Their position and others like them might, in this respect, be compared to that of the Zealots about two thousand years ago who regarded co-operation with imperial Rome as a corruption of Jewish values.[35] No doubt inspired by previous military successes in Jewish history, a series of revolts were instigated which were all eventually crushed by the Romans leading to a large Jewish Diaspora. No matter how often the revolutionaries were defeated it made no difference to their willingness to try again until their ruin and that of their people was completed.

So drastic an outcome today is not expected but the threat of transfers of the Palestinian population, if terrorist violence is resumed on a large scale at a later date, is still real while the practical misuse of the idea of jihad in Islamic thought remains. This is a struggle only Muslims can wage with Muslims but until the greater jihad – the Jihad al Akbar, the war against the enemy within to cleanse impurity – is given priority over the lesser jihad – the Jihad al Asghar, that is fought on the battlefield – it would be impossible to achieve the spiritual renewal in mandatory Palestine that could begin to reflect the early successes of Islam in the time of the Prophet. For the victory at Badr, in Islamic tradition, was won by God and not by a 'martyrdom operation' against civilians.

For the Palestinians, therefore, neither military 'victories' nor economic separation nor a two-state solution can in themselves secure the peace for future generations. **The prediction is for war without end until the greater jihad assumes priority in practice over the lesser jihad in the Palestinian national movement's relations with Israel.**

For the Israelis

Of all nations the Jewish people are best placed to understand that a belief, deeply held, cannot be destroyed by external force. For it has been their destiny to sustain belief in one God through ages when they had no state of their own, in the face of persecutions and injustices beyond number, culminating in an attempt at annihilation of its defenceless

people without precedent from within a European civilisation at war, which destroyed its perpetrators and helped restore a Jewish kingdom after two thousand years. The cost was incalculable but, in Jewish tradition, achieved by God rather than by military might.

Granted that secularists may take a different view, the point here is that fundamental change, such as the re-establishment of a Jewish state, would be incomprehensible on the basis of a 'balance of power' approach alone. For on their own admission, Jews were powerless to protect themselves when others failed to do so. Zionism did not precede Judaism but built its political and, later, its military might on that legacy – the promise to the patriarchs. The Hebrew Scriptures, authoritative for religious Jews, indict those who ascribed their successes to any but God. For example, even from the English translations the greatness of King David lay not in his military victories or political might. His rise to power proved this: his victory over Goliath is attributed to God and not to swords or spears. While military and political strength must always have a role to play in this world, the evidence of the place of Israeli force against even peaceful or less violent protests[36] militates against the creation of a climate of peace between Israelis and Arabs.

For the Israelis, therefore, neither military victories nor economic separation nor a two-state solution can in themselves secure the peace for future generations. **The prediction is for war without end until peaceful initiatives – like the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza – can assume priority in practice over political and military strength in Israel's relations with the Palestinian national movement.**

3.6 CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE ANALYSIS AGAINST THE SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE CONFLICT AREA

Reviewing the prospects for war between Palestinians and Israelis hereafter would be based on two simple assumptions:

1. The greater the imbalance in military power between parties in dispute the greater the likelihood of war (because either the more powerful side will be tempted to use that military might to enforce its will or the weaker side will resort to indirect military methods such as guerrilla war and terrorism);
2. The greater the imbalance between one party's peaceful methods of conflict resolution as compared to others (the 'balance of peace') the greater the likelihood of war (because lack of reciprocity tends eventually to undermine peaceful methods of conflict resolution in favour of military methods).[37]

Or vice versa, in predicting the prospects for peace. An imbalance of military power need not matter if it is off-set by a favourable 'balance of peace' between the parties.

The specific criteria for evaluating the analysis at regular intervals would be as follows:

- 'War without end' means the outbreak of armed conflict in Israeli/PNA territories at periodic intervals indefinitely. The tests applied would be whether:

a. An armed conflict is contained rather than resulting in, or threatening, a wider Middle Eastern or global war;
b. The Islamic practice of jihad in the Arab Middle East moves away from the lesser to the greater jihad, i.e. from a culture of war to a culture of peace;
c. Israeli relations with the Palestinians give greater emphasis to peaceful means of conflict resolution than to their relative political and military strength.

If peace is secured within a generation so that guerrilla war and terrorism ends or, in the event of an occasional outbreak of armed conflict, 'a' applies despite the lack of progress on 'b' or 'c' then the conclusions of this chapter will have been refuted and the usefulness of the method of analysing the conflict (at section 3.3) will be in doubt.

The international community's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly the Quartet, is regarded as important in facilitating conflict resolution but not as a primary determinant of outcomes unless a broader Middle Eastern or global war is threatened.

3.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

In this analysis the prospects for peace are directly related to the fairness (or justice) with which each party to the conflict evaluates the other parties' positions in the peace process. In so doing it is important to remember that while there can be no peace without justice between the parties it is also true that there can be *no peace without mercy*. For this reason, the primary role of education (and religion) in the legally charitable sense needs to be recognised in evaluating the peace process with fairness and compassion.

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[2] . See www.ipp2000.org under 'IPP History' for full details.
[3] . See IPP Briefing No. 1, Appendix A4 below.
[4] . See Appendix A1 below.
[5] . See Appendix A5 below.
[6] . See Project on Demilitarisation (Prodem) Briefing No. 1 and Series A where these concepts are applied to the ending of the Cold War: Peter Southwood (ed.) with Steve Schofield and Ian Davis, The Triumph of Unilateralism: The Failure of Western Militarism, No. 1 (March 1993); NATO's Military Supremacy: What Is It For?; No. A/1 (September 1993); with Ian Davis, Western Generals: The Dangers from British and American Military Success, No. A/2 (University of Leeds, April 1994); Military Adventurism: Learning from the Past - Looking to the Future, No. A/3 (University of Leeds, October 1995).
[7] . The IPP Background Paper, December 2002, p.1 states: 'The focus of IPP is the "balance of peace" (i.e. between peaceful* and military techniques for resolving international disputes) which is emerging as an integral part of the global war on terrorism. An imbalance of peace means an undue prevalence of warlike values and ideas or, conversely, peaceful values and ideas. The one manifests itself in proposals for excessive military forces, judged against any conceivable threat, and a level of military expenditures beyond the requirements for defence. Or vice versa.' (Cf. Prodem Background Paper, October 1992.) *Examples of peaceful techniques or methods include economic, social and diplomatic means. The contrast with military methods also implies they are based on consent rather than coercion by the parties in dispute.
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[9] . See Appendix B4, A7.4, A9.2 and Table B2 below.
[10] . See Appendix B2.4 below quoting Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2002), p. 171.

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[18] . See Appendix C2.3 below citing Roy (see note 16), p. 71; and Stanley Fischer, Patricia Alonso-Gamo and Ulric Erickson von Allmen, 'Economic Developments in the West Bank and Gaza Since Oslo', Economic Journal, vol. 111 (June 2001), p. F262.
[19] . See Appendix C2.4 below.
[20] . See Appendix C3.1 below.
[21] . See Appendix C3.2 below.
[22] . See Appendix B2.4 and C3.3 below.
[23] . See Appendix C4.7 below.
[24] . 'Conclusions of the London Meeting On Supporting the Palestinian Authority, 1 March 2005', p.1 accessed from UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office web site at: www.fco.gov.uk on 5 March 2005.
[25] . See Appendix A7.2, A7.3 and A9.3 below. The 'Quartet' consists of the United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations.
[26] . See Appendix D2 below.
[27] . See Appendix D4.1 below quoting Edward W. Said, 'What Can Separation Mean?' in The End of the Peace Process (Granta Books, London, 2002), p. 328.
[28] . See Appendix D4.2 below.
[29] . See Appendix D3.1 below (defining 'Track-II' talks) and Appendix D3.3.
[30] . See Appendix D3.2 below.
[31] . See Appendix F2 below.
[32] . See Appendix F4 citing Cookie White Stephan et al, 'Introduction to Improving Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel: Theory and Practice in Coexistence Educational Programs', Journal of Social Issues, pp. 238-9.
[33] . See Appendix F3.5 below.
[34] . See 'Hamas Under Attack from Abbas and Israeli Forces', Financial Times, 16-17 July 2005: 'Hamas appears determined that if and when the withdrawal [from Gaza] takes place, it will be able to claim it as a victory for its resistance against Israel'. A Hamas spokesman on BBC 1 Television News duly made the claim of military victory during the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
[35] . See Appendix A2 below.
[36] . See Appendix A7.4 and A9.2 below.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – HISTORY

A1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to enable the reader to understand key historical experiences that forged the cultural and national identities of Israelis and Palestinians.

This is clearly a difficult task because each 'side' understands history differently. As the historian, Charles D. Smith, puts it:

> … a word about the question of balance or fairness when subjects are so controversial and arouse intense emotions. As a historian I believe it necessary to examine other peoples and eras in light of the values and historical processes that produced them. This means that opinions and claims abhorrent to observers removed from the scene may become entirely comprehensible when viewed as part of a people's history and interaction with others. I therefore consider Zionist and Palestinian attitudes to be equally comprehensible in the context of their respective histories and cultures.[1]

The problems, arising from diametrically opposed interpretations of history by parties in dispute, are addressed in Appendix F on 'Education and Politics'. Here parts of Smith's work are summarised; facts are selected on the basis of what is relevant to the purpose stated above. Reference is then made to a scholarly work, edited by Dietrich Jung, which argues that regional patterns of conflict, like that in the Middle East, are closely linked to international relations and their directions have to be understood in a global context.[2]

A2 PALESTINE AND ERETZ ISRAEL

Modern day Israel includes much of what was Palestine. Known to Jews as Eretz Israel – the 'land of Israel' – it was established around 1,000 B.C. (Different dating systems are used by Jews and Muslims.[3]) Before the region was Israel or Palestine it was inhabited by Canaanites who 'belonged to the northwest Semitic peoples of northern Mesopotamia and Syria, of which the Jews were also a part.'[4] Canaanite culture was distinguished by a linear alphabet, of which Hebrew was a dialect, which became the basis of Western writing systems. Jewish distinctiveness was based on a monotheistic faith when most other cultures at that time were characterised by the belief in many gods. Centuries later, faith in one God became the basis for Christianity and then Islam.

The Jews believed that God had given them the land of Canaan and they entered the region in the twelfth century B.C. at about the same time that a people of Greek origin called Philistines, from whom the name Palestine derived, settled in the coastal plains. After about two hundred years the Jews defeated the Philistines and Canaanites and, as part of the conquest, captured Jerusalem under their king David. The first temple was built there by his son, Solomon. After his death the kingdom divided: Israel, in the north, surviving until 722 B.C. when it was conquered by the Assyrians; and Judah, in the south, lasting until the Babylonians subjugated it in 586 B.C. and destroyed the temple.

The Babylonian exile was ended after the Persian conquest of Babylon in 539 B.C. and Jews were permitted to return to Palestine. Those that did rebuilt the temple in Jerusalem but remained subject to foreign rule until one such ruler rededicated the temple to the Greek god Zeus, thereby provoking a violent rebellion, led by the Maccabees, which restored Jewish independence by 140 B.C. This ended, though, by 63 B.C. with the incorporation of Palestine into the Roman Empire. Tensions arose between those within Judaism who favoured cooperation with Rome and those, like the Zealots, who regarded this as a corruption of Jewish values. The most serious revolt against Rome led to the destruction of Jerusalem and the second temple in A.D. 70. Further unrest led to one final armed rebellion from A.D. 132 to 135, which was eventually heavily defeated by the Romans resulting in a large Jewish 'Diaspora' or dispersion to lands outside Palestine. Jews still regarded Eretz Israel as the promised land and Jerusalem its religious centre.[5]

A3 THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Once the Eastern Roman Empire became Christian, its Byzantine rulers applied existing Roman laws against Jews more rigorously and developed new regulations to isolate them. The intensity of persecution varied at different times and in relation to the ebb and flow of Byzantine wars with the Persian Sassanid dynasty, particularly over Palestine and Jerusalem. Then, in A.D. 632-633, the Arabs invaded the central Middle East.

This change resulted from the impact of the Prophet Muhammad and the revelation from God which he delivered to the Arabs. It became the religion of Islam, which means submission to the will of God. Scholars differ on the question of whether Muhammad intended to take Islam beyond the Arabian peninsular but that did occur and within about a century of his death Islam extended 'from the Pyrenees in Europe to beyond the Oxus River in Central Asia and to the Indus River Basin in India.'[6] However, the religion split into two major parts, Sunni and Shi'i Islam, over who was the rightful successor to Muhammad as leader of the Muslim community, with consequential differences in religious interpretation.

The attitude of Muslims to Jews and Christians was generally tolerant because they were recipients of the divine message, and thus had a place in the lineage of Islam, but they were regarded as inferior because it was believed they had corrupted God's messages to them. Jews and Christians became known as 'dhimmis', those to whom Muslim rulers granted protection in return for their submission and payment of 'jizya', a poll tax paid by non-Muslims. This protection included their right to worship in their own way.[7]

Although Palestine occupied a generally minor role in Islamic history until the modern era – except during the Crusades from 1097 to 1291 – Jerusalem was the third holiest city in Islam, after Mecca and Medina. According to Islamic tradition, Muhammad stopped there briefly during his night journey to heaven and set foot on the Temple Mount, site of the Jewish temples. A shrine over the stone, the Dome of the Rock, commemorates this.

A4 PALESTINE AND THE ORIGINS OF ZIONISM

The Ottoman Turks took Palestine in 1516-17 and ruled it until the end of the First World War. As Sunni Muslims, the Ottomans regarded dhimmis as inferiors but accepted responsibility for their protection. At first their status was much better than that of Jews in medieval or early modern Europe. However, the position started to change in the eighteenth century due to increasing European influence and patronage of Christian minorities. Ottoman efforts to resist these pressures failed and resulted in a reorientation of Muslim–non-Muslim relations in the mid-19th century with serious future implications.

Land ownership was a crucial issue affecting social relations and power resulting from the impact of the Ottoman land reform laws passed in 1858 and 1867. In Palestine the inconsistent implementation of these laws paved the way for extensive outside investment but with little Ottoman success in controlling the revenues derived:

> It is clear that a major transformation of landholding patterns had occurred in Palestine before the Zionist immigration began, with the beneficiaries being either Palestinian notables or outsiders, usually Christians from the coastal areas.[8]

Economic data indicate a major expansion of Palestinian productivity in agriculture and industry before Zionist colonisation. This, though, reflected a colonial phenomenon: the relative inefficiency of indigenous production methods compared to those introduced by European colonists, which in Palestine included Jews from the 1880s onwards. Between 1895 and 1914 some 40,000 Jews entered Palestine mainly to establish agricultural colonies rather than to settle in cities, and less for religious reasons than to create a base for the future restoration of Israel. By 1914, though, out of a population of 650,000 some 80,000 were Jewish settlers and 25,000 to 40,000 other European or Arab settlers.[9]

The existence of a predominantly Palestinian Arab population does not mean that it had acquired a national consciousness by this stage. New scholarship does indicate that educated Palestinian Arabs did identify themselves with a region, Palestine, defined by boundaries. This did not, though, arise solely from their encounter with Jewish nationalism in the form of Zionism as has often been assumed. Nationalism in the European secular sense defined the bonds linking a people to a particular piece of land as their main source of identity. This was a part of Zionism and would be used to justify Zionist claims to Palestine, albeit as a religious legacy from a Jewish kingdom that had existed two millennia before. In 1914 Zionists comprised 31 per cent of the Jewish population of Palestine and less than four per cent of the total population.[10]

A4.1 The Modern Zionist Movement

The driving motivation behind modern Zionism was its desire to establish an independent Jewish life in Palestine but this owed more to secular nationalism and discrimination against Jews in Western and, particularly, Eastern Europe than to religious Judaism:

> Modern Zionism differed from the traditional Jewish yearning to return to Zion, Eretz Israel, in that religious Jews viewed the matter as one to be decided by God. Just as their exile reflected Yahweh's [i.e. God's] punishment of Jews for their transgressions of His laws, so would their return indicate that He had granted them redemption, a redemption that many believed could occur only when the end of the world was at hand. In contrast, modern or political Zionism was activist and predominantly secular. It was a movement of Jews who were disenchanted with their religious culture but who rejected the idea of assimilation into European society. This seemed impossible because of the persistence of hostility toward Jews despite the passage of laws in Western Europe granting them equality. The situation was much worse in Eastern Europe, where the persecution of Jews intensified as the [nineteenth] century drew to a close.[11]

The term 'anti-Semitism' was coined during the 1880s to underline that this hostility was racial and, therefore, 'modern' rather than based on the religious antipathy of old.

The first wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine, following the pogroms in Russia between 1881 to 1884, were mostly inspired by religious rather than nationalist motives and the majority settled in urban areas instead of the new agricultural villages. It was only after the formation of the World Zionist Organisation in 1897, called by Theodor Herzl who became its president, that the development of Zionism was able to exert a larger influence on the second wave of immigrants into Palestine between 1904 and 1914. This congress at Basle in 1897 had declared the goal of Zionism to be 'the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by public law.'[12] To allay Ottoman objections to self-rule and fears of European intervention neither the real objective of a Jewish state nor its basis in international, rather than public, law were openly declared. The World Zionist Organisation created its own bank in 1899 and in 1901 a Jewish National Fund was established with the stated purpose of buying and developing land for Jewish settlements in Palestine – land that became inalienably Jewish and could not be worked by non-Jews. The ideological commitment of second wave immigrants, many nurtured in Russia's revolutionary atmosphere, was to socialist ideals but as part of a separate Jewish movement. Their vision of a new Jewish society, based on Jewish labour alone, involved a commitment to the land and establishing a socialist agricultural basis for a future Israel. By 1914 fourteen out of the forty-four existing Jewish agricultural settlements had been sponsored by the World Zionist Organisation.[13]

A4.2 The Arab Response

Palestine at the beginning of the twentieth century comprised an Arab population that was mostly Sunni Muslim whilst eleven per cent were Christian, the main denomination being Greek Orthodox. Most Muslims regarded themselves as Ottoman subjects with allegiance to the sultan or caliph as head of the Islamic community. Greek Orthodox Christians, in particular, appear to have been more aware of their identity as living in a specific area called Palestine, distinct from Syria of which it was an administrative part.

> What is clear is that Zionism, with its goal of establishing a dominant Jewish presence in Palestine, revised significantly the Arab conception of the Jews and their place in a Muslim society. Zionists and Zionist claims changed completely the traditional Muslim conception of Jews as occupying dhimmi status, protected by, but subordinate to, Muslims, a role that most Ottoman Jews had continued to play despite the legal equality they had been granted along with Christians as a result of Tanzimat [or the reordering of society] reforms [dating back to 1839]. Zionism, as a European movement, came to be seen initially as another attempt by Western imperialism to subordinate Muslims to Europeans, and became even more threatening once it was realized that the Zionists wished to take part of what had been Arab lands for centuries and remake it into a Jewish homeland. Arab opposition emerged before World War 1 in response to Zionist immigration and land purchase and was shared by Muslims and Christians alike.[14]

Although there was some violence by Arab peasants opposed to Jewish land purchases most gradually accepted Jewish landowners because they were permitted to work the land and derive an income – despite criticisms of these practices by labour Zionists.

A5 THE BALFOUR DECLARATION AND ARAB NATIONALISM

The issuing of the 'Balfour Declaration', named after the then British foreign secretary, was the result of intense lobbying by leading Zionists including Chaim Weizmann (later first president of the state of Israel). In the view of Charles D. Smith, this Declaration would not have been made unless Weizmann's arguments concerning the value of Zionism to British interests had blended with events that seemed to show he was right so that British officials decided that they would rather control Palestine than allow it to be internationalised.[15] Key statesmen also had a genuine sympathy for Zionism.

The cabinet approved the Balfour Declaration, which was issued as a letter to Lord Rothschild, titular head of the British Jewish community, on 2 November 1917. It stated:

> His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.[16]

Thus only the civil and religious rights of the 90 per cent non-Jewish (i.e. Arab) majority at the time would be respected while political rights would be just for the Jewish community, subject to their attaining a majority. The reference to the rights of Jews in other countries was inserted to meet the concerns of the one Jewish cabinet member that granting national status to Jews, whom he regarded as a culture not a nation, would arouse European anti-Semitism by emphasising Jewish distinctiveness.

Once the Balfour Declaration had been issued the British sought to offer assurances (beyond those previously made) to Sharif Husayn, who had declared an Arab revolt against their Turkish overlords in June 1916. In the context of British Middle East policy during the First World War, the need to support Husayn and the continuation of the Arab Revolt led to a statement referring to the Arabs' achievement of independence as a nation and proclaimed British government support for Jewish immigration into Palestine only 'in as far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political…' [17] Such assurances of political freedom for Palestinian Arabs were not contained in the Balfour Declaration but they reassured Husayn for the time being.

Subsequent attempts by British administrators in Palestine to be fair to both sides were seen by Zionists as threatening to undermine Jewish prospects for an independent state. However, the Allied distribution of 'mandates', established by the newly created League of Nations after the war, gave Britain Palestine in 1920 (ratified in 1922). The mandatory power accepted a mandate on the proviso that it would facilitate the development of the political, economic and social institutions of a given area to achieve self-government and then withdraw. In the case of Palestine, the Balfour Declaration was included in the obligations for the mandatory power such that the conditions for Jewish immigration to achieve eventual dominance were to be assisted.[18] At about the same time a short-lived independent Arab kingdom in Syria left a memory of Arab independence and potential for Arab unity that was to echo down the years to the present time and pit Arab nationalisms in specific countries like Syria or Palestine against Pan Arabism.

In the context of relations between the great powers, the struggle between Jews and Palestinian Arabs was just beginning:

> Each rejected the idea that the British had an obligation to the other. The idea of fairness under the mandate, of encouraging the development of self-governing institutions, could apply only to themselves, not to their rivals. For the British to attempt to balance the scales was, to the Arabs, a denial of their basic rights, to the Jews, the same, and to some signifying the anti-Semitism of the British administrators in the bargain. There was to be no harmonizing of these conflicting conceptions of 'right'…[19]

A6 CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

A6.1 The Interwar Years, 1920-1939

During most of the interwar period British officials sought to placate Arab opinion, concerning Jewish immigration and the building of a national home, whilst simultaneously ensuring that no concessions were made that would seriously impede Zionist efforts. However, after their crushing of the Arab Revolt between 1936 to 1939, the British White Paper of 1939 declared, against the background of developing tensions in Europe and the Mediterranean, that 'His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the

Arab population of the country.'[20] The White Paper called for the establishment of a Jewish National Home within an independent Palestinian state.

Like the Balfour Declaration, the White Paper was motivated by strategic considerations related to war efforts, in the latter case imminent in 1939, but unlike the Balfour Declaration it showed no concern for Jews or Palestinian Arabs. Britain's new regard for Arab objections to Zionism reflected the greater importance of Arab opinion in the wider Middle East to British interests than Jewish opinion in Palestine or London. While moderate Arabs found the White Paper helpful more militant views rejected, as they had done since 1918, the notion that any part of Palestine could be given to the Zionists. On the other hand, the White Paper shocked the Zionist leadership into reassessing their links to Britain. Ben-Gurion, later Israel's prime minister, thought that the support of another great power with a large Jewish community would have to be sought: the United States. He insisted on the Jewish right to determine its own course, without regard to British policies. Thus military co-operation against the Axis powers went hand in hand with illegal arms acquisitions to prepare for probable armed conflict with Britain thereafter.[21]

There had been a great expansion of both Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine between 1919 and 1939-40 but also an increasing separation. By the end of that period Jews had become almost 30 per cent of the population (compared to 10 per cent at the beginning) or about 467,000 out of a total population of some 1.528 million. The Arab population had increased from 660,641 in 1922 (the first census) to around 1.061 million in 1940.[22]

A6.2 The Second World War

The consequences of the Second World War on Palestine and the future of Zionism went far beyond the military situation. In 1941 Adolf Hitler began to implement his plan for exterminating peoples described as inferior according to Nazi doctrine. Primarily this policy of genocide was focused, first, on European Jews and, secondly, on gypsies though other categories were also included. By 1945 approximately 6 million Jews, about two-thirds of the total in Europe, had been deliberately rounded up and systematically killed by gassing and other means.[23] Awareness of the Holocaust, from late 1942, led to growing Jewish demands for the Allies to make every effort to take in refugees and that Palestine now be recognised as a Jewish state to house survivors. By the end of the war Zionism and the future of the Jewish survivors in Europe were closely interlinked in United States politics thereby producing a difference of policy between the British and American governments on the issue of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Arab response to Zionism and awareness of the Holocaust was formulated by a meeting of Arab heads of state in October 1944. This conference called for the formation of what became (in March 1945) a League of Arab states. The conference declared:

> Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab world and that the rights of the Arabs [Palestinian] cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab world…

> The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes that have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, that is, by inflicting injustice on the Palestine Arabs of various religions and denominations.[24]

This remained at the heart of the Arab argument against Zionism to the present day.

A6.3 Partition of Palestine, 1948

For the British, after the Second World War, facing US opposition to their policy and also Zionist terror in Palestine aimed at driving them out, the burden became too much. The Labour government passed the issue over to the United Nations setting the scene for war between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Amidst continuing crisis and conflict David Ben-Gurion declared, on 14 May 1948, that the state of Israel existed within the borders awarded it by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) partition plan, except for the Negev region where Israeli control was unsure. The USA was the first country to recognise Israel, followed immediately by the Soviet Union. On the same day Arab states sent armies into Arab Palestine and the new Jewish state.[25]

The wars of 1948 were devastating for the Palestinian Arabs, the one after independence as much as the one before. During the fighting with Arab states, Israelis began a deliberate policy of ejecting Arabs from the territories they occupied and forcing them into Arab-held territory. Between 400,000 and 450,000 Arabs were expelled or fled. Just 133,000, of the approximately 860,000 Arabs who had their homes in what was now called Israel, remained. Of the rest, 470,000 became refugees in camps either in Arab Palestine, controlled by Jordan, or in the Gaza Strip, which was held by Egypt, while the remainder were dispersed into Lebanon, Syria and Jordan itself with Egypt and Iraq taking smaller numbers.[26] After this dispersion, the Palestinian question became a matter of refugees to be addressed by Arab states until a Palestinian national movement began to emerge in the 1960s, itself frequently at the mercy of Arab state rivalries.

The Israeli population, on the other hand, soared to one million as a wave of immigrants entered the new state. About half were Jews from Arab lands whose position had become unsustainable, particularly in Iraq, following the creation of the state of Israel. By 1952, 325,000 Jews had migrated to Israel from Arab Middle East as a result of persecution, ending centuries of existence as minorities under Muslim rule.[27]

A7 THE ISRAELI-PALESTINAN CONFLICT, 1949-1993

Israel found itself, after the conclusion of the UN-sponsored armistice agreements between the Arab states and Israel in 1949, in a very hostile environment. Technically a state of belligerency still existed and Israel's successful defence of its borders, which remained on agreed armistice lines until the 1967 war, did not bring official recognition by Arab states or many other states. The issue of Palestinian Arab refugees was a major

stumbling block. Arab leaders regarded Israel as the product of Western imperialism, populated by Europeans with the encouragement of European and American governments whilst other Arab lands were struggling for full independence from European domination. Arab attitudes were unjustified from an Israeli perspective. In their view Arab governments should recognise Israel and integrate Palestinian Arabs into their own societies. Moreover, Arab incursions over armistice lines should be controlled by Arab governments, which ought to be held responsible for any forays into Israeli territory. Military security was paramount for Israelis and Ben-Gurion undertook an activist policy, which was not limited to defence but embraced retaliation against the countries from which infiltrators came.[28] (See Appendix B3 for more details.)

A7.1 Formation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation

In January 1964 a summit held in Cairo under the auspices of the Arab League took the decision to create an organisation that would represent Palestinians and strive towards the liberation of Palestine. The inaugural conference of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was held in May 1964. Syria, for its part, turned to a smaller Palestinian organisation, al-Fatah, which was willing to conduct military operations against Israel.[29]

Fatah had been formed in 1958 comprising, as its core, young Palestinians who had fled to Egyptian-controlled Gaza when Israel was created. One of these was Yasir Arafat, later the PLO leader. Several factions emerged, most of which were identified with current ideas on Arabism and Arab unity under the heading of the Arab National Movement. Within this framework Arab unity was seen as the precursor for the liberation of Palestine but the leaders of Fatah took the opposing view: that military action to liberate Palestine had to precede the achievement of Arab unity. By mid-1965, when Fatah had started to attack Israeli installations and work up plans to terrorise the population, its pamphlets argued that such actions would help ensure the right level of tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours leading to Arab unity to confront Israeli military threats. The eventual result would be Arab victory and the liberation of Palestine.

A7.2 The 1967 War and Its Aftermath

Instead, the 1967 War was a shocking debacle for the Arabs. This war did result, though, in a UN resolution, based on a joint US and Soviet draft, which has remained the official foundation for negotiating efforts to resolve the questions raised by Israeli occupation of Arab lands ever since. Security Council Resolution 242 stressed the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.’ It called for ‘withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied in the recent conflict’ and for ‘the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force.’ Another clause referred to ‘a just settlement of the [Palestinian] refugee problem.’[30]

While Arab and Israeli efforts continued on the diplomatic front, Palestinian groups re-evaluated the means to vest control of Palestine from the Israelis. Yasir Arafat, the Fatah leader, promoted the start of a war of liberation from inside the newly occupied West Bank. However, efforts to that end were unsuccessful in 1967 due to effective Israeli retaliation and intelligence and also the lack of a mass response from Palestinians.[31]

A7.3 The 1973 War and Its Aftermath

Although Israel won the 1973 War, too, an Egyptian military presence in the Sinai created a new bargaining environment in which Israel lacked the dominance it had maintained for six years. UN Security Council Resolution 338, that brought the war officially to an end, called on all parties to begin 'implementation of SC resolution 242 in all its parts' through negotiations 'under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.'[32]

Israel's stance towards the West Bank after the 1973 War greatly assisted Arafat and the PLO while undermining the position of Jordan's King Husayn in the Arab world. He had sought and failed to achieve a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces on the West Bank similar to that which had occurred in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. This weakened his authority to speak for the Palestinian people while at the same time Arab leaders showed more willingness than in the past to permit them greater prominence at international events. In October 1974 an Arab summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco recognised 'the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in any Palestinian territory that is liberated.'[33] Husayn accepted this. One month later Arafat and the PLO were given international recognition when he spoke before the UN General Assembly, which gave observer status to the PLO.

The official position of the PLO, according to its 1968 charter, was for the liberation of Palestine to be achieved through 'armed struggle' and for the creation of a secular democratic society in place of Israel. Moscow armed the Palestinians but encouraged political compromise that produced in-fighting amongst Palestinian militant groups. The debate over the idea of a Palestinian national authority in any areas taken from the Israelis went on for years but the basic terms were as set out in the Rabat Declaration.[34]

A7.4 The First Intifada, 1987-1993

The PLO withdrawal from Beirut, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, had led the leadership to establish its new base in Tunis. Its diminished influence, internally and externally, increased factionalism even though Arafat loyalists continued to dominate the Palestine National Council (PNC), the PLO's governing body. The relationship between the Arabs in the occupied territories and the PLO leadership in Tunis as well as with the Israelis was only transformed when the First Intifada – which means literally a 'shaking off' of a condition[35] – broke out in December 1987:

> The intifada was a spontaneous eruption of hatred and frustration, but it represented years of anger, directed mostly at Israel but to some extent also at the external Palestinian leadership. Much of the fury resulted from personal factors not directly related to politics or economics – the daily harassments, arrests and beatings that the ordinary Palestinian had faced for years.[36]

Aggressive land acquisitions had recurred from 1985, after a relatively quiet period, such that it was not unusual for the Israeli military authorities to simply fence off Arab land and declare it Jewish property, the owners being left with no legal redress. For the military administration was the law in the occupied territories and it responded in August 1985, under Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin, with a new 'iron fist' policy against Arab protests. This intensified hatred on both sides. From an Arab perspective, Israeli expansionist objectives appeared to be nearing fulfilment as they saw new Jewish settlements being built on the West Bank. Simultaneously a new Arab generation, born and brought up under Israeli occupation, questioned their parents' submission to daily humiliation. The older generation saw this as endurance or 'sumud' and put their hopes in the PLO leadership abroad. The youth saw that hope fade with the declining influence of the PLO in the mid-1980s. Economic hardships were an additional factor. Sumud implied acceptance of conditions that threatened the future of young Palestinian Arabs. Some of them used arrest, beatings and imprisonment to formulate relationships and strategies for the future. For them 'Prison was like an education'.[37]

The intifada began in the Gaza Strip and spread quickly to the West Bank, undirected by any higher body. However, it was sustained by an extensive network of local committees, which had been formed during the course of the previous decade, and of neighbourhoods that organised themselves for mutual support. Essentially the intifada was a revolution or rebellion of the poor, young and disadvantaged whose loose organising framework the PLO representatives then tried to bring under its own direction. Generally, a decision was taken by those on the ground to restrict protests to demonstrations and stone-throwing so that knives and guns were banned. While violence, albeit of a controlled kind, was for many Palestinians a significant method of demonstrating overt opposition to Israeli rule, it was recognised that the image of Palestinians facing with stones Israeli soldiers who shot to kill would affect world opinion.[38]

A political agenda also emerged in January 1988 from the leadership in the occupied territories calling, in particular, for an independent Palestinian state led by the PLO that would coexist with Israel. Subsequently, with direction from the PLO in Tunis, this and other principles became the official agenda of the intifada. The various groups were never fully integrated but formed a unified command which, for the most part, agreed on tactics and issued joint directives that were then taken up by the grassroots movement. The PLO leadership in Tunis, previously fearful of independent leadership but now dependent on their local knowledge, was later encouraged to consider diplomatic compromise when the resistance in the occupied territories demanded it.[39]

For the Israelis, especially their government, the intifada was interpreted on the basis of their own preconceptions about Arab protests. For some it was unacceptable while for

others, such as Yitzak Rabin, it was 'terrorism' to be dealt with by force because Arabs, they thought, understood nothing else. Consequently military repression, including shooting at demonstrators and beating prisoners, was deemed acceptable.

The Israeli response produced international criticism, particularly in the light of the solely Palestinian fatalities in the first five weeks of the intifada. Israeli efforts to suppress the uprising included attacks on, or arrests of, those who advised against the use of arms or who advocated peaceful coexistence. However, such repression had the opposite effect to the one desired: middle class Palestinians united with the younger generation because of the indiscriminate nature of Israeli retaliation. Civil disobedience was widely supported including Palestinian boycotts of Israeli goods and refusal to pay special Israeli taxes to finance the occupation, provoking Israeli countermeasures. Labour groups and women's committees joined the resistance. Nevertheless, the first two years of the intifada was a period of increasing violence on both sides. By the end of 1989 an estimated 626 Palestinians and 43 Israelis had been killed.[40] This period also witnessed the growing prominence of Islamic resistance organisations, which started to undermine PLO authority. (See Table B2 for more details.)

At the international level, Arafat's efforts to win international recognition finally achieved success when, in December 1988, the US government agreed that he had met their conditions for substantive dialogue by renouncing terrorism and accepting UN Resolution 242. A month before the PNC had declared Palestinian independence, which had been recognised by many Arab and Muslim states and also by the Soviet Union. The stage had been set for the PLO's new entry into a peace process despite Israeli and anti-PLO Palestinian opposition.[41]

A7.5 The Madrid Talks, 1991-1993

It was, though, only against the background of the ending of the Cold War, and the Gulf crisis and subsequent US-led war with Iraq over its occupation of Kuwait, that direct diplomatic negotiations began. PLO support for Iraq had badly damaged its standing with Gulf states while Islamic groups, which were also initially affected by this, won support from Islamic countries, notably Iran, and groups associated with the Islamic resurgence.

The Madrid talks were the first direct, official negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, Syria and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (although each negotiated separately). They were based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and, in addition, the Camp David accords of 1978 that had led to a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt but not to arrangements for full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The key points of relevance from the Camp David accords involved the idea of 'interim' stages for resolving differences before final negotiations, particularly on the status of the occupied territories. The only significant progress made by the talks was between Israel and Jordan.[42] Palestinians and Israelis seemed far apart while violence, often orchestrated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, intensified in the occupied territories.

However, secret talks were underway in Oslo, Norway that led to an historic agreement between Israel and the PLO.

A8 THE OSLO ACCORDS, 1993-1999

A8.1 The 1993 Oslo Accord

The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Accord was the result of a separate process from the Madrid talks and conducted without US involvement. The main instigators were Yossi Beilin, a deputy foreign minister in the Rabin cabinet after June 1992, and Terje Rod Larsen, a Norwegian researcher into Israeli rule in the occupied territories. Beilin delegated two Israeli history professors to pursue efforts with a Palestinian representative thereby allowing the Israeli government to maintain a distance from the talks, if they did not bear fruit.[43] (See Appendix D3 on 'Track II' diplomacy.)

There were two aspects to the Accord: the Declaration of Principles and the letters of Mutual Recognition. The Declaration, which was officially signed at the White House on 13 September 1993, was conditional on the exchange of letters of recognition by Yasir Arafat, as chairman of the PLO, and Yitzhak Rabin, as prime minister of Israel. This exchange duly occurred: the PLO recognised 'the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security' and accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338. In his letter Arafat declared that the PLO renounced terrorism and would seek to control those that might engage in it. He also undertook that those clauses in the 1968 PLO Charter that denied Israel's existence and called for 'armed struggle' to overthrow her were 'now inoperative and no longer valid' and he would propose their removal from the Charter to the PNC. (This was carried out in December 1998.) For his part, Rabin wrote in his letter to Arafat that 'the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the P.L.O. within the Middle East peace process.'[44]

So Israel had accepted the PLO as the organisation representing the Palestinian people but not their objective of a Palestinian state. Palestinian 'rejectionists' claimed Arafat had recognised Israel's existence without gaining mutual acceptance of the Palestinian right to self-determination. Meanwhile Israeli rejectionists regarded the recognition of a Palestinian people, not to mention the PLO, as anathema and a prelude to such a Palestinian state in areas they intended to retain for Israel.

The Declaration envisaged, within preset time-frames, a negotiated agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, which would be granted self-governing status except for Israeli settlements in Gaza. The intention was to create what became the future Palestinian Authority comprising an elected council that would govern Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 'for a transitional period not exceeding five years.' (See Appendix D2 on Palestinian state-building and self-reliance.) The transitional period would date from the election of this council, intended to be July 1994, which would be dependent on first concluding an Interim Agreement to define the structure and authority of the council. 'Permanent status' negotiations were due to begin

no later than July 1997 covering issues excluded from the jurisdiction of the elected council as they were still subject to unilateral Israeli control. They included 'Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.'[45]

Although, once the Palestinian Council had been installed, the Israeli military government was to be withdrawn the Declaration also stated that after this withdrawal Israel's military authority would continue to have responsibility for external security and to override Palestinian civil authority on internal security and public order relating to settlements and Israelis. Thus no Palestinian authority, independent of Israeli supervision, had been ceded and most matters were subject to negotiations on which there was wide scope for disagreement. Moreover deadlines were not kept. The Interim Agreement, or Oslo 2, was not concluded until September 1995 with the council elected in January 1996.[46] The permanent status talks did not begin until July 2000.

A8.2 Oslo 2, 1995

Both Arab and Israeli opponents of the 1993 Oslo Accord had made clear their intention to undermine its implementation. For Muslim opponents the Accord meant losing most of Palestine west of the Jordan river and the potential loss of Jerusalem. For militant Jews a withdrawal from much of the West Bank, or Judaea and Samaria as they called it, involved a denial of their biblical heritage, which had been reclaimed through building settlements. Violence intensified in 1994 including a massacre of Arab worshippers in the Mosque of Abraham in Hebron by a Jewish settler living nearby and Hamas suicide bombings. Israeli disillusionment in the hope for peace with Palestinians was reciprocated by Palestinian despair at their future economic and political prospects. The tensions created mounted as the Interim Agreement was being finalised.[47]

The Oslo 2 Accord, signed at the White House by Rabin and Arafat in September 1995, specified the types of powers and responsibilities the Palestinian authority or 'Council' would have. Whilst it could sign economic, cultural, scientific, and educational pacts with foreign countries diplomatic agreements were precluded. Hundreds of Palestinian prisoners were due to be released by Israel in stages and a Gaza seaport and a safe passage route between Gaza and the West Bank established. Problems of implementation were increased by the ambiguity on some aspects of the agreement sustaining Palestinian enthusiasm. Oslo 2 called for expansion of the Palestinian authority's jurisdiction over more areas of the West Bank from which Israel had agreed to withdraw. The extent of that authority was dependent on which of three zones labelled 'A', 'B' or 'C' an area was in. In the case of Zone C, and its relationship to issues to be determined in the permanent status talks, it was possible for Arafat to claim that Oslo 2 guaranteed the return of 80 per cent of the West Bank to the Arabs while Rabin informed the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, that it left 70 per cent of the same land, or all of Zone C, in Israel's hands. The reason for the difference lay in the fact that several clauses in the agreement referred to lands in Zone C, which would be controlled by the Palestinian Council subject to exceptions retained for permanent status talks.[48] A further factor of special significance in the Accord was that it provided for expansion of a network of by-pass roads linking

Jewish settlements to each other and pre-1967 Israel. This had the effect of cutting off Palestinian areas from each other thereby inhibiting effective implementation of independent Palestinian authority.

In the emotionally charged atmosphere leading up to and following the signing of the Oslo 2 Accord, Rabin was assassinated on 4 November 1995 by a devout student of the Torah and rabbinical writings, influenced by the teachings of militant Orthodox rabbis.[49]

In the midst of strife religious-secular differences in Israel have become more pronounced, especially in areas like Jerusalem, which are occupied by Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews. Orthodox Judaism was recognised as the official branch of the Jewish religion when Israel was established. Their rules governed all aspects of religious life. However, Orthodox statutes had begun to be challenged by Conservative and Reform Jewish congregations in the USA and Israel, but their requests for inclusion were rejected by Orthodox rabbis and their followers, often with verbal or physical violence. When secular Israeli courts began to approve legal challenges to Orthodox dominance by 1999, leaders of Jewish orthodoxy criticised members of the Supreme Court. In that year Orthodox parties held twenty-three of the sixty-six seats in the Knesset and had key roles in the cabinet. Although they differed on what was to be done with the occupied territories they all had the same goal of eventually forcing Israel under religious law.[50]

A9 ENDING OF THE OSLO PROCESS, 2000 to 2003

A9.1 The Camp David Talks, 2000

Arab anger was frequently directed at the peace process itself:

> Whatever the language of the Oslo Accords, Palestinians had anticipated the eventual creation of a state in most if not all of the [occupied] territories, while the period since 1993 had witnessed the near doubling of the settlements, the vast expansion of the bypass road network built on expropriated Arab land, and more, not fewer, restrictions on Arab movement.[51]

In a deteriorating situation President Clinton, in the last year of his term in office, sought renewed negotiations even though the two sides remained far apart on every key issue.

At Camp David in July 2000 the Israelis offered the Palestinians, through US negotiators, what had been reported the previous May: 66 per cent of the West Bank would be handed over and, over twelve to twenty years, a further 14 per cent but Israel would retain permanently 57.7 per cent of settlements (keeping 77 and returning 58 to the Palestinians) and absorb 90.6 per cent of settlers who live in larger urban settings. The major settlement blocks effectively cut the Palestinian 'state' into three parts with no territorial proximity. Even though these parts might be linked by tunnels or bridges they would also be encircled by barriers and checkpoints, as before under the Oslo Accords, while Jewish settlers would be linked by by-pass roads directly to Israel. In the view of Charles D. Smith, there is no doubt that the initial offers at Camp David were path-breaking in that

no other Israeli leader had ever made such terms available to Palestinians. However, Smith goes on, those terms had already been rejected in May as preventing the creation of a viable Palestinian state.[52] Other issues on which the talks foundered were Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees.

A9.2 The Second Intifada, 2000-2003

On 28 September 2000, Ariel Sharon, who became prime minister of Israel five months later, made a carefully staged visit to Temple Mount, called Haram al-Sharif by Muslims, to underline his commitment to a unified Jerusalem and Jewish control of Temple Mount. The uprising began with Palestinian protests at this visit involving rocks and tire burnings. Israeli responses included the use of live ammunition and snipers. This, in turn, triggered a Palestinian armed response. By the end of the year 325 Palestinians and 36 Israelis had been killed. Official Israeli military records show that while Palestinians had used firearms in 27.6 per cent of the demonstrations Israel always used firepower.[53]

Although, like the First Intifada, a spontaneous outburst had occurred reflecting deep-rooted Palestinian rage, this Second Intifada was directed not only against Israel but also the Palestinian Authority and aspects of the Oslo process. Consequently a number of factions led by Palestinians from the occupied territories, such as Tanzim, would not accept Arafat's authority. (See Appendix B4 regarding Palestinian internal security and justice.) The conflict was made worse by an Israeli policy of targeted assassinations at a time when most Palestinian protests did not involve weapons. While Israel claimed evidence of terrorist activity, to justify such killings, many Palestinian civilians also died suggesting infringement of the rules of engagement by Israeli troops. The army often acted unilaterally with Israeli estimates that 25 per cent of Palestinian deaths by January 2001 were accounted for by minors under the age of eighteen (i.e. 81 out of 324).[54]

The situation worsened for both sides over the period from 2001 to 2003. The use of suicide bombings spread from Islamic groups, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to secular bodies like Tanzim, which had split from Fatah. Even women became suicide bombers. In the cycle of attack and retaliation trauma was inflicted on both sides though Israel's military power was overwhelming but did not achieve security. In 2002, in an effort to enhance security, the Israeli government began building a barrier, ranging from eight to twenty feet in height, intended to run the length of the West Bank, and absorbing at least 4,000 acres of Palestinian land when completed. The Intifada had claimed an estimated 2,400 Palestinian lives and 800 Israeli, plus nearly 50 foreign nationals, by June 2003. Israel had reoccupied all the areas of Zones A and B on the West Bank, previously put under Palestinian control, and destroyed the Palestinian Authority infrastructure on the grounds of its failure to prevent suicide bombings from its territory.[55] Israeli attacks were then launched on Gaza, stronghold of Hamas.

A9.3 The Road Map, 2003

President Bush, in an address to his nation in June 2002, had said that he would not intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict until Yasir Arafat had been replaced as head

of the Palestinian Authority as he (like Sharon) blamed him for continuing Palestinian violence. However, he did envision under a new leader the creation of a Palestinian state as being necessary for Israel's own security.[56] This was a goal of his 'war on terror' following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001.

The 'Road Map' derived from Bush's call for Arafat's removal and the start of Palestinian reform. It was developed in mid-2002 by the 'Quartet' consisting of the United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations but not released until 30 April 2003, following the removal of Saddam Hussein in the Second Gulf War. The Road Map envisaged three phases, (though the timetable was overtaken by events):

I. From April 30 to May 31, 2003, 'Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life and Building Palestinian Institutions'
II. 'Transition – June-December 2003'
III. 'Permanent Status Agreement and End of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2004-05'[57]

The Palestinian prime minister, Mahmud Abbas (who was elected President in 2005), accepted the Road Map but the Israeli prime minister objected on two grounds: it was performance-based so there was a mutual responsibility to act whereas Israel wanted proof of Palestinian sincerity before acting; and the plan called for immediate withdrawal of settlements built since March 2001. However, despite these objections and lobbying for changes, Sharon did accept publicly the idea of a Palestinian state thereby appearing to reject the official 1977 position of his Likud party, which demanded the full Israeli absorption of the West Bank ('Judaea and Samaria').[58] Even so understandings of the term 'sovereignty' or 'independence' in relation to a Palestinian state differed widely as between the various parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A10 GLOBAL POLITICS AND REGIONAL CONFLICT

Underlining the significance of global politics is the edited work by Jung which contests stereotypes of Palestine, in particular, arguing that 'the regional patterns of conflict and violence have been deeply moulded by international and transnational relations, rather than being the result of a peculiar Middle Eastern culture.'[59] The essays include:

- *'Global Conditions and Global Constraints: The International Paternity of the Palestine Conflict' by Dietrich Jung*. This theoretically informed historical perspective examines the evolution of Palestine as a political territory and the institutional and ideological aspects of Palestinian nationalism. It discerns patterns of nationalist conflict not dissimilar to that found in European history and demonstrates that the war-prone emergence of the Middle Eastern state system fits tightly into the logic of international politics.[60]
- *'"Culture Blind and Culture Blinded": Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations' by Morten Valbjorn*. While two approaches to Middle Eastern politics have replaced the previous neglect of culture by International Relations scholars, this change has over-emphasised the focus on culture.[61]

- *'Religious Mobilizations in Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: The Case of Ain Al-Helweh' by Bernard Rougier*. The process of forging a new religiously defined identity has led Palestinian refugees to violently reject the traditional symbols of Palestinian nationalism in favour of a transnational Islamist movement engaged in a global struggle.[62]

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[25] . Smith, pp. 162 and 195.
[26] . Smith, p. 200.
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[32] . Smith, pp. 316-18 quoting from UN Security Resolution 338, listed as Document 8.3, p. 335.
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[50] . Smith, pp. 465-6.
[51] . Smith, p. 490.
[52] . Smith, pp. 493-5.
[53] . Smith, p. 501.
[54] . Smith, p.502-3.
[55] . Smith, pp. 505-7.
[56] . Smith, p. 514.
[57] . Smith, p. 515 quoting from 'A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict' at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm
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APPENDIX B – MILITARY SECURITY

B1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to enable the reader to understand the 'balance of power' between governments and paramilitary groups involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The way in which this is done is as follows:

- Anthony H. Cordesman's work outlines the relevant facts and war scenarios.[1] He explains the difficulties of predicting conflict outcomes from the military balance.
- Uri Bar-Joseph offers an analysis of Israel's concept of national security and concludes that its national security cannot rely on military superiority alone.[2]
- Seth G. Jones and K. Jack Riley provide an analysis of Palestinian jurisdiction of internal security and justice and argue for a road map for security sector reform.[3]

This appendix can only give a summary of relevant aspects of their work.

B2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE

Note of amendment by Editor (on 16 January 2009):

This section B2 was available from the date of publication on 30 January 2006 until 29 January 2009. However, as the data is becoming increasingly dated and an annual copyright fee has been charged by the publisher for open access on the IPP web site it is no longer deemed necessary to maintain this part of the Appendix.

B3 ISRAEL'S CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Uri Bar-Joseph summarises the three pillars of Israeli strategy, since its formulation in the early 1950s, as: deterrence; strategic warning; and battlefield decision.[4]

(1) On *deterrence*, Israel regards its use of military threats to deter a rival from unilaterally challenging the status quo as its main peacetime strategy. Israeli strategic deterrence combines the threat of denial – that is, the opponent will not achieve his goals – with punishment – that is, the rival will pay a heavy price for challenging Israeli deterrence. Consequently conventional war winning capabilities have been built up, accompanied with a proven resolve to use them, occasionally supplemented by implicit nuclear threats. (2) Due to its numerical inferiority in manpower Israel has had to rely on a reserve army and the capacity, therefore, to rapidly mobilise this force in the case of a sudden Arab attack. The regular army alone is insufficient to meet such a threat so the effective bridge to full mobilisation is a *high-quality strategic warning*. This warning informs policy makers that strategic deterrence has failed and that war is likely. (3) Once war begins, a *rapid, clear battlefield decision,* involving the full and swift defeat of the enemy, becomes the key element of the doctrine. Speed is essential because Israel lacks the resources, especially manpower, to conduct prolonged wars. The decision also has to be clear so as to restore effective future deterrence. Additionally, since punishment is a central part of that deterrence, Israel's occupation of Arab lands is a key operational goal both to teach the opponent a lesson and also to bargain with for future diplomacy.[5]

However, Bar-Joseph goes on to suggest flaws in each component of this concept: (1) While Israeli *deterrence* is usually counted a success, paradoxically, 'Arab states have initiated wars when Israel was at the height of its power, and avoided such moves when Israel's image as the region's most powerful nation had been shaken.'[6] The examples cited include the Egyptian-initiated 1969-70 War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 and Syria's incidents on the Golan Heights and involvement with Egypt in 1973. This was despite the IDF's undoubted military superiority in that period following its towering victory in the1967 War. Conversely, despite the IDF's loss of prestige after the 1973 War, Egypt and Syria avoided anti-Israeli action from their territory. Bar-Joseph considers this as evidence that Arab willingness to challenge Israeli deterrence is influenced more by the nature of the current status quo than by its military prowess. He concludes that: 'Contrary to the common belief in Israel, the effective means to prevent Arab challenges to the nation's security is political no less than military.'[7]

Allied to this point, (2) the failure of Israeli intelligence to provide *timely warning* of the Arab attack in 1973, and on most other strategic occasions, provides little optimism for the future. He suggests that the solution to Israel's apprehension of a surprise attack lies in creating conditions that will prevent neighbouring states concentrating their forces near the Israeli border or suddenly activating them if already there.[8] (3) Similarly, Israel failed

to translate its *military successes* into concrete political gains, following the 1967 War and on other occasions. Although, during the Second Intifada, the IDF tried 'burning into the Palestinian consciousness' that violence will yield no political gains more Israelis were said to believe that the use of force against the Palestinians 'leads Israel nowhere'.[9]

B4 PALESTINIAN INTERNAL SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Against a background in 2004 of occasional 'intra-Palestinian violence and Hobbesian lawlessness'[10] in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, Seth G. Jones and K. Jack Riley argue for a road map for security-sector reform, based on careful assessment of the existing position and lessons drawn from reforms in other post-conflict societies.

B4.1 Internal Security

The Palestinian Authority's domestic security forces were formally created in May 1994, after the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. This agreement established several branches, subsequently expanded to cover the apparatus in Table B3 – the position before the death of President Arafat in 2004. Until then internal security forces operated largely under his control, operated with few checks and balances and in a way that was not transparent. 'Palestinian internal security forces are generally organised by the rule of the perceived patron rather than the rule of law.'[11]

The IDF has destroyed the physical infrastructure of Palestinian security forces since the Second Intifada began in September 2000. However, there is, according to Jones and Riley, significant evidence of collusion between the Palestinian Authority security services and anti-Israeli militant groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Even before this time the Palestinian security forces were only marginally effective: initially showing some willingness to seize arms and act against individuals but their actions were not systematic enough during the 1990s. Moreover, they often violated basic human rights through the use of torture or assassination. The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group claims that the Palestinian Authority has assassinated at least 24 Palestinians since 2000.[12]

In a nutshell, the Palestinian security services, under Arafat, were inefficient, unaccountable to legislative or judicial oversight and popularly viewed as corrupt; they were left with little infrastructure; and could not establish order even in Palestinian Authority territory whereas the IDF or paramilitary groups controlled important areas.[13]

B4.2 Administration of Justice

Following the Oslo Accords in 1993, a Palestinian criminal justice system was established including a legal system, courts and a Ministry of Justice. The present system is a complex amalgam of laws of different origin. Although the Palestinian Authority has established some comprehensive laws applying to both the West Bank, which followed Jordan in adopting civil or French-based law, and the Gaza Strip, which under Egyptian military administration kept its British influence, a number of Ottoman and Israeli laws

and decrees persist in each area. A series of courts deal with almost all levels of crimes and civil claims while Islamic sharia courts handle personal status laws, including the rights of men and women. There are also State Security Courts and Military Courts with jurisdiction over cases involving threats to internal and external security.

TABLE B3

PALESTINIAN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, 2004

Security Service	Function
Civil Police (Al-Shurta)	Keeps public order, directs traffic and arrests common criminals
National Security Force (Al-Amn al-Watani)	Guards checkpoints, patrols borders and conducts joint patrols
Preventive Security Service (Al-Amn al-Wiqa'i)	Handles subversion, counterespionage and dissident organisations
Coast Guard (Shurta Bahariya)	Patrols territorial waters off Gaza Strip
Civil Defence (Al-Difa'a al-Madani)	Conducts rescue and fire services
General Intelligence (Mukhabarat Salamah)	Gathers intelligence and conducts counter-espionage operations
Military Intelligence (Istikhabarat al-Askariya)	Arrests and interrogates opposition activists and investigates other security bodies
Special Security Force (Al-Amn al-Khass)	Gathers information about opposition groups and monitors other security bodies
Presidential Security Service, Force 17 (Al-Amn al-Ri'asah)	Protect[ed] Arafat and other top PA officials, arrests opposition activists and suspected collaborators with Israel

Source: Seth G. Jones and K. Jack Riley, 'Law and Order in Palestine', Survival, vol. 46, no. 4 (Winter 2004-05), Table 1, p. 159.

The World Bank's analysis of Palestinian judicial reform concluded in 2001: 'Legal development, despite public statements to the contrary, has not been a priority of the Palestinian Authority.'[14] The security services have repeatedly ignored orders of the Palestinian High Court to release detainees, judges have been removed from office without reasonable cause and the courts have been unable to prosecute security officers who are alleged to have committed crimes. According to the World Bank, by 2002 the Palestinian Authority was in the bottom 16 per cent of countries worldwide in controlling corruption, in the bottom 12 per cent in relation to governmental effectiveness, and in the bottom half in terms of the effectiveness of the rule of law. The proportion of Palestinians who believe there is significant corruption in Palestinian institutions rose from about 50 per cent in 1996 to 85 per cent in 2004.[15]

The Palestinian legal community lacks sufficient resources and training. The absence of competent legal institutions has encouraged the role of tribal and unofficial forms of law enforcement and justice in place of the limited progress made between 1994 and 2000 before the Second Intifada began. Palestinian refugee camps are especially prone to patron-based types of dispute resolution and maintenance of public order.[16]

B4.3 Lessons from Abroad

In assessing the experiences of the many post-Cold War examples of international efforts to rebuild the internal security and justice systems of states, taking into account important differences from the Palestinian case, Jones and Riley conclude:

> All were in the process of a major transition, almost all had recently emerged from decades of civil war or instability, and most were developing countries with little capacity for autonomous transition. The examples of Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan also demonstrate that in the absence of security, reconstruction efforts can be excruciatingly difficult. Genuine reform in Palestinian territory is only likely to take root in a benign security environment, such as existed for most of the 1990s. Ending the current intifada and curbing the level of Palestinian-Israeli violence is a prerequisite to security and justice reform. Genuine reform will also not happen unless the Palestinian Authority and population make a serious effort; external assistance is not sufficient.[17]

B4.4 The Way Forward

After making various proposals for security and justice reform (not summarised here) Jones and Riley suggest certain indicators of success to judge the quality of reforms:

- *Public perception of Palestinian Authority corruption and official misconduct*. While this is bound to lag behind events citizens' interaction with security forces and the legal system mould perceptions of fairness and how acts of corruption are brought to public attention. Palestine has a capable survey capacity so the effect of reforms should be measurable in surveys of corruption and confidence.

- *Continued unification of Palestinian laws and procedures*. An important element of procedural justice and perceived fairness is that policies do not vary greatly by location, as outcomes can at present for a complaint in the West Bank and Gaza.
- *Reduced executive control and increased accountability over security forces.* Useful measures might include: salaries of security forces not being paid by the executive branch of government; ending presidential decrees; abolishing Military and State Security Courts; putting Civil Police under the Ministry of Interior.[18]

The authors acknowledge the length of time needed for, and difficulty of, remedying the Palestinian internal security system and administration of justice but consider that until this job is started a viable and peaceful Palestinian state would be impossible. (Another perspective on Palestinian state-building is provided in Appendix D.)

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[5] . Bar-Joseph, pp.137-8.
[6] . Bar-Joseph, p. 138.
[7] . Bar-Joseph, p. 139.
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[9] . Bar-Joseph pp. 141-2. The first quotation is from the Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon cited in Ha'aretz, 30 August 2002 and the second from Bar-Joseph. There is further analysis (not summarised here), questioning the concept of the IDF as a 'people's army' and its force structure, of Israel's nuclear policy (supported overwhelmingly by Israelis) and of the relationship between diplomacy and the use of force in reducing threats.
[10] . Jones & Riley, p. 157 referring to the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes who famously described, in his work The Leviathan, that the life of man in a state of nature 'is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.'
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[12] . Jones &Riley, p. 160.
[13] . See note 34.
[14] . Jones & Riley, p. 161 quoting Douglas Ierley, Law and Judicial Reform in Post-Conflict Situations: A Case Study of the West Bank [and] Gaza, Report of the World Bank Conference (July 2001), p.17.
[15] . Jones & Riley, pp. 161-2.
[16] . Jones & Riley, pp. 162-3.
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APPENDIX C – ECONOMIC SECURITY

C1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to enable the reader to understand the economic and financial aspects of security in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Part of this task has already been accomplished: Appendix A has covered relevant aspects of economic history, which illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of the parties to the conflict; and Appendix B examined the economic context for war scenarios in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

This Appendix will focus on more recent economic development and the political economy of Israel and the Palestinian territories, in particular:

- A study by Markus E. Bouillon, funded in part by an Israeli government scholarship (though he makes clear that no attempt was made to infringe his academic freedom as a doctoral researcher or influence his judgement), provides information on the economies in question and the role that their private entrepreneurs and business communities played in the Middle East peace process during the period of the Oslo Accords and to the start of the Second Intifada. However, his theoretical model and conclusions are omitted here.[1]
- Rex Brynen, based on extensive research in the Middle East and donor countries, explores in his work the role of foreign aid to the Palestinian territories and the relationship to peacebuilding.[2]

This appendix can only give a summary of parts of their work.

C2 ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN ECONOMIES

C2.1 The Israeli Economy

The background to the transformation of the Israeli economy is outlined in this way:

> Once a traditional economy based mainly on agriculture, light industry and labour-intensive production, Israel used to be described as the 'most socialist economy of any nation outside of the Eastern bloc' until the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, from 1922 to 1973, Israel's high rates of growth had been second only to Japan. Development had been achieved through a highly centralized, state-driven economic policy, making Israel a world record-holder in high taxes and foreign debt, fuelled also by high defence expenditure and the costs associated with absorption of large numbers of immigrants.[3]

First German reparations, then growing American financial aid had enabled the government to take on a leading role in developing the economy. In its market economy the public sector and collectivist institutions such as the Histadrut, the General Federation of Labour, had dominated the private sector. Formed in 1920, the Histadrut had: represented workers and provided a wide range of services to its members, totalling 1.8

million in 1994 or 42 per cent of all salaried workers in the economy; incorporated Kibbutzim (communal, especially farming settlements in Israel) and Moshavim (co-operative associations of Israeli smallholders); and had been a major employer in its own right. Its holding company, Hevrat Ovdim, included leading corporations in industry, building, insurance and banking which employed 25 per cent of Israel's workforce. Its economic enterprises generated up to 27 per cent of the country's industrial product in 1986.[4] The Histadrut's close ties to government, which for decades meant the ideologically related Labour coalition, had made it second only to the government in economic policy making. However, being a workers' body, the Histadrut did not seek to create profits nor did its firms have to be profitable as the Federation had access to membership fees.

Until the 1990s, the government itself had been Israel's largest employer and had controlled important resources including land, raw materials and water. Bond and share issues had required its approval and foreign exchange was controlled. The government in effect decided what to produce through a system of licence requirements and the granting of monopolies and high subsidies were part of its strategy of import substitution given to firms in return for a promise of investment, employment and exports.

However, these policies and their consequences including the near bankruptcy of several Histadrut firms, resulting from inefficient operations, and balance of payments problems, due to the rapid economic growth coupled with high government expenditures, led to a growing economic crisis which peaked in 1984 with inflation running at 445 per cent. An Emergency Stabilization Plan, approved by a national unity government in 1985, brought the situation under control by cutting the budget deficit, devaluation of the currency, and reducing export subsidies.[5]

Israel then underwent, as part of this programme, drastic economic reforms in the 1990s. Some 600,000 Russian immigrants who entered the country between 1990 and 1994 ushered in a new bout of economic expansion. The economy grew at an average of more than 5.2 per cent per year in the period 1991 to 1996 – faster than any other industrial economy. In spite of the rapid increase in population, Israeli unemployment was only 6.3 per cent in 1995.[6] The business sector grew even more quickly at 7 per cent per annum revealing a trend towards a more liberal economy but with still a high level of concentration of economic power. This trend was also facilitated by foreign direct investment and trade deregulation and renewed efforts at privatisation of state enterprises and reform of capital markets. Based on its military industry, Israel became a major high-tech producer so that by the end of the 1990s approximately 85 per cent of the country's industrial exports were technology-oriented.[7] (Table C1 gives further economic details.)

Israeli exports increased rapidly during the 1990s as a result of the gradual dismantling of its protectionist trade regime and the exposure of its domestic market to foreign imports. Among Israel's most important markets were the occupied territories.

TABLE C1

ISRAEL'S ECONOMY AT A GLANCE

Social	**1980**	**1990**	**1999**	**2000**	
Population (millions)				6.2	
Annual Average Growth				**1994-2000**	
Population (%)				2.4	
Labour force (%)				3.3	
					Most recent estimate
Urban population (% of total)					91
Infant mortality (per 1,000 life births)					
- Israel					6
- High-Income Countries					6
Illiteracy (% of pop. age 15+)					
- Israel					4
- High-Income Countries					<5
Key Economic Ratios and Trends	**1980**	**1990**	**1999**	**2000**	
GDP ($ billion)	21.8	52.5	100.8	110.3	
Gross domestic investment/GDP	22.4	25.1	21.0	19.3	
Average Annual Growth (%)	**1980-1990**	**1990-2000**	**1999**	**2000**	
GDP	3.5	5.1	2.2	5.7	
GDP per capita	1.7	2.2	-0.2	3.5	
Domestic Prices (% change)	**1980**	**1990**	**1999**	**2000**	
Consumer prices	131.0	17.2	5.2	1.1	
Implicit GDP deflator	134.7	15.9	6.7	2.0	
Balance of Payments					
Current account balance ($ millions)	-871	170	-1,881	-	
External debt					
Foreign direct investment ($ millions)	51	151	2,363	-	

Source: Markus E. Bouillon, The Peace Business (I.B. Tauris, 2004), Table 1, pp. 24-5 adapted from the World Bank, 'Israel at a Glance', www.worldbank.org/data/

C2.2 Israeli Business Interests

The economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s produced a drastic limitation of the Histadrut's position. It gave up most of its enterprises and a third of its members, in the latter case resulting from the abolition of many exclusive pension and health insurance benefits that had previously been associated with membership. The 'New Histadrut' in 1994 focused on the trade union aspect of the organisation while the state and private sector took on a more central role in the Israeli economy. The Histadrut's industrial flagship, Koor, was dramatically restructured: in 1988, 126 out of its 130 subsidiaries were unprofitable so it had to shed up to 40 per cent of its workforce or 4 per cent of the total Israeli labour force; and by 1995, an American group had taken over the conglomerate thereby terminating its relationship with the Histadrut.[8] Koor once again became Israel's most profitable industrial company with 20,000 employees in about 30 subsidiaries and a net income of $156 million in 1995, accounting for 7 per cent of the country's total annual industrial output and exports.[9] As Israel's first multinational company Koor integrated itself into the global business community.

Bouillon summarises the relationship between large enterprises like Koor and the other sectors of the economy as follows:

> … the Israeli economy was characterized by a dualism between government-owned and other big business firms on the one hand, and the majority of small and medium-sized companies on the other, and dominated by the government and big business elites. These were connected in a variety of institutions, socially, and through joint business ventures to such an extent that a coherent political-economic elite stratum emerged, which made economic policy and pursued interest politics in a highly personalized manner. Smaller enterprises, in contrast, had little political influence and were marginalized in politics as in the economy.[10]

C2.3 The Palestinian Territories

Before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 both territories were generally underdeveloped and relied on agriculture and monetary receipts, either workers' remittances in the case of the West Bank or mainly UNRWA contributions in Gaza. Economic integration between Israel and the Palestinian economy from the occupation until 1993 was the single most significant factor underpinning economic development. The customs union with Israel quadrupled effective tax levels which, in concert with many non-tariff barriers and the Arab countries' boycott of Palestinian products with any Israeli inputs, led to a growing concentration on the Israeli market, with full dependence on Israeli goods – nearly all imports to Gaza and 90 per cent to the West Bank came from Israel while Israel absorbed up to 82 per cent of all exports from Gaza in 1982 and Israel and Jordan each took about 50 per cent of exports from the West Bank until the late 1980s.[11]

Israeli policies hindered private sector growth and industrial development in the occupied territories while the export of Palestinian labour, mostly to Israel, became the only engine for growth. Industry was limited to small subcontractors for Israeli firms in the textile industry. The combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the territories was only 5 per cent of Israel's in this period, which indicated the scale of inequality in the relationship.[12] The outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 worsened the economic situation even more and also led to a decline in domestic investment. Other factors, including the impact of the Gulf War in 1991, contributed to the economic crisis which the territories experienced.

Set against this background, the Oslo Accord of September 1993 included economic provisions which, together with the 'Paris Protocol on Economic Relations' of April 1994, laid the foundations for the customs union between the Palestinian territories and Israel. Although the Protocol assured free access for goods between these two markets it kept imports from third parties under Israeli control. Import taxes collected by Israeli customs were to be passed to the Palestinian Authority. While this was one of the key sources of income for the Authority the Israeli treasury kept most taxes because as much as 60 per cent of imports to the territories were regarded as Israeli exports to the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian Authority was free to set its own tariffs for products on three lists but Israeli tariffs on these goods were already zero or very low.[13]

The most serious problem resulting from the Paris Protocol was the de facto separation of the two economies. The agreement stipulated the continuity of Palestinian employment in Israel but, instead, Israel substituted foreign workers for Palestinian ones. This, in turn, resulted from the closures Israel maintained from 1991 due to regular terrorist attacks. Employment of Palestinians in Israel fell from 30 per cent to 7 per cent in 1996 with an attendant heavy loss of income. Trade decreased as imports fell by around 25 per cent and exports by almost 50 per cent between 1992 and 1995. GDP was reduced by approximately 14 per cent between 1992-96 and private investment fell by 60 per cent. The territories became even more dependent on Israel such that, by 1998, 95 per cent of exports were to Israel.[14]

As a consequence of the reduced employment opportunities in Israel and the political requirement to create jobs, the Palestinian Authority became the largest single employer, accounting for 20 per cent of the total labour force by mid-1998. The Authority then employed almost 50,000 civilians and 40,000 police.[15] It increasingly seemed like a 'rentier state', which controlled donor aid from foreign countries and political loyalty by means of economic dependence. The Second Intifada, beginning in September 2000, led to even higher rates of unemployment and poverty just as the Palestinian economy had finally indicated some recovery in the first half of that year. Table C2 gives further economic details.)

TABLE C2

THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AT A GLANCE

Social	**1996**	**1999**	**2000**
Population (millions)	2.5	2.8	2.9
Population growth (%)	3.9	3.7	3.7
Gross National Income (GNI) ($ billions)	4.0	5.1	4.7
GNI per capita ($)	1,570	1,800	1,610
Infant mortality (per 1,000 life births)		22.8	
Key Economic Ratios and Trends			
GDP ($ billions)	3.6	4.2	4.2
Gross capital formation (% GDP)	34.4	39.9	
Exports of goods and services/GDP	19.3	17.1	
Average annual growth			
GDP	1.2	7.4	-6.2
Structure of the Economy			
Per Cent of GDP			
Agriculture	15.8	8.9	
Industry	24.7	28.9	
Services	59.9	62.2	
Imports of goods and services	68.2	74.8	
Domestic Prices (% change)			
Inflation, GDP deflator	8.5	5.1	3.2
Balance of Payments			
Aid per capita ($)	217.0	180.3	

Source: Markus E. Bouillon, The Peace Business (I.B. Tauris, 2004), Table 4, p. 42 adapted from World Bank, World Development Indicators Database (April 2001), devdata.worldbank.org/

C2.4 Palestinian Business Interests

The Palestinian business sector was small and under-developed. In 1965 more than three quarters of industrial units in the West Bank employed less than five people while in Gaza industrial units employed on average 2.3 persons in 1960. At the time of the occupation in 1967 only five such units in the West Bank and two in Gaza employed more than 100 workers.[16] Under the occupation, industrial activity in the territories was confined to labour-intensive, low-productivity manufacturing.

One of the most important entrepreneurial activities involved subcontracting arrangements with Israeli companies, particularly in the textiles industry. This arose from the supply of cheap unskilled or semi-skilled Palestinian labour, coupled with the dependency of Palestinian businesses on raw materials imported from or through Israel and the small size of their domestic market. So, by the late 1980s, 70 per cent of Palestinian textiles and footwear were made for Israeli enterprises and re-sold as Israeli brands.[17]

By 1994, 73 per cent of all firms in the territories employed less than five workers and 90 per cent employed less than ten. Palestinian manufacturers faced 35-40 per cent more taxes than similar Israeli firms did, adversely affecting costs and competitiveness,[18] while Palestinian production and export capacities were further limited by complex administrative procedures, restrictive import quotas and detailed labelling requirements quite apart from the effect of the Arab boycott against Israel including Palestinian exports via Israel.

Exports did not exceed 18 per cent of total sales in 1994, mostly relating to goods produced under subcontracting arrangements, because foreign markets were largely closed to Palestinian producers.[19] Investment plans required licences, which the Israeli military government only rarely granted to Palestinian producers when it considered there was no conflict with Israeli producers' interests.

New Israeli licensing policies in 1992 and heightened expectations for growth led to a significant increase in the number of registered enterprises after 1994. This, though, concentrated capital in a few conglomerates run by the Palestinian Authority or its officials, wealthy Palestinians amongst the Diaspora and a handful of successful local business people forging close ties to the Authority. The biggest of these companies was the Palestine Development and Investment Company (PADICO) which was set up in 1993 with a working capital of $1.5 billion.[20] Its activities or those of its subsidiaries included industrial projects, tourism, telecommunications and industrial parks.

The economy became identified with emerging state-controlled monopolies and other dominating enterprises. Such conditions prevailed in the petroleum, cigarettes and cement sectors that accounted for about 18 per cent of the Palestinian Authority's revenue of $1.7 billion in 1997.[21] Thus a dualistic economy evolved divided between a politicised core of monopolistic conglomerates and private small and medium-sized companies.

C2.5 A Summary

The author's summary, which includes the Jordanian economy and its business sector (omitted from this Appendix for reasons of space), is as follows:

> The three economies of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Territories, thus, were all characterized by the dominance of large conglomerates and political-economic elites, while the majority of small and medium-sized enterprises were marginalized and excluded from the circles of power and political decision-making… In all three entities, in addition, the distinction between the two sectors grew more pronounced during the 1990s and the years of the peace process.[22]

C3 BUSINESS INTERESTS AND THE PEACE PROCESS

C3.1 Israeli Business

After the start of the Intifada in 1987 big business in Israel began to publicly promote the benefits of regional reconciliation. For some business leaders the abolition of the Arab boycott of Israeli goods was viewed as a top priority. Benny Gaon, the Chief Executive Officer of Koor, who exemplified the new attitude of Israeli big business, argued in November 1994 for a regional economy of peace and called on large industrial concerns to take the lead and the risk on this by inviting foreign capital for joint ventures in Israel and the region. Even he, though, had to acknowledge that the real peace dividend for large Israeli enterprises lay in the opening of doors to third countries like India, Japan, China or the emerging South East Asian markets rather than in the advantages of deals with Jordanians or Palestinians.[23] By the time of Gaon's departure in 1998, although he personally maintained his public commitment to peace, big business had achieved its underlying objective for, as the Arab boycott dissolved, Israel's economic benefits came from the growing internationalisation of its economy.

Simultaneously, a new possibility for business relations was revealed, that is, the transfer of labour-intensive industries like textiles from Israel, where they became uncompetitive due to high labour costs and the ending of protectionist regimes in the domestic market, to Arab countries. After 1994 the textiles industry faced competition from cheap imports, as tariffs fell from over 70 per cent to 12 per cent for clothing and 8 per cent for textiles until 2000, and also the end of quotas on textile imports within a decade.[24] The central part of the Israeli textiles industry adapted, in the main, by shifting to foreign locations including Jordan and Egypt while continuing to provide know-how, quality control and marketing expertise.

At first Israelis were just as enthusiastic towards Palestinians but within a year of the Oslo Accords many doubted what the Palestinians could offer them economically. This reluctance to engage with Palestinian entrepreneurs resulted from lost or threatened revenues arising from the changing political context (including closures in the aftermath of terrorist activities). An Israel Manufacturers Association (IMA) survey at the end of

1993 involving a sample of 372 Israeli companies representing more than a quarter of Israeli industry found that, inter alia, while

- 96 per cent expected the Oslo Accords to have a positive impact on economic growth;
- 36 per cent expected the interim period of the Oslo process to affect them negatively; and
- 74 per cent expected that Palestinians would establish competing industries.[25]

Lost revenue was anticipated to total $1.4 billion in sales as a result of the interim period with reduced exports particularly in building material, wood and textiles to the Palestinian territories. Job losses were expected to total 9,000 in the industrial sector. Smaller businesses and business associations were especially concerned by Palestinian competition. Thus the hope for economic growth overall was based on an end to the Arab boycott rather than co-operation with Palestinians (though 85 per cent were in favour of this).[26]

Big business in Israel, on the other hand, had an interest in maintaining and making use of cheaper Palestinian labour. Israeli entrepreneurs opposed the closure of the territories, in the wake of the deteriorating security situation, because of the severe disruption it caused to sectors like construction and agriculture. Israeli businessmen also proposed building up light industries in the territories, as this sector was losing its competitive edge due to high Israeli labour costs. Information technology businesses stood to benefit from the Accords, especially when in the late 1990s Israel faced a shortage of software programmers and high-tech personnel while every year some 10,000 Palestinian computer specialists graduated.[27] This interest fuelled the Khaddourie high-tech industrial park, which the Palestinian Authority planned near Tulkarem, close to various Israeli high-tech centres. The Peres Centre for Peace supported the establishment of the park through its technology fund, in which Koor and other large businesses invested.

The outcome of intense internal debates among Israeli industrialists and business associations, with regard to economic relations with the Palestinians, was a compromise in 1999 between the advocates of economic integration, favoured by big business, and clear regulations, if not economic separation, preferred by traders and small businesses. The IMA advocated the gradual establishment of a customs union but with physical borders and customs controls. A transition period was felt to be necessary during which specific sectors would be afforded temporary protection.[28]

C3.2 Palestinian Business

The opinions of the Palestinian business community were frequently in tension. On the one hand, they wanted independence, the development of a national economy and fairer, more equal economic relations with Israel. Yet, on the other hand, many entrepreneurs were also dependent on raw materials from Israel, acted as subcontractors or agents for Israeli firms and relied on the Israeli market and the maintenance of links to that economy and, thus, were against a separation of Israeli and Palestinian economies.[29]

There was a short period of optimism in 1993. A survey of 195 Palestinian companies with 15 or more workers, representing over half of the biggest companies, found that:

- 92 per cent expected the Oslo Accords to have a positive effect on economic growth;
- 89 per cent expected increases sales to Israel;
- 95 per cent regarded themselves as being in competition with Israeli firms;
- 53 per cent had direct or indirect subcontracting arrangements with Israeli companies; and
- 23 per cent believed that ending subcontracting would force many local factories to close.[30]

Consequently a majority supported a continuation of subcontracting arrangements. However, fears soon began to dominate Palestinian business people that they would lose out, instead of win, in business relations with Israel (though 76 per cent had favoured co-operation, preferably in joint ventures). Within one year Palestinians appeared reluctant to forge new business relations with Israeli firms.[31]

Part of this reluctance and the desire for separation and an autonomous economic policy arose from disappointment over the first two years of co-operation under the Paris Protocol (see C2.3 above). As a consequence of these negative experiences the Palestinian Businessmen Association, consisting of 200 of the largest establishments, decided to boycott the 1995 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) conference in Amman. Persistent problems with closures and the peace process led them to do the same in 1996 and 1997 even those these events – held under the auspices of the USA, European Union and the World Economic Forum – were arguably the most successful initiative to bring the regional states and international community together to promote economic co-operation and development in that area of the world.[32]

Privately, though, many Palestinians said that survey results concerning their business attitudes (after 1993) should not be taken literally. They were not really in favour of severing ties with the Israeli economy, given their dependence on the Israeli raw materials and markets. As a result of the 1996 ‘agency law’ requiring Israeli manufacturers and merchants to work through Palestinian agents, and to give up or share their distributorships for international goods with them, direct imports rose rapidly. By 1997 there were over 2,000 registered importers compared to only 56 in 1994.[33] A divide occurred amongst Palestinian business people. Whereas the newly emerging commercial order supported greater independence from Israel and smaller businesses, especially in food or pharmaceuticals, also favoured protection for local industries, those sectors dependent on Israel, including textiles or stone and marble, strongly rejected separation. This interest in retaining links with Israel was also strengthened by the reluctance of Jordan and Egypt, the main alternative export markets, to open their markets to Palestinian goods.

So the Palestinian Trade Centre (Paltrade), a business association promoting the development of the private sector, while publicly stating its desire for more independence and greater economic autonomy, clearly focused on Palestinian exports to Israel where

the biggest increase in market share was possible. Paltrade came to lobby for a free trade agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in relation to the final status economic negotiations, on the basis of three principles: the private sector as growth leader in a market economy; close links with the Israeli economy; and the establishment and strengthening of economic links with Arab states. These principles emerged from a 'National Economic Dialogue Project' initiated by the Palestinian Authority and put into operation by Paltrade in 1999. However, reference to a free trade agreement was omitted from the final version of the recommendations from this Project, which reiterated the desire for more economic independence from Israel – a position agreed on by both the Palestinian Authority and the private sector.[34]

C3.3 A Summary

The author concludes:

> Thus, in the Palestinian Territories, as in Israel and, to a certain extent, in Jordan, it was mainly the larger business conglomerates that maintained an interest in co-operation. In both Jordan and the Palestinian Territories, co-operation was a politically sensitive issue, which was often rejected in public, yet explored in secret. On the Israeli side, the peace process as such had been important because it opened up new overseas markets, while the regional markets were largely irrelevant. At the same time, Israelis were highly interested in preserving their economic dominance in the Palestinian Territories and the beneficial labour-sharing arrangement, which was now also extended to Jordan. Since both Jordanians and Palestinians desired to gain a share in the potential benefits from collaboration, the formula for co-operation was found in industrial joint ventures capitalizing on Israeli know-how and technology in combination with cheap but skilled Jordanian and Palestinian labour. It was this formula that set the stage for the evolution of co-operative ties, which mainly developed in industrial collaboration and subcontracting. Trade meanwhile remained hindered by many barriers, manifesting the Israeli desire to preserve the status quo and the Jordanian and Palestinian interest in protection for domestic industries.[35]

C4 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

C4.1 Introduction

A few weeks after the Oslo Accord was signed in 1993 representatives of about forty-three countries met in Washington and promised $2 billion in aid, later increased to over $4 billion, to sustain the five year interim period. The intention behind this first donors' conference was, according to the organisers, 'to support the historic political breakthrough in the Middle East through a broad-based multilateral effort to mobilize resources to promote reconstruction and development in the West Bank and Gaza.'[36]

In his study Brynen argues that if continuing economic aid is to have the greatest impact it is necessary to identify and understand the lessons of the past. The process of economic

assistance has been closely linked to both the political consolidation of the Palestinian Authority and also the motivating forces behind the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Consequently it is important to understand how either of these processes has been influenced by the flow of foreign aid. This summary is limited to the author's assessment of *donor responsiveness* to the war-to-peace transition (i.e. peace-building) in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 1993-98 along four inter-connected dimensions:

- *Mobilising assistance*: generating the required resources;
- *Coordinating assistance*: how well donors, agencies and recipients work together;
- *Delivering assistance*: the extent to which donors deliver on their promises;
- *Allocating assistance*: the responsiveness of international aid programmes.[37]

C4.2 The Context: Patterns of External Assistance

Prior to the signing of the Oslo Accord, Western donors and Arab donors, including the PLO, were the main sources of external aid to the West Bank and Gaza. However, little by way of reliable data existed before 1992 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its first compendium of projects, based on questionnaire responses from donors. UNDP put the aid commitments from donors and multilateral agencies – excluding the PLO and many Arab funds – as $174 million in 1992 rising rapidly to $263 million in 1993. The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) put the actual Western aid disbursements at only $182 million in 1993. Most of this aid flowed through Palestinian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or international NGOs based in the donor country. The UNRWA accounted for $109 million of the aid commitments in 1992 but from the following year, in the face of a fast growing refugee population and regular budget difficulties, its contributions fell rapidly.[38] Most Western aid went on education and health. There is much less information on Palestinian and Arab aid to the occupied territories with widely varying estimates. Nevertheless, it had important effects in areas like agriculture, infrastructure, municipal services, housing and education.

The PLO's major financial crisis in the early 1990s had serious consequences for the institutions it had supported in the West Bank and Gaza. One Palestinian economist estimated that PLO funding to the territories was cut from $350 million in 1988 to $120 million in 1990 and then to just $40 million in 1993. Undoubtedly, by the summer of 1993 its financial support for institutions in the territories had been reduced by about 80 per cent and the PLO had had to suspend payments to the families of its martyrs.[39] A political consequence of the suspension of Arab funding to the PLO, as a result of its pro-Iraq policies during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, was to motivate PLO engagement in the Madrid peace process and to sign up to the Oslo Accords.

C4.3 Mobilising Assistance

The co-sponsors of the international donors' conference on 1 October 1993 were confident on the basis of initial pledges for the first year, and indications of planned support for the interim period, that the $2.4 billion of five-year external assistance needs

identified by the World Bank would be met.[40] In fact, as Table C3 shows, this target was far surpassed with donor pledges exceeding $4 billion by late 1998. It does, though, need to be emphasised that these are pledges of assistance rather than actual disbursements to projects, which will be discussed in C4.5 below. Moreover, about one-quarter of the pledges were loans, albeit often at low rates of interest, rather than grants. Some aid is tied to particular goods and services and other assistance takes the form of donated goods instead of cash. There is also the difficulty of distinguishing new pledges from previous commitments. The accuracy of Palestinian Authority figures in Table C3 is hindered by differences in donor accounting systems and slowness in responding to requests for information by some aid agencies. However, the use of a five-year pledging period made it difficult to re-publicise unspent funds as a new pledge for the next year.[41]

A second aid conference in November 1998 apparently pledged $3.4 billion towards the next five years of donor assistance leading to the conclusion that

> Overall, the record of aid mobilization in Palestine is an impressive one, with well over $8 billion pledged for the decade following 1993. This clearly reflected the strategic importance of the conflict and the historic opportunity presented by the peace process.[42]

C4.4 Coordinating Assistance

Since the aid programme for the West Bank and Gaza involved over 40 countries and two dozen UN and other multilateral agencies, a score of Palestinian ministries and hundreds of NGOs the structure of donor coordination was complex. While the system was imperfect and sometimes unwieldy it reflected the economic and political environment of the Palestinian territories as well as other demands: accommodating rivalry amongst donors; finding a balance between inclusive participation and resolute direction (in turn suggesting limited membership); and timeliness despite weak Palestinian institutions. In this situation the abilities of key personnel could be as vital as the shaping of structures of coordination. Arguably the most serious weakness was the failure of these structures to forge lasting Palestinian capabilities due to the early dominant role of various multilateral agencies and key donors in setting priorities and, subsequently, the misalignment between the organisation of the various sectoral working parties and the emerging development planning within the Palestinian Authority.[43]

In the Palestinian territories there was little attempt to tie donor aid formally to the fulfilment of specific clauses in the various Oslo agreements – known as ‘conditionality’. The use of conditionality in peace-building was far less successful than initiatives aimed at donor coordination. Generally this was due to lack of effective policy mechanisms or the will to use such mechanisms as existed at their disposal. In any event the key issues raised by donors – like Palestinian transparency and accountability and clarity over Israeli responsibilities – were intrinsically difficult to resolve, particularly in view of Israeli concerns over its national security and Palestinian preoccupation with its state building.[44]

TABLE C3

PLEDGES OF DONOR ASSISTANCE TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, 1993-98

Donor	**Pledge** ($ thousands)	**Donor**	**Pledge** ($ thousands)
Algeria	10,000	Italy	156,837
Arab Fund	150,000	Japan	312,023
Argentina	1,368	Jordan	20,211
Australia	13,010	Kuwait	25,000
Austria	25,350	Luxembourg	11,500
Belgium	39,080	The Netherlands	154,166
Brunei	6,000	Norway	244,021
Canada	43,568	Portugal	825
China	15,935	Qatar	3,000
Czech Republic	2,718	Republic of Korea	15,000
Denmark	50,131	Romania	2,880
Egypt	17,210	Russia	4,778
European Investment Bank	300,000	Saudi Arabia	208,000
European Union	421,580	Spain	147,152
Finland	13,904	Sweden	95,774
France	80,549	Switzerland	90,316
Germany	355,422	Turkey	54,971
Greece	28,231	UNDP	12,000
Iceland	1,300	United Arab Emirates	25,000
India	2,000	United Kingdom	128,656
Indonesia	2,000	United States	500,000
International Finance Corp.	70,000	World Bank	228,700
Ireland	7,074	World Food Programme	9,334
Israel	75,000	TOTAL	4,181,574

Source: Rex Brynen, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza (United States Institute of Peace, 2000), Table 3.1, p. 75 citing Palestinian Authority (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Dec. 1998).

C4.5 Delivering Assistance

The timely and effective delivery of aid to the West Bank and Gaza has faced several serious hurdles:

> Some of these have been structural in nature, arising from the inherent difficulties of spending large amounts of money in a small economy, as well as from the almost Kafkaesque [i.e. nightmarish bureaucratic] constraints created by the various complex Palestinian-Israeli interim agreements. More important still, however, have been constraints associated with the actions (or inactions) of the key players in the process. Israeli impediments – variously arising from security concerns, diplomatic maneuvering, and bureaucratic procedures – have been the most important of these, with Israel's policy of closure having particularly negative effects on the Palestinian economy. The Palestinian Authority has borne its share of responsibility for shortcomings, too: initially weak institutions have grown much stronger and more efficient, but problems of corruption and financial irregularity have undercut many of these gains. It is also clear that PA economic policy has often been driven by political concerns, most notably a desire to consolidate the domestic position of the regime and create foundations for future statehood, while strengthening the Palestinian bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel.[45]

Nevertheless, despite these hurdles, the overall record of delivering aid by the end of the first pledging period of 1994-98 was quite good: a total of $3.8 billion (out of $4.2 billion pledged) had been committed by donors to specific projects in West Bank and Gaza and $2.6 billion of this total had actually been disbursed.[46] This did not, though, necessarily mean that the timely disbursement of funds was being done in a manner that promoted peace and economic reconstruction.

C4.6 Allocating Assistance

External aid did not establish a viable Palestinian economy, which remains fragmented geographically and heavily dependent on Israel. Instead this economy has still to develop areas of comparative advantage and continues to be very vulnerable to external shocks. The serious problems of the Palestinian Authority's large public sector workforce, financial irregularities, corruption and lack of transparent dealings through the monopolies represent legacies which will weaken long term economic development whatever their short-term political utility.[47]

The picture was positive in some respects during the 1990s according to one report of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO). The infrastructures relating to transportation, communications, waste and water had improved. Certain Palestinian Authority ministries had acquired real credibility in terms of institutional capacity and efficiency. Most social services had kept pace with very rapid population growth and some had even improved service delivery to an extent.[48]

However, despite real economic growth in 1998, in the longer term sustainable development in the Palestinian territories ultimately depends on the outcome of the peace process and the framework of any Palestinian state established in the future.

Development planners have had to make allocation decisions in a context of political uncertainty. Beyond that, allocation of external aid has also been affected by a panoply of complex factors including many unrelated to peace-building or economic development, e.g. donors seeking political profile and economic self-interest; the Palestinian Authority pursuing bureaucratic politics and such like; and local NGOs, facing reduced funding and isolation by the Palestinian Authority, sought their own niche in this wider context.[49]

The search is not for perfect solutions but for better ways of undertaking development aid in war-to-peace transitions by recognising the underlying dynamics at work. It is with the broader lessons of the Palestine case study that the author concludes.

C4.7 Conclusion

Brynen, in putting the Palestinian case in context, concludes:

> The steady deterioration of the peace process during 1996-98 and the broader decline of the Palestinian economy in the 1990s underscore that development assistance can neither create peace in the absence of political will among all of the local parties nor single-handedly create prosperity in the face of multiple economic shocks and structural constraints.[50]

Nevertheless he argues that the increase in post-1993 international aid played an important and possibly critical role. Without such assistance it is likely that Palestinian GNP would have fallen by a further 6-11 per cent.[51] Apart from other gains (cited in C4.6 above) it is unlikely that the Palestinian Authority could have established itself as a functioning entity without external support. Moreover, while much harder to assess, such aid has significantly contributed to the Authority's political stability by enhancing policy performance or reinforcing political patronage.

Although waste, authoritarianism and corruption are substantial issues in the Palestinian territories, war-to-peace transitions are always difficult particularly when forms of war continue and peace in the full sense remains hard to secure. Maladministration is almost always the norm in such situations and, by international comparison, the relative performance of Palestine was better than many others.[52]

While aid efforts can be criticised in many ways on balance, given the economic and political context in the Palestinian territories, their contribution was invaluable in building institutional capacities and offsetting economic decline. External aid sustained space for further political negotiations amidst uncertainty. 'Without international assistance it is doubtful whether the Palestinian Authority – or the peace process – would have been around to see the day [when meaningful negotiations were renewed].'[53]

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APPENDIX D – POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY

D1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Appendix is to enable the reader to understand institution building and peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the Oslo Accords in 1993-95. 'Peacemaking' is action to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means.[1]

This Appendix will focus on joint Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking but only on Palestinian state building for the reason that the state of Israel has been recognised by the PLO but it remains to be seen whether Israel will eventually recognise a sovereign, independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories. Nothing written in this Appendix, though, should be taken as supporting or opposing the establishment of such a state on the part of IPP or its Trustees. The four contributions highlighted here are as follows:

- Nathan J. Brown has studied Palestinian institutional development with regard to both the domestic and wider Arab perspective rather than in relation to the conflict with Israel. He argues that this has the benefit of a fresh approach, which more accurately conveys how those involved in building Palestinian institutions perceive their own endeavours, while also offering more relevant comparisons than those with Israel and the Zionist movement, common in English writings.[2] Funding for the research, mostly conducted in 1999-2000, came through the United States Israel Educational Foundation and United States Institute of Peace.
- A three-year project, undertaken jointly by two Israeli and two Palestinian scholars, evaluated 'Track-II' diplomacy in the Middle East involving informal talks between non-officials of conflict parties intended to try to clarify outstanding disputes and explore options for resolving them, at least initially, outside the parameters of official negotiations and in less sensitive circumstances. The focus here will be mainly on the process leading to the Oslo Accords.[3]
- Looking to the future, two contrasting views are presented on a 'two-state' solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the late Edward Said's critique of partition, written in 1999 from a Palestinian perspective;[4] and Israeli diplomat and politician Yossi Beilin's Geneva Accord in October 2003, achieved through the work of a group of Palestinians and Israelis, endorses a 'model draft framework final status agreement between the two peoples'.[5]

This appendix can only give a summary of parts of their work.

D2 RESUMING ARAB PALESTINE

D2.1 The Theme

The story of the 'Rocard report' or '[American] Council on Foreign Relations report', known after the chair and sponsor respectively of the independent task force on Palestinian governance whose final report was issued in June 1999, illustrates the theme of Nathan Brown's book. For at first sight the report appears to be simply the result of

pressure for reform from international donors, disturbed by corruption and inefficiency in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). They received a partial response over public finances but were frustrated in any wider attempt to reform an authoritarian system. For such progress was dependent on the context of Israeli-Palestinian relations and ultimately failed due to the return to violence just over a year later in the Second Intifada.[6]

However, digging a little deeper into the domestic conditions for institutional reform permits an alternative perspective on the report to emerge, which regards it as part of a Palestinian struggle over the proper direction for politics in their proto-state. The main authors of the Rocard report were two Palestinian academics, Khalil Shikaki and Yazid Sayigh. They drew not just on international expertise but far more on debates amongst Palestinian intellectuals and political activists while also learning from the political experience of Arab states in the region. So the issues, raised by the task force report, had been discussed by Palestinians since soon after the start of the PNA and did not cease when that report's recommendations were submerged in PNA bureaucracy.[7]

Understanding Palestinian politics in areas like corruption as simply the by-product of the conflict of Israel does a disservice to those working for change and also risks misrepresenting those issues. For example, the Palestinian General Control Institute had issued a report on the financial and administrative practices of the PNA's new ministries, two years before the task force report, which provoked a struggle between the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and President Arafat on corruption. (However a World Bank study in 2001 revealed corruption levels that were low compared to those prevailing in other developing countries and regions).[8] While Palestinian politics cannot escape its external context for long that, at most, conditions and cannot determine outcomes. Other underlying patterns are at work:

> The central theme of this book is that the struggle over defining Palestine concerns not how Palestinian politics should begin but over how it should be resumed: for Palestinians, the creation of the PNA was not an act of creation but of resumption. Palestine is understood–rightly or wrongly–not as a wholly new creation but as something built on a Palestinian past and present; it is shaped not simply by its relations with Israel but also by its history and its links with its Arab counterparts. Political struggles within the PNA concern how to resume Arab Palestine.[9]

D2.2 Palestinian Politics Since the Oslo Accords

Much of the political struggle in the Palestinian territories, from the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993-95, has concerned how to build a Palestinian state as separate as possible from the context of the contest with Israel. This has concerned three very different, and frequently conflicting, senses of resumption based on varying visions of Palestine's past and future but a common acceptance of a distinct Palestinian nation, as part of a broader Arab nation, and the legitimacy of the nationalist struggle:

- *Resuming Palestine as a Political Entity*. Palestine was built as a distinct political entity under the British mandate (see Appendix A4). Despite its fatal flaws, from a Palestinian perspective, the period of the mandate witnessed the definite formation of Palestinian national identity, which had begun in the late Ottoman period, and the establishment of schools, courts and other institutions. On this view, the task of the national movement is to assert Palestinian control over these bodies so that they develop to meet Palestinian rather than British or Zionist needs.[10] Similarly:

  > … Palestinians involved in negotiating the [Oslo] accords, and in subsequently building the PNA, never regarded the negotiations as the source of Palestinian institution building or legitimacy. Many saw those agreements as important steps in obtaining Israeli and international recognition but did not see them as constituting Palestinian politics. Nor did they wish the content of the agreements to shape Palestinian political developments any more than necessary. The PNA showed little interest in fostering ties with Israel and Israeli institutions beyond what was necessary to make the economy and the Oslo Accords function, sometimes in a minimal way.[11]

  What legitimacy the PNA affirmed domestically was derived from the PLO. Its task was not to build new institutions but to draw together a wide variety of institutions that had developed in different contexts. On this view, Palestinian political institutions are described as having real historical antecedents that have only to be restored or redirected toward nationalist goals.

- *Resuming Palestine's Arab Identity*. The Palestinian leadership has tried, in the period since 1993, to base institutional development, not on agreements with Israel, but rather on the much longer term process of state building in the Arab world. In those instances where Palestinian antecedents were not enough or required updating, PNA officials usually turned to precedents set by Arab countries, in particular Jordan and Egypt. Thus the framework of PNA ministries, the way its laws were expressed, security forces' uniforms, the style of its newspapers and the formulation of its curriculum found their counterparts within the wider Arab world. While this Arab dimension should not be over-emphasised because from the mid-1960s Palestinian nationalists concentrated on developing an identity that was partially distinct from Pan-Arabism, the parallels with broader Arab history went deeper than many Palestinians appreciated, as most Arab states emerged out of a lengthy and seemingly indefinite struggle against colonialism.[12]

- *Resuming Normal Politics*. This view maintained that the failure to resolve nationalist issues through the Oslo Accords should not cripple the development of Palestinian life in many areas. Indeed some holding this attitude regarded the building of institutions as much removed from those agreements as possible, and the limitations on Palestinian sovereignty that they implied, as virtually a nationalist imperative.[13]

> International examples of this attitude included the Rocard report, which insisted that meaningful political reform did not need to await the outcome of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Likewise the reports of human rights organisations were unwilling to permit the prevailing security situation to account for human rights violations by the PNA. While the senior Palestinian leadership generally showed little willingness to identify with this perspective many within Palestinian NGOs, professional associations, the legal fraternity and the PLC worked to build a normal Palestine. They achieved real results but these were frequently dependent on that very Israeli-Palestinian relationship they sought to escape or ignore.[14]

D2.3 The Constraints and Opportunities of the Oslo Accords

Accepting the central theme of grounding an understanding of Palestinian politics mainly in a Palestinian and broader Arab context, it has to be remembered that the Oslo Accords, subject to widely differing interpretations by all parties, has limited Palestinian institutional development as well as offering some opportunities. The first agreement in 1993 referred to the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority and to a synonymous Palestinian Council, though subsequent agreements referred to the term *Palestinian Authority*. However, official Palestinian terminology refers instead to a *Palestinian National Authority* (PNA). The council in official documents is called the PLC, the legislative branch of the PNA (but not synonymous with it). Despite this history, as noted above, the PNA presents itself as a body authorised by the PLO to administer those areas of the West Bank and Gaza which Palestinians control pending the formal declaration of a Palestinian state by the PLO.[15] (Its 1988 declaration remains in effect as far as Palestinians are concerned; a subsequent declaration would merge the PNA and the Palestinian state into a single entity, possibly absorbing the PLO, too.)

Even so the Palestinian leaders could not ignore the constraints of the Oslo Accords or the resulting limitations on sovereignty. Still, the PNA began straight away to operate as though it were a state and Palestinians started to complain not only because of the constraints on its actions but also because of the manner in which it acted: the PNA could be oppressive and corrupt, in its *modus operandi*, quite apart from the Oslo Accords. Thus many Palestinians, concerned by the likely consequences for full statehood, made yet greater efforts to encourage the development of institutions and practices appropriate for normal political life.[16]

It could be argued that the theme adopted here (see D2.1 above) takes Palestine as a state in the making too seriously. Many of the PNA's critics would claim that the limitations are so intense that the PNA should be regarded 'as a thinly veiled continuation of the Israeli occupation.'[17] Instead many Palestinian leaders maintain that the nationalist issue must remain paramount for all Palestinians, in the face of the realities of the occupation, and thus domestic issues like governance, democracy, and corruption should not be pressed too forcefully at such a time for fear of national division.

Yet drawing again on comparable Arab histories, in response to such alternative views against a domestic focus, suggests that external control and influence did not determine the development of Arab political institutions though it certainly influenced that effort. Similarly, much Palestinian political energy since 1993 has been spent in making Israel less relevant to Palestinian lives. The many failures and partial successes of such initiatives should not blur their existence or the altered conditions they have produced. The emerging state of Palestine is following Arab history in building political institutions and practices in a hard and competitive environment. While not ignoring that setting, the Palestinians are placed at the centre of their own history and politics.[18]

Five areas of developing Palestinian institutions and practices in the period 1993 to 2002 are addressed (though, for reasons of space, not summarised here): the legal framework; defining the basic constitutional framework for the PNA; the PLC, being the first exclusively Palestinian legislative body; relations between state and society under the PNA, especially NGOs and professional associations; education and attempts to write a Palestinian national curriculum. The latter includes an appendix confronting the oft-repeated charge that Palestinian textbooks inculcate hatred of Israel and Jews.[19] Readers may wish to refer to some of these chapters for detailed treatment of the subject matter.

D3 TRACK-II DIPLOMACY

D3.1 What Are Track-II Talks?

The four co-authors of this study into the Middle East Track-II process, mainly in the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, assess *inter alia* the contribution of these talks to conflict resolution in the region. Their attempts to apply this approach more widely and to identify the factors that determine its successes and failures are not addressed here.

Track-II talks are not to be confused with academic conferences, even where Arab and Israeli scholars participate and engage with one another, nor with secret diplomacy that governments may conduct through their representatives. Rather

> … Track-II talks are convened specifically to foster informal interaction among participants regarding the political issues dividing their nations and to find ways of reducing the tensions or resolving the conflict between them. The purpose of Track-II exercises is to provide participants with a setting that is conducive to achieving such objectives.[20]

Officials who take part in Track-II talks normally do so in an informal way that does not commit their governments to any position adopted in these talks. Nevertheless, if Track-II talks turn out to be very successful then they can lead to secret formal negotiations such as occurred in mid-1993 during the Oslo talks between Israel and the PLO.

Generally Track-II talks do not require formal and official (Track-I) negotiations to be run in tandem. Even so participants in Track-II talks must have some relations with officials amongst their countries' policy makers in order for them to be effective.

Track-II talks can also usefully be distinguished between 'soft' and 'hard' exercises. The former are concerned with an exchange of views and information between the parties so as to increase understanding of each side's positions and policies. The latter might help to negotiate agreements between governments. The informal standing of Track-II participants is used to begin talks on sensitive issues that cannot be treated in a formal way or between parties that have not yet recognised each other. Whereas 'soft' Track-II talks may involve sharing outcomes with wider constituencies, 'hard' talks frequently necessitate complete secrecy because media coverage may risk the whole initiative.[21]

Various roles are fulfilled in Track-II talks:

- A 'sponsor' refers either to the institution issuing the invitation to the talks or the institution on whose behalf the talks are being arranged. In the latter case a research institute might provide a venue but act only as a channel for its national government, which would be regarded as the real sponsor of the talks.
- 'Leaders' refer to each side's highest political authority, e.g. the prime minister and minister for foreign affairs in Israel's case, or the chairman for the PLO.
- A 'mentor' is a high-level political leader who acts as a 'chaperon' for the talks. He or she initiates the Track-II talks and later convinces the national leaders of their importance. The role of the mentor is particularly crucial in 'hard' talks that are aimed at achieving a breakthrough in conflict resolution. This proved so in the case of the Oslo talks.[22]

Establishing criteria for judging success or failure of Track-II talks can be very difficult. Most Track-II talks have modest objectives, especially compared to the Israeli-Palestinian talks which led eventually to an historic breakthrough. It would be unfair to use the latter as a yardstick to judge other such talks particularly as the Oslo talks were originally intended to assist the stalled Track-I Madrid negotiations rather than replace them. Consequently it appears better to evaluate Track-II talks by the purpose defined by the sponsors and participants of these talks.[23]

D3.2 Why Did The Oslo Talks Succeed?

Track-II talks in the Middle East emerged soon after the 1967 War in the context of the search for a comprehensive peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli settlement. As a specific example the Oslo talks, launched in December 1992, are described and analysed to understand the role of the Track-II approach in negotiating the historic Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles signed in September 1993.

A key aspect of the Oslo process was the retreat on substantive issues. The PLO leadership, although long accepting a two-phased 'interim' and 'final status' process (as in Madrid), had always argued for a clear appreciation on the final goal of negotiations, namely, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. By late 1993, though, Arafat had committed himself to such a process without any certainty as to the end result. While it made the Oslo deal acceptable to Israel, as the price for breaking the stalemate in

the Madrid process and recognition of the PLO, it sowed the seed for much subsequent misunderstanding and to the eventual breakdown of the Oslo process in 2000-01.

> Nevertheless, by mid-1993 an array of international, regional, and domestic circumstances propelled both Israel and the PLO to accept positions that they had long rejected. Yet the new political environment could not by itself produce the breakthrough concluded in Oslo. Without the unique characteristics of the Track-II approach, the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles could not have been negotiated.[24]

Participants

One important factor in explaining the success of the Oslo talks was the character, background and personal contacts of the individuals involved.

The Israelis at Oslo, Yair Hirschfield and Ron Pundik, were bona fide independent scholars attached to Israeli universities but had news leaked out the Israeli government could have denied involvement. Even so they had excellent contacts with top Israeli leaders including Yossi Beilin, who was Deputy Foreign Minister when the Oslo talks commenced. As Hirschfield and Pundik were not seeking office they were not so constrained to consider only what was acceptable to public opinion. While they were ardent Zionists they also believed Israel needed to become a normal state, albeit with a Jewish character, so a solution of the Palestinian problem was crucial and, they thought, possible. Later in the process they reluctantly accepted a more limited role when Track-I negotiators Uri Savir, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and Joel Singer, a lawyer, took over.[25]

Similarly, the Palestinian participants in the Oslo talks were well-suited to their role. Although Abu Ala', Hassan Asfour and Maher al-Kurd were official representatives of the PLO the fact that they were relatively unknown at the time gave the PLO a degree of credible deniability, as in Israel's case. That none of them were known to have had an 'operational' history within the PLO also provided some reassurance to the Israeli side. Likewise, despite some Palestinian concerns about potential links to Israeli intelligence, dealing with Israeli academics and then diplomats rather than military personnel helped build confidence. Unlike their official Israeli counterparts Abu Ala' (later Speaker of the PLC) and other Palestinian participants regularly took part in academic conferences. Abu Ala's low profile in the PLO provided protection from public attention and comparative freedom of action which may have helped secure the Oslo agreement. Asfour and Al-Kurd were middle-ranking officials whose role was mostly determined by their PLO patrons.[26]

Both sides were ready and willing to reach a deal. Each became convinced that the other party's participants were speaking authoritatively on behalf of their respective leaders. In May 1993, after five rounds of talks in Oslo, the Palestinian side proposed an upgrading of the talks to confirm their real status and this happened at the end of May when Savir joined the negotiations leading to the first formal talks between Israel and the PLO.[27]

Mentors

Even more important than the nature of Track-II participants were the two individuals who served as mentors due to their unique qualifications.

For the Israelis, Yossi Beilin regarded the Track-I negotiations, within the Madrid process, as completely futile. He was an ideal Track-II mentor because he was committed to assisting progress in the Arab-Israeli peacemaking and was convinced there was only a small window of opportunity for the government of Yitzhak Rabin, in which Beilin served, to negotiate a deal. While he was one step below Israel's top leadership he had full access to Foreign Minister Peres and somewhat less to Prime Minister Rabin himself. Thus Beilin was well placed to convey his understanding of the Israeli leaders' freedom of action to the participants at Oslo so they comprehended more clearly what would or would not be acceptable to them. Later, once Beilin was convinced that the Oslo talks had real potential his unique position allowed him to persuade Peres, and eventually Rabin as well, that the opportunity for agreement should be seriously investigated. In this Beilin was willing to take political risks and pursue a more innovative approach.[28]

For the Palestinians, Abu Mazin (also known as Mahmoud Abbas, elected Palestinian President in 2005) was a close political adviser to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. He had been in charge of supervising contacts between the PLO and Israelis for more than a decade and was seen by the Israelis as being committed to negotiating a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Abu Mazin had a longstanding view that relations with Sephardic (oriental) Jews in Israel and abroad needed to be cultivated. He thought that an approach to the Israeli peace constituency and the oriental Jewish community would reap political dividends. His preference was for serious work away from the limelight though by the early 1990s, with the death of several Palestinian leaders, his responsibilities grew. During the 1991-93 Madrid talks Abu Mazin was the official head of the PLO committee superintending the bilateral negotiations so he was very familiar with the issues. Like Beilin, Abu Mazin was a political visionary but he acted with discretion, convinced that the Oslo talks would only succeed if a small group of people were in the know.[29]

Leaders

The Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, followed one overriding objective: to show that the Madrid talks could not offer the Israeli leadership an alternative to the Oslo talks. With assistance from Abu Mazin he took a series of steps that, in effect, undermined any remaining hopes the USA or Israel might have of a breakthrough in the Madrid talks. By early 1993 Arafat had concluded that the United States was not likely to sponsor any agreement that would meet the PLO's minimum conditions. Rather the dominant view at the PLO's headquarters in Tunis was that the US was more attentive to Israel's concerns than Israel was itself. Thus the conclusion was reached that the PLO would probably get a better deal from Israel directly than through relying on partial US mediation. Abu Mazin fulfilled the role of consolidator of the Oslo talks, convincing Arafat of its worth.[30]

Unlike Arafat, the Israeli leader Rabin had to be convinced of the value of direct talks with the other side. Peres, who preferred informal approaches and secret diplomacy, once he had Rabin's provisional consent to explore the Oslo option, fully embraced it from February 2003. Yet the prime minister's support for these talks was not self-evident. It was clear, though, to Beilin and other Israeli participants that Rabin's support was the precondition for their success; only he could convince the Israeli public based on his long and distinguished military career. Although Rabin also had doubts about the capacity of formal negotiations to deliver important results, and he preferred the secrecy of the Track-II approach, he was averse to anything intellectual:

> He regarded academics as divorced from the 'real world,' loose with words, fond of general formulations, careless with regard to detail, and undependable if not irresponsible when it came to matters of national security.[31]

Nevertheless, two factors consistent with his nature may have made him more receptive to the Oslo process: his own political credibility distinguished him from Peres but he was sensitive that he had not yet delivered on his 1992 election campaign promise to conclude an agreement on Palestinian autonomy within six to nine months; and secrecy had in fact been maintained at Oslo. Moreover, the inclusion of Savir and Singer in the team would also have helped to address his doubts about a process conducted by academics.

Sponsors

The Norwegian government played a pivotal role in the success of the Oslo talks, at first through Terje Larsen, then Director of Norway's Institute for Applied Social Science. Apart from initiating and funding the meetings the Norwegian government also provided key logistical and security services for the Oslo talks. Then, in May 1993, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst became involved in the talks and his mediation efforts reached a peak in mid-August. Both sides expressed appreciation of the Norwegian role.[32]

United States Involvement

Since early 1992 the official talks in Washington, as part of the Madrid process, had been held under the patronage of the US government, which viewed itself as the principal architect of the Middle East peace process. The Madrid talks had been based on excluding the PLO but the United States could not take a negative line to Oslo because that would have meant adopting a more anti-PLO position than Israel itself had taken.

Even so, President Clinton's administration was taken by surprise by the success of the Oslo talks despite being aware of them. While partial briefings and deceptive communications by participants in the Oslo talks were a factor the most likely explanation for the depth of the Clinton administration's surprise is that the US intelligence community was not requested to monitor the Oslo talks because no significance was attributed to this venue. The US Secretary of State viewed them as an academic seminar.[33]

D3.3 Why Did the Oslo Process Fail?

The authors argue that:

> The ultimate failure of the Oslo *process* to deliver a final and stable resolution of the conflict over time should not be confused with the effectiveness of the Oslo Track-II talks as a breakthrough *mechanism* in 1993. At the time it was agreed, the Oslo DOP [Declaration of Principles] provided a glimpse into a better future based on mutual recognition and a roadmap to peace, but the political realities on the ground between 1993 and 2000–the mutual mis-reading of Oslo's 'spirit' as well as the continuous violation of its text–eventually destroyed the political process and brought about an almost total reversion to pre-Oslo attitudes on both sides.[34] [Emphasis in the original.]

After rehearsing the Palestinian and Israeli rationales for the renewed outbreak of violence in September 2000 and the resulting strategies on each side for breaking out of the Oslo framework, the authors conclude that this breakdown and the loss of faith in the sincerity and credibility of each party as a partner in peace are not the right criteria for assessing the value of Oslo as a Track-II exercise:

> Whereas the implementation of the Oslo agreements may have been fatally flawed and full of misperceptions and delusions, the fact remains that the Oslo Track-II put in place a pathway to ending the conflict. Ultimately, only a return to this Oslo legacy is likely to provide the basis for a lasting settlement.[35]

D4 PARTITION OR A TWO-STATE SOLUTION?

D4.1 What Can Separation Mean?

Edward W. Said acknowledged that:

> An apparently deep and unquestioning desire on the part of most Israelis and Palestinians seems to be the need to exist in separate states.[36]

While accepting that there is an on-going and very high likelihood of tension wherever the two peoples come into contact with each other, what has to be recalled is that the situation is unequal in terms of power and land such that Palestinians are effectively objects to be disposed of at Israel's bidding.

This situation is complicated by the separatist logic of Palestinian nationalism. Accepting that a people stripped of their identity and land and enduring decades of exile and military rule should wish to be restored as a fully-fledged member of the community of nations, their representatives were attempting (in 1999) to maintain the undesirable status quo so as to establish a mini-state that will never experience full independence. For throughout Palestine/Israel the two populations are living cheek by jowl, in close if

unwelcome proximity, due to the shocking efficacy of Israeli settlement policies since 1967. So both Israeli and Palestinian visions of separation are unrealistic and 'destined for decades of future violence'.[37] Both ideas are fundamentally and philosophically unfeasible.

Today Palestinians lack the political, military or moral will to create an independent state, understandable and desirable as this idea is – were it achievable. But

> … how are we to uproot 350,000 Israelis, how are we to empty the recently built Jewish parts of East Jerusalem, how are we to remove the settlements, how are we to defeat the settlers and the army anytime in the present or near future? We have no way to do any of those things, and obviously negotiations will not do it.[38]

Israeli dreams are equally unworkable. Instead Palestinians must adopt a strategy with like-minded Israelis on matters of common interest: secular rights; anti-settlement activities, education and equality before the law. This cannot be undertaken by officials of the Israeli government or Palestinian Authority with an interest in the *status quo* but by those whose vision moves beyond the debilitating perspectives of separation. Trying to draw lines between different peoples whose stories and situation cannot be separated will not solve the fundamental problems between them as the unhappy examples of Pakistan and India, Ireland, Cyprus and the Balkans abundantly demonstrate. Now it is necessary to reflect on coexistence after separation and despite partition.[39]

New partitions should be seen as the last, desperate fling of a dying ideology of separation, afflicting Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, neither of which has overcome the philosophical problem of the Other. When it comes to any kind of abuse 'the Other is always one of us, not a remote alien'[40]

D4.2 A Two-State Solution

Yossi Beilin describes the background to the Geneva Agreement, signed in October 2003 and officially launched in December that year, as the unofficial work of a group of Palestinians and Israelis seriously committed to negotiating a 'final' deal.[41] Further innovations related to new formulae for dividing the territory, the role of an international body to keep the peace and in the preliminary statements. For example, the right of the Jewish people to a state is completely affirmed for the first time in such a document.

The cover letter to the Swiss Foreign Minister, signed by all attendees to the signing ceremony for the Geneva Accord, offers a model draft framework final status agreement between Palestinians and Israelis.[42] It notes that the Palestinian government and Israeli government have accepted the Road Map (see Appendix A9.3), which includes reaching a final status agreement by 2005 on the basis of a two-state solution. This makes it important, in their view, for an example of such an agreement to be provided to show that an historic compromise is possible, despite the pain of granting concessions, to meet the vital national interests of each side.

This endeavour is seen as an educational initiative and a service to decision makers.

In the context of the Road Map process, the draft agreement points to a mutually acceptable and achievable end result and a response to doubters and supporters of interminable interim agreements:

> This Agreement will bring about the creation of a sovereign Palestinian State alongside Israel, put an end to the occupation, terminate conflict and bloodshed, and end all mutual claims.[43]

The Agreement itself (set out in full in Beilin's book) envisages the complete withdrawal of Israel from the territory of the state of Palestine within 30 months of the entry into force of the Agreement, in accordance with the terms stated in that Agreement.[44]

The core of the agreement is 'the concession of sovereignty over the Temple Mount [in Jerusalem] to the Palestinians in exchange for Israeli sovereign discretion over the number of refugees admitted to Israel, with the rest free to settle in the Palestinian state.'[45] Over many years each party has clung to 'virtual rights': while Israel has never actually adhered to its sovereign rights over Temple Mount, which since 1967 has been administered by an Islamic trust, the 'right of return' of Palestinian refugees to Israel was an idea that even Palestinian leaders knew could not be realised because it would end the Jewish majority in Israel. The two parties have traded these rights in the Geneva Accord.

While the Geneva Agreement may not be implemented by 2010, in Beilin's view, it represents the last opportunity to realise the Zionist dream before demographic trends create a Palestinian majority between Jordan and the Mediterranean.

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APPENDIX E – RELIGION AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

E1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to enable the reader to understand the concept of 'jihad' in the historical origins of Islamic thought and beliefs. The importance of this topic arises from its use by militant Islamic groups in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Jihad is treated here as a potentially extreme illustration of the link between religion and political ideology though, as will be seen later, it need not necessarily be pursued by violence and war. There is an analogous concept of 'holy war' in Judaism and Christianity, which is not described because it does not appear to have the same currency today that it once did. Furthermore, religion and politics can be related in ways that are charitable in law, that is, not controversial. The next Appendix (F) offers an example, albeit one linking education, rather than religion, to politics in a charitable manner.

One recent work is taken to explore the theme of 'jihad' here:

- M.J. Akbar has written what is described as 'the very first cohesive history of jihad'. His introduction to the subject with his explanation of the concept is given but not the full history that covers the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tangentially.[1]

Hence this appendix can only give a summary of the relevant parts of his work.

E2 BACKGROUND

An opening question is how Pakistan became the breeding ground for 'the first Islamic international brigade in modern times'?[2] The President of that country, Pervez Musharraf, acknowledged it was swamped by the Kalashnikov and jihad culture, which he is trying to change. How, too, did Osama bin Laden find a hideout and opportunity in this culture?

> The answers lie in the sources of anger, for this is a war being fought in the mind as much as anywhere else.[3]

Whereas conventional war tends to be defined in terms of national interests and uniformed armies this jihad is also a war fought through surrogates by irregular armies. Jihad is only one Islamic response to the apparent world domination of the United States of America but it has the ability to change the course of history as on 11 September 2001.

This work tries to explain the origin and nature of both the battle and the battlefield. Jihad is moulded by the history of Islam and the history of the Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan, for example, was created by a moderate liberal leader but soon became 'a homeland of fundamentalists who constitute as great a threat to their haven as they are to the people and nations they seek to subdue.'[4]

E3 THE SHADE OF SWORDS

The ‘shade of swords’ is an invitation to die, not a request to kill:

> When Muslims take the name of their Prophet, Muhammad, they always add a prayer: Peace be upon Him. Peace is the avowed aim of Islam, a word that means surrender; as-Salam, or the Peaceful, is one of the names of Allah. But the Islamic faith also demands, from time to time, in a holy war defined by specific circumstances, the blood of the faithful in the defence of their faith. This is jihad.[5]

The profession of faith is called the ‘shahada’: There is but one Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet. Those who become martyrs for Allah are the ‘shaheed’. Believers surrender only to Allah. Now and again they may have to submit but such defeat is just a pause before renewal. They wait, keep the faith and renew their jihad until victory is achieved as Allah promised in His bargain with the believer, clearly set out in the Holy Quran. ‘Islam has always recognized the reality of war in human affairs, and set its moral and political compass.’[6]

A definition like this is open to abuse in that there is a temptation to reinterpret both text and history to suit contemporary needs. For example, some Muslims today will convert a holy war into a mere injunction to inner purification.

> It is true that the Prophet insisted that a greater jihad was the struggle to cleanse impurity within, but that does not take away from the fact that the lesser jihad inspired the spirit that once made Muslim armies all-conquering, enabled Muslims to protect their holy places, and ensured that most of the community lived within the protection of Muslim power despite formidable challenge from Christian alliances in a world war that was virtually coterminous with the birth of Islam.[7]

If today’s Muslim rulers are reluctant to sound the call to jihad it is because they fear the consequences of failure. Defeat becomes an indictment of the ruler, which is risky because Muslims have long held rulers to account as they are commanded to do. Most Muslim governments are perceived as unrepresentative and undemocratic so with the disappearance of the traditional Islamic polity to meet the needs of the community, the ‘umma’, the arena for struggle is taken by radical Islamic movements outside the boundaries of official authority.

Unconfident rulers use the promotion of religious fundamentalism as a prop in relation to an external threat: Pakistan, for instance, created to protect Islam rapidly politicised jihad as an instrument to protect elites who had usurped power in the face of ‘infidel’ India. Fundamentalist elements prospered in Pakistan while the simultaneous collapse of aspects of secularism in India nurtured the rise of Hindu fundamentalism.[8]

The West needs to come to grips with the historical context of Islamic fundamentalism.

There is still a strong urge to secularism, sense and democracy in Pakistan and India immanent in South Asian culture and traditions, which may prove a saving grace if that finds its political balance in both countries.

> Is common sense too much to ask for in the region of the jihad against Israel? For many, the case for a Palestine state is so obvious that it barely needs reiteration. Indifference and procrastination have allowed the conflict to turn cancerous. However, Palestine is also being used by many non-democratic Arab states as the cause they can focus public opinion on, deflecting criticism from their own regimes.[9]

The West may have underestimated the Muslim will to martyrdom. It did not recognise the child who would walk serenely under the shade of swords.

E4 CHAPTER AND VERSE

Islam began with a miracle. 'Iqra' – read – said the angel Gabriel and the illiterate Muhammad started to read the word of God out to the world in a delightful prose that was subsequently compiled and became the Holy Quran.[10]

Unlike the Christian calendar, which begins with the birth of Jesus Christ, the Muslim calendar starts from the moment of survival, the 'Hejira', or the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution by his own tribe the Quraysh. For when he announced his revelation and sought refuge in Medina they wanted his life because he promised to destroy idol worship in the Kaaba at Mecca and so damage the lucrative benefits of the pilgrimage. The Quraysh sent an army against the Muslims, who took position at the well of Badr. The Prophet was anxious, in view of the fact that the Muslims were outnumbered three to one, and prayed to Allah. As he did so he cried out: 'Oh Allah, if this band of Muslims perish today Thou will not be worshipped any more.'[11] However, after sleeping he awoke reassured by a dream in which Gabriel came to the help of the Muslims. Inspired by the Muslim victory at Badr, believers to this day have no doubts that they, too, will receive Allah's help in the heat of battle.

So the spirit of jihad became part of Islam at Badr, which inspires believers with a heroism beyond reason and fills unbelievers with dread. It is rooted in 'jahd', meaning exertion or striving. The jihadi wins irrespective of whether the battle is won: for, in the long run, this war of righteousness will be won; while, in the short term, death will bring martyrdom and paradise. At the same time the striving cleanses the soul for no martyrdom can occur without inner purity:

> The greater of the two kinds of jihad, the Jihad al Akbar, is the war against the enemy within; against one's own weakness and wandering. It is the Jihad al Asghar, or the lesser jihad, that is fought on the battlefield.[12]

Islam, as the word implies, does not seek violence but nor does it permit meek surrender. There are circumstances in which all Muslims are commanded to fight to defend their

faith and war then becomes a duty. This lesser jihad led to astounding success for Muslim armies. A brilliant empire was established in a comparatively short time that merged east and west for seven centuries. Yet jihad is not authority for empire-building. Its most powerful expression is when all seems lost, rather than won. That is the spirit of Badr.

In the Quran (Surah 22, Al Hajj, Verse 39) permission to fight is given to those who have suffered injustice, not to those who take up arms. The analogy of David and Goliath is used repeatedly. If the Muslims ever required a triumph over Goliath it was at Badr.[13]

While the Muslim community does not display monotonous uniformity across a huge geographical region, when there is a belief that Islam and Muslims are under threat from powerful enemies the only answer is unity, faith and war. Now the Christian West has taken the place of the Quraysh, though it is a view formed over a millennium.

> All empires rise and fall, but the Muslim believes in a three-phase cycle: rise, fall, and renewal. Since an empire is the achievement of man, corruption is inevitable. The Prophet foresaw this when he said that the best Muslims were those of his generation, and that each successive generation would see progressive decline. He understood the ability of power to corrupt, hence his notable dictum: the closer you are to government, the further you are from God.[14]

The answer to corruption was not surrender before an infidel but an on-going moral renaissance out of which would come the next stage of political success. The Prophet promised in the Sunna (that is, the practice of the Prophet) that a true 'imam' (the al-Mahdi) would appear who would restore the glory of power by the purity of faith and a return to first principles. In order to understand Islam today that beginning must be understood.

E5 CONCLUSION: ISLAM'S PRINCIPLES

Islam's principles clearly state that: there shall be no compulsion in religion; your religion for you and mine for me. Following Medina, though, Muslims declined to offer the other cheek to those who would persecute them. In those circumstances death was a little thing on the road to martyrdom. In the author's view that, too, is the inspiration and conviction of Islam passed on from generation to generation. Allah's bargain with the believer is called jihad and it was struck in Medina.[15]

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APPENDIX F – EDUCATION AND POLITICS

F1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to enable the reader to understand the potential role of education in evaluating and influencing the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is intended to address the need for human and personal security.

The sources used to achieve this purpose are as follows:

- Ruth Firer, the Israeli project coordinator and her Palestinian counterpart, Sami Adwan, have conducted school textbook analysis to provide 'a comprehensive overview of how the difficult Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the 20th century has been presented in history and civics textbooks from the end of the eighties to today.'[1] This initiative has some similarities to the IPP concept of 'peace games'.
- Donald A. Sylvan, Jonathan W. Keller and Yoram Z. Haftel report on an exercise aimed at testing international relations theories and a group of Middle East experts to see how they fare in forecasting Israeli-Palestinian relations.[2] This is a closer match to the peace games idea, in which there is also a dual concern with conflict outcomes and methods of analysis.
- The Journal of Social Issues published an issue devoted to 'Arab-Jewish Coexistence Progams' which examines in more depth education for coexistence.[3]

This appendix can only give a summary of relevant parts of their work.

F2 ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN HISTORY AND CIVICS TEXTBOOKS

F2.1 Textbooks in Cultures of War and Peace

The research is based on the belief that national ideologies are implanted through educational (and other) processes in general and textbooks in particular that influence learning in school classrooms. Through over a hundred years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict each side's identity has been forged in a culture of war. This study examines the narratives of this conflict as currently presented in contemporary history and civics textbooks and in the curriculum statements of middle and high schools of both nations.[4]

A *culture of war* relates to all aspects of human life rather than just to war itself and other acts of aggression. Such cultures are founded on regarding one's own race as the most important and denial of others in all types of socialisation influencing self-development.

> Nations involved in wars and conflicts resort to all forms of power games in defending themselves and defying the others. It is a 'win-lose' formula that controls their relationship where each side tries hard to defeat or destroy the others and describe them in a negative character. Dehumanization of the enemy is a means to justify the use of violence and to rationalize the human as well as the material losses.[5]

Alternatively, a *culture of peace* is founded on human rights, the values of civil society and justice so that negotiation and dialogue are considered the proper methods of mediating conflicts and disagreement. Such cultures also relate to all aspects of life. Peace-oriented individuals cite examples from history

> … proving that wars have never solved any conflicts, because the losing party, by rule, seeks revenge. Often, the winner's prosperity as a result of victory breeds new problems and conflicts, like corruption and internal social tensions. The cost of war in human life, energy and resources is immense; instead such precious resources can and should be used for human benefit…[6]

While, in theory, both cultures are self-contained, in practice people maintain a mix of both cultures; war and peace intermingled in varying proportions. The authors' belief is that the various elements of any particular culture have to be analysed in relation to the their religious, national and social background and carefully balanced so as to enhance the elements of peace and reduce the likelihood of conflict and aggression. Although conflicts are unavoidable they need to be addressed through non-violent mediation.

Peace education is not value-free but based on the belief well expressed in one UN body: 'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that defenses of peace must be constructed.'[7]

While peace educators generally agree upon human values they disagree on the most effective means to realise the goals and on the importance of these morals because of their varying cultures and contexts.

Education in the Middle East has usually been used as a means of advancing a particular combination of ideological, religious or nationalistic viewpoints. Consequently Israeli and Palestinian curricula and textbooks frequently tend to perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes of the other side and a positive self-image.[8]

In comparing the same narrative in both textbooks and curricula statements the researchers acknowledge the widely differing positions of both nations, e.g. in terms of their experience in developing textbooks, standards of school and teacher training and the fact that building state institutions by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has only begun. The findings of this study have the ultimate goal of empowering children of both sides with the capacity to maintain one another's identity in an environment of tolerance and acceptance instead of hatred and animosity.[9]

F2.2 Methods of Textbook and Curriculum Statement Analysis

Using textbook analysis as defined by international organisations and academic institutes, the study focuses on textual analysis of curriculum statements (i.e. goals of education) and syllabi (i.e. topics for teaching) together with the contents and teaching methods within those parts of the textbooks that address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[10]

Each side's textbooks and curriculum statements have been evaluated chronologically against the following *objectives and criteria of analysis* for dealing with controversies:

- *Information*. A minimum of information about each nation and the relations between them has to be included, defined according to age level. Content selection is dependent on subject discipline. Historical research, for instance, has to include such principles as accuracy, reference to reasons and results, etc. A variety of historical narratives and points of view are required.

- *Attitudes and Values*. History and civics textbooks aim to raise national self-identity, based on human rights and irenical values, and leading learners to a sense of behavioural obligation and responsibility. Texts should convince pupils that they can improve their lives even if some problems can only be solved in the long term. Stereotypes and prejudice must be removed from such materials.

- *Intellectual, Emotional and Behavioural Skills*. A student and 'process-centred' approach is required aimed at developing problem-solving abilities and methods of conflict management as well as skills in communication and related disciplines like negotiation and mediation. The texts need to give attention to the emotional aspect of national identity and try to teach students to acknowledge and control their feelings. Pupils need to be able to participate in their environment for self-improvement in their own communities and to co-operate with other nations.[11]

These objectives lead to detailed criteria for content analysis (not replicated here).

F2.3 Comparative Summary of the Textbook Analysis

The textbook systems differ in the two nations: Palestinian schools use only textbooks that are authorised by the PNA but a part of these are still Jordanian and Egyptian ones passed by Israeli military censorship; Israeli schools can choose textbooks from an open market including those not on a list recommended by the Ministry of Education. The first and only authentic Palestinian textbooks were published from September 2000. As a result of these differing educational systems a different research sample had to be chosen.[12]

Two versions of the historical narrative are told. Differences include the following:

- Zionism in Palestinian texts is a Western plan to colonise the Arab world and, in particular, Palestine. The Israelis view Zionism as a genuine national movement for repatriation and acknowledge the national Palestinian movement;
- All clashes between Israelis and Palestinians are described differently, e.g. the 1948 war is called 'the War of Independence' in Israel but 'Al-Nakba' (the disaster or catastrophe) by Palestinians;
- The Nazis and the Holocaust are an essential part of the Israeli narrative but not mentioned at all in Palestinian textbooks. According to Adwan's interpretation the

> focus on the Holocaust may prevent Israeli pupils from recognising Palestinian suffering arising from the 1948 War and the Israeli occupation since 1967. On the other hand, in Palestinian textbooks the Jews and the Israelis are portrayed only in relation to the local conflict and the Western Zionist scheme. In Firer's view, this may prevent Palestinian pupils from gaining an insight into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prospects of resolution.

- Each side emphasises the international decisions which suit its interests, e.g. the Palestinians cite UN Resolution 194 on the right of return of refugees while the Israelis emphasise the UN Partition Resolution of 1947. Each sides stresses the fact that the other rejected the decision it favoured and both sides interpret differently those resolutions they do accept, e.g. Resolution 242 in 1967;
- Although in describing the wars the other side is always to blame, being the first to attack or cause a pre-emptive strike, the Israeli texts heighten Israel's victories while Palestinian texts recognise Arab defeats but stress victorious battles.[13]

There are three topics showing remarkable similarity:

- Textbooks of both sides ignore periods of relative calm or refer to them as interludes in a protracted conflict, e.g. 1921-29;
- Until recent Palestinian texts were written the Palestinian viewpoint was marginalized on both sides;
- Detailed descriptions of human suffering are left out of both nations' textbooks.[14]

The Oslo Accord in 1993 is viewed as a start for peace by Israeli textbook authors while Palestinian texts regarded it as an interim period that would lead to a full Palestinian state which would have peaceful relations with its neighbour, the state of Israel. New Palestinian schoolbooks avoid using the term 'State of Israel' in text or maps and Israeli texts do not use the terms 'Palestinian National Territories'. Each side uses its own religious and political terms when referring to the land without regard to the other side's terminology thereby contributing to each side's ignorance of the other's sensitivities.

New Palestinian textbooks are less loaded than previous Jordanian textbooks in their portrayal of Israelis, mainly in their role as occupiers; obviously disparaging terminology and stereotypes are avoided:

> Nevertheless colored illustrations depict the Israeli occupiers in roles harmful to the Palestinians that reinforce negative attitudes and feelings. It cannot be said, however, that these illustrations would not reflect everyday experience of the majority of the Palestinians since 1967.[15]

Only in new Israeli textbooks are Palestinians called by that name instead of 'Arabs' or 'Israeli-Arabs'. Until the mid-1980s negative stereotypes were frequent in Israeli texts but from then on became much less so. Negative descriptions still recur mainly when the text is addressing conflict including Arab/Palestinian massacres of Israelis.

The latest textbooks of both sides since 1993 show the different expectations and suspicions of the other side, reflecting the burden of history:

> Unfortunately, this mixed attitude of hope, fear and anxiety, WAS unbalanced towards the negative side, as the *Al-Aqsa intifada* of 2000 has proven.[16] [Emphasis in the original]

Aware of the difficulties posed by the Second Intifada, the authors make detailed recommendations for revising existing textbooks, curricula and syllabi so as to remove animosity reflected in narratives and stereotypes; to integrate stories of the 'other' [side]; and to emphasise the common inheritance of both nations.

F3 FORECASTING ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS

F3.1 Purpose

Whenever violence erupts or talks begin between Palestinian and Israeli leaders academics are often asked by the news media for post-hoc explanations of their causes. However, 'A more challenging test of academic prowess, of course, is whether our [academic] theories and expertise can forecast those events.'[17]

A key assumption of this research is that accurately forecasting an outcome ('outcome validity') is an insufficient measure by itself for assessing the relationship between a theory and a publicly accepted set of events. In the context of Israeli-Palestinian relations such work is evaluated not just on whether it forecasts high levels of conflict between the parties in 2002 (the authors' original article was prepared in 1999) but also on an intellectual assessment of the research model used to arrive at those forecasts. In taking this route the group of scholars involved in this project follow an academic tradition rooted in a discussion of language and logic in the expectation that they could thereby contribute to more robust theory in peace and conflict analysis.[18]

In identifying the main factors determining Israeli-Palestinian relations a purpose of the research is to understand the comparative effect of certain variables at:

- The (international) system/regional level;
- The state/(sub-state) level; and
- The decision making level.[19]

In doing this the concerns of many international relations scholars regarding the influence of agents and structures, and how separable they may be, can be addressed. (This is discussed in section F3.4 below.)

F3.2 Project Background

The project began in 1996 involving a group of academic Middle East experts (beyond those who authored the article on which this summary is based). Overall, it was designed to encapsulate the reasoning behind their forecasts about the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. That reasoning is given the form of rigorous 'if-then' rules (explained below), which provide the basis for creating a rule-based computer model. The benefits of this approach are:

1. 'Mapping' of areas of agreement and disagreement between the scholars concerning the importance of specific 'driving' forces behind the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and the identity of particular if-then links;
2. Exploration of the implications of combining different scholars' logic.
   So if some scholars argue that X leads to Y and others suggest that Y leads to Z then the previously vague or unconsidered implications of the combination of X leading to Z for the direction of the Middle East peace process may be brought to light for the purpose of debate and/or to advance knowledge.
   For example: King Hussein's death => worsening of Israeli-Jordanian relations => a less benign Israeli security environment => less likelihood of a two-state solution emerging between Israelis and Palestinians. [=> means 'leads to'];
3. Discovery of surprising ('counter-intuitive') yet logical consequences of the stated rules provokes further analysis to ascertain precisely how the basic assumptions lead to the unexpected consequences and reflections on the validity of these assumptions. This is not a common feature in other analytical techniques.[20]

F3.3 Construction of Scenarios

The project scenarios focused on five outcomes of Israeli-Palestinian relations with a time horizon of 2002:

(1) A two-state solution;
(2) A negotiated agreement, status quo (in 1998) plus territoriality (i.e. more land), and Palestinian autonomy;
(3) No negotiated settlement, status quo territory, and Palestinian independence;
(4) No negotiated settlement, territorial status quo, Palestinian autonomy; and
(5) No negotiated settlement, status quo plus territoriality, Palestinian autonomy.[21]

At one stage of the project the participant experts were divided into three groups, each of which was tasked to generate scenarios leading to those of the outcomes above that had been assigned to their group. So as to standardise the discussion each group created both the 'rules' or 'if-then' statements and then the 'state of the world assumptions' (SOW) associated with those rules. SOW are simply additional 'if' clauses that serve as wider conditions for each of the rules, e.g. Palestinian Authority action Y in response to Israeli action X might be the SOW that a Palestinian government was led by Yasser Arafat with

his views and governing style (or by a similar leader). Such a SOW would be relevant to a large body of rules. The scholars also developed a standardised terminology.[22]

The model was created by inputting these if-then rules and SOWs into a computer programme designed to track the many and complex chains of logic. To aid organisation and clarity the chains of causation in the model were identified in relation to the above outcomes. There could be more than one pathway or 'scenario' leading to each outcome.

F3.4 Learning About the Underlying Theories

Having undertaken a scenario-specific approach to forecasting it was possible to reflect on the 'driving forces' of Israeli-Palestinian relations by comparing the sets of variables driving the computer model with existing international relations theories, through a 'sensitivity analysis'. This type of analysis is a way of determining which variables had the biggest impact, according to scholars' forecasts, by changing the values of specific variables one at a time. The major driving forces underlying this expert-based model are:

- Relations between Middle Eastern states;
- Externally generated threats to Israel's existence; and
- Domestic factors such as coalition politics in Israel.[23]

This can be interpreted as giving more weight to international (systemic) and state-level variables than to decision-making variables (compare F3.1 above), which is in line with international relations theories dealing with two-level games and providing mixed support for public opinion and realist theories (that focus on one-level).

F3.5 Results

Sufficient time had not yet passed to evaluate all aspects of the specific expert forecasts but four tests were applied: two tests compared the forecast of the [Sylvan et al] model with the only other published forecasts that could be found; and the expert forecasts were compared with the circumstances surrounding the election of the Labour party in Israel in 1999 and also the consequences of King Abdullah succeeding King Hussein in Jordan. Only the results of the first two tests are summarised here, as being the most relevant.

Comparison with Two Other Published Forecasts

(i) One of the published projects that tried to develop scenarios in advance was that by Hussein Sirriyeh in 1995.[24] According to him the only possible outcome was that of a two-state solution although three scenarios to reach this goal are outlined. One of these scenarios is similar to Sylvan et al, which posits that for a two state solution to emerge a Labour-led coalition is not a sufficient condition; it 'must be headed by an Israeli prime minister with strong security credentials and with a comfortable Jewish majority in the Knesset.'[25] Sirriyeh does not take these two variables into account. Under the circumstances of the Labour coalition led by Ehud Barak the Sirriyeh and Sylvan et al models had differing forecasts, after the

withdrawal of the Shas party, because the coalition no longer had a 'comfortable Jewish majority'. Israeli newspaper reports from that time were almost all agreed that this would be insufficient to allow a two-state solution through the Knesset. This suggested that the Sylvan et al forecast was closer to the target. Another difference is that the Sylvan et al model discounts the importance of international actors whereas Sirriyeh stresses their role. Evidence to date does not appear to support the latter's claims except with respect to the US role as a mediator.

Both models agree that financial support from the international community is not a vital factor for a two-state solution (but compare this with Appendix C4.7).

(ii) The other published project is the research programme by A.F.K. Organski and Ellen Lust-Okar in 1997 and A.F.K. Organski in 2000.[26] These authors used an 'expected utility model' to try to forecast the status of Jerusalem as a result of the peace process. It is noteworthy that the models of Organski and Lust-Okar reach several similar conclusions to that of Sylvan et al:

a. A Labour-led coalition is more likely to reach an agreed settlement with the Palestinians than a Likud-led coalition;
b. Leaders' personalities are not as important as the make-up of alternative coalitions in determining the outcomes of negotiations;
c. The importance of the role of Barak, as Peres' more hawkish foreign minister (at that time), in marketing an agreement to the Israeli public.[27]

There were, though, remarkable differences between the two models:

a. Whereas Organski and Lust-Okar forecast that Netanyahu, as Israeli prime minister, would eventually agree to Jerusalem being divided into two capitals along the Green Line, in fact he always stood very firm on this issue and took provocative decisions on its development, in line with Sylvan et al's forecast.
b. Organski and Lust-Okar believe that the USA has a major impact on Israeli policymaking and hence on the outcome of negotiations so that, in the face of Netanyahu's intransigence, the USA would end up accepting a Palestinian proposal of Jerusalem under Palestinian rule. Instead, under the Sylvan et al model, the degree of US involvement is changed in such circumstances but the US was not expected to take a pro-Palestinian position. It was this latter direction that came about, after Madeleine Albright became Secretary of State, suggesting that the Sylvan et al model captures US-Israeli relations better.[28]

Yet both models proved wrong about the outcome of the Camp David summit in 2000 for each predicted a negotiated solution to the issue of Jerusalem as well as the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

a. On the Palestinian position, both models failed to appreciate Arafat's unwillingness or inability to compromise;

b. On the Israeli side, Barak's concessions on Jerusalem seemed to correspond more closely to the Sylvan et al model rather than Organski and Lust-Okar's;
c. Despite considerable US pressure to bring the two sides to an accord this did not have the desired effect, suggesting that the Sylvan et al sensitivity analysis pointing to the lack of much US policy influence may be accurate after all.[29]

F3.6 Review of the Process of Expert Forecasting

Two sets of questions were addressed by the experts involved in the Sylvan et al project: The first starts with whether there is a gap between the results of the model, representing the contributors' logic, and participants' actual assessment of the significant driving forces behind the Israeli-Palestinian relationship? The second question begins with how participants' forecasts stood up against 'real world' events? A questionnaire was constructed that confronted participants with both the implications of their own logic (as reflected in the results of the 'sensitivity analysis' above), and also several possible or obvious discrepancies between their forecast and 'real world' events.[30]

While participants generally agreed that the results of the sensitivity analysis did reflect the if-then rules they had contributed, several respondents felt that the drivers they had included were not comprehensive. However, instead of attributing this to flawed or incomplete reasoning in their if-then statements about the underlying drivers of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship they argued, looking back, that this was due to certain factors in the structure of the forecasting exercise. Several participants argued that the 'rigid' if-then rules of the exercise inhibited the inclusion of psychological and decision-making variables in a carefully calibrated manner to suit the precise context at the time. One contributor proposed that forecasts placed too much attention on Israeli, as opposed to Palestinian, variables as casual drivers but this view had to be subordinated to those of others in the group when if-then rules came to be written. Other members of this participant's group suggested that, in particular, power differences in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship led to this participant accepting this Israeli-centric perspective.[31]

When faced with discrepancies between their forecasts and what actually happened participants accepted that they had been mistaken in certain respects but showed a tendency to bolster their preconceptions and minimise the significance of contradictory evidence through the use of particular defence systems (also found in the wider research literature on this subject). For example one participant stated that, on the whole, the factors that would bring the Israeli Labour Party back to power had been correctly identified thereby glossing over, deliberately or not, several required 'ifs' that had not been empirically confirmed by the course of events. Another contributor thought that the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 was actually predicted by several 'if-then's but this necessitated a generous interpretation of those statements. Relating to the same period, another participant proposed that the peace process was still mainly on track as forecast, in view of the values certain key variables had taken on, and that the violence could just be a hiatus before a final status resolution. Finally, another participant was emphatic that a two-state solution was 'inevitable' now, in view of the collapse of the peace process – it would just happen later than expected.[32]

F3.7 Conclusion

The four tests of the Sylvan et al model (only two of which are summarised here) reveal solid results. While no set of results of such a complicated model are definitive and future developments may enhance or reduce their evaluation of the reported forecasts these tests offer assurance that it is a basis for understanding Israeli-Palestinian relations.

In reflecting back on the process, the expert group has exhibited many of the rationalisations found in other such forecasts, even though the results are more favourable than most. While not claiming to be faultless in their forecasting of Israeli-Palestinian relations the group concludes that much can be learned from both the content and the process of such an expert-forecasting project.[33]

F4 ARAB-JEWISH COEXISTENCE PROGRAMMES

In November 1999 there was a conference on coexistence education at the University of Haifa where Jewish and Arab theorists and practitioners, who have dedicated their activities towards the objective of encouraging positive Arab-Jewish coexistence within Israel, met to present their work. Deep socio-political changes have occurred in the status and relations between Israeli Arabs and Jews in the last decade and it was felt that the current models of coexistence education required examination and innovative questioning in the light of these changes. Despite the painful events of the Second Intifada in the period 2000-2003 coexistence education has continued. A recent survey disclosed that over 150,000 people are currently involved in structured coexistence activities within Israel. Much of the work to facilitate these activities is largely unknown outside Israel. So the articles in this Journal of Social Issues offer an introduction to this work for researchers and practitioners worldwide who seek to improve inter-group relations.[34]

While the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be resolved on the basis of individual-level, interpersonal processes alone changes at this level can promote the desire for societal-level changes. ‘This link makes individual-level, interpersonal coexistence educational programs vitally important to a lasting peace.’[35]

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[5] . Firer and Adwan, p. 12.
[6] . See note 5.
[7] . Firer and Adwan, p. 14 quoting from the constitution of the United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
[8] . Firer and Adwan, pp. 14-15.
[9] . Firer and Adwan, pp. 15-16.
[10] . Firer and Adwan, p. 17.
[11] . Firer and Adwan, 17-19.
[12] . Firer and Adwan, p. 151 where a summary of the Palestinian and Israeli research samples is provided.
[13] . Firer and Adwan, pp. 151-3.
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[16] . Firer and Adwan, pp. 155-6.
[17] . Sylvan et al, p. 445.
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Further reading

In addition to further references cited at the end of the chapters and appendices of this Briefing, the following title may be of interest:

Philo, Greg, and Mike Berry, Glasgow University Media Group Bad News from Israel, (Pluto Press, London, 2004)

This book examines media coverage, particularly television coverage, of the current conflict in the Middle East and the impact it has on public opinion.